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This thesis explores how informal sector gold mining affects land
development processes in the Brazilian Amazon. The 1987-1990 invasion of
the Yanomami Indian reserve, in the state of Roraima, by 40 000 wildcat
gold miners provides the context for research. Having analysed the macro-
economic and political factors that sparked the gold rush, consideration is
given to its impact on the land-uses in the state. Land-use change is
analysed by looking at how different rural producers and urban dwellers
adapted their management techniques and livelihood strategies to the
opportunities arising in the mineral sector.
Fieldwork in Roraima was undertaken over a 16 month period
between November 1990 and March 1992. Quantitative data was collected
on the rates at which different groups of land users participated in the gold
rush, while subsequent recorded interviews provided qualitative
information on their motives for involvement and how they incorporated
mining within their other activities.
A large proportion of local smallholders went gold mining in order to
supplement their agricultural incomes. Understanding the household
economics and risk aversion strategies associated with smallholder
migration to the gold fields raises interesting questions concerning the
management of the gold rush through appropriate agricultural policies.
While this provides an insight into the geography of the labour
movements associated with the gold rush, a detailed study of the
relationship between informal sector mining and ranching sheds light on the
capital flows linked to the mineral boom. As ranchers invested in the gold
fields and successful miners bought ranches, changing circumstances in
the mining economy came to influence management practices in the beef
production sector. The implications that this has on deforestation and land
conflict throughout the Brazilian Amazon are discussed.
In this way, the mining boom is seen to influence people and places
which are distant from the gold fields themselves. This is clearly apparent in
the case of Roraima's riverine dwellers and Macuxi Indians. Even though
these groups had minimal participation in the gold rush, their lives were
profoundly altered by the economic and political changes that it provoked.
This wider influence of informal sector mining is shown to be particularly
influential in shaping the formation of local elites, which in turn may play
an important role in defining the future exploitation of mineral resources.
Thus, by recognising the ways in which this and other gold rushes
affect the ownership and management of land over wide areas, the research
demonstrates that informal sector gold mining is a powerful agent of land
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GLOSSARY OF BRAZILIAN TERMS
Mining terminology
Garimpo: an informal sector mine.
Garimpeiro: anybody involved in garimpagem, the
term is used broadly to cover both those involved
in the mineral extraction process itself, as well
as pilots, cooks, merchants etc. who work in the
garimpos.
Garimpagem: informal sector mining.
Blefado: skint, penniless.
Bamburrado: struck it rich.
Barranco: Plot of land in a garimpo to mine on.
Fofoca: The word literally means 'gossip', but
signifies a rush of garimpeiros to a particular
site which rumours suggest is producing well. A
garimpo can be described as being in fofoca, when
it is at the centre of a rush, usually in the
immediate aftermath of a substantial find.
(par de) Maquinas: a set of pumping equipment, for
semi-mechanised mining.
Pista: airstrip.
Balsa: a raft upon which mining equipment is
mounted for working river-bed sediments.
Dono: 'owner'. Dono do garimpo means owner of the
mine. A dono da maquina is owner of a set of mining
equipment. Dono da pista- owner of an airstrip etc.
Draga: A large mechanised dredger.
Meia-Praga: work relationship under which the dono
do garimpo or dono da maquina engage their
workforce. In both cases the dono provides food and
employment for the workers who are paid with a
percentage of the gold production.
Conta-Pr6pria: work relationship in which the
garimpeiros organise their own catering and are
considered to be working independently, not for
somebody else.
Other terminology
Aviamento: a system of debt peonage in the
extractive economy which was most prevalent during
the Amazon rubber boom.
Barrica: a measure of Brazil nuts which weighs 72-
78 kilograms.
Caboclos: riverine dwellers who usually live off a
combination of fishing, hunting agriculture and
extractivism.






Posseiro: a squatter- somebody who lays claim to
land which does not belong to them.
Roga: plot of land devoted to food production.
Sorte: payment of management on a fazendas in which
the manager receives a proportion of the new stock
raised each year.
Tapuio: name given to the detribalised Indians who
survived Pombal's Directorate.
Terra Firme: land that is not seasonally inundated
by the rising water of rivers.
Terras devolutas: land which has no owner and
therefore belongs to the federal government.
Titulo Definitivo: The most secure land title.
Preface
This thesis explores how wildcat mining in Amazonia
affects regional land development processes. The focus on
informal sector mineral production, or garimpagem as it
is known locally, was not immediate. Indeed, I was
initially reluctant to place the subject at the centre of
my research, as some specialists had argued that studying
the recent growth of the Amazonian informal mining sector
would detract from the more fundamental issue of regional
land development. Besides, following the current
Amazonian gold rush via the considerable media coverage
that it generated, suggested that the event was already
the focus of detailed academic attention. As it
transpired the impressions gathered from both sources
were misleading. On arriving in Roraima, Brazil's
northernmost state, the dominance of informal sector
mining over all other facets of the local economy was
unmistakable. Perhaps just as importantly, nobody was
studying the impacts of a local gold rush which had
brought very considerable changes to that area during the
late 1980s. Within this context I set about investigating
the relationship between informal sector mining and other
Amazonian land-uses, seeking to dispel the myth that
garimpagem is a peripheral activity in processes of
regional development.
In chapter one the theory underpinning the adopted
methodology is discussed and here I simply outline how
the fieldwork was conducted. The basic intention was to
examine how different social groups, who practise varying
land-uses, responded to the changing socio-economic
circumstances of the gold rush. The first task therefore,
was to make contact with the range of rural producers
that I had chosen to study. This was achieved by tapping
into an extensive social network which links the state
capital Boa Vista to rural areas. Having discovered it,
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this network proved to be an invaluable mode of
communication, and was used throughout the fieldwork to
strengthen contacts, as well as to send photographs and
messages between the city and the countryside. For
example, Indians on short visits to the city frequently
stayed at a hostel on the edge of Boa Vista run by the
Indian Council of Roraima (CIR). Regular conversations
with the hostel's residents provided useful information
on the latest events in the villages, and generated
invitations to stay in certain communities. Smallholder
farmers and riverine dwellers had a similar network- which
revolved around the marketplace in the state capital Boa
Vista. Every week government transport would bring them
from all over the state to sell their produce there.
Ranchers were the only group which I aimed to study who
did not have such an accessible urban forum. It was via a
working relationship with government agencies like INCRA
and the agricultural secretariat that I came into contact
with these larger producers since many of them held
positions in these organisations.
In broad terms the research was approached on three
different tiers. At the level of the state, data on land-
use changes and alterations in the rural economy was
collected from governmental agencies as well as from
relevant statistical and cartographic sources. This
provided the necessary background against which the
particular responses of land-users could be understood.
The second level of analysis was that of the social group
itself. Here I wanted to gather quantitative data on the
extent to which each group was directly involved in the
gold rush. This in turn would prepare both myself, and
the respondents, for the third tier of analysis built
around qualitative interviews at the level of the
household. The questions at this scale explored how
garimpagem was integrated within pre-existing land-use
activities, and how land management strategies adjusted
in response to the gold rush.
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Working in rural Amazonia is however far from
straight forward, and some of these objectives proved to
be easier to fulfil than others. I present here a brief
account of the main problems that I encountered, together
with a synopsis of the data that I succeeded in
collecting.
Building up a picture of land-use change at a state
level proved to be more difficult than I had anticipated,
as relevant data was scarce. My intended comparison of
the 1985 agricultural census of Roraima with that of
1990, to gain an insight into the main trends of land-use
associated with the gold rush, was thwarted when the 1990
census was never executed. Thematic Mapper (TM) satellite
images might have provided an alternative source for some
of the information, but they were prohibitively
expensive. This is not to say that a macro-picture of
land-use change was not obtained, only that it derived
from a variety of different sources most of which were
qualitative not quantitative. Some relevant material was
available in the documentation of government agencies,
but it was through discussions with politicians,
agricultural extension workers, and land-owners that I
gathered the clearest understanding of how the local
economy was changing.
Quantitative data was obtained on the involvement of
each social group in the gold rush, and this did much to
illustrate the dynamics of change on a macro-level.
Research techniques were tailored to specific
situations; it is for example inappropriate to approach
riverine dwellers or Indians in the same way as ranchers.
The only direct questionnaire survey was applied to heads
of Macuxi villages who had gathered for a meeting to
discuss the demarcation of their lands. Filling in the
questionnaire befitted both the formality of the meeting
and their status as village heads, and they were asked to
give data on their village as a whole. In contrast,
colonist farmers were very suspicious of any official-
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looking documentation, and so data was gleaned through
conversations which covered the key points. Once the
interviewee had replied to all of the questions in the
course of this wide ranging discussion, the relevant
information was noted down against a checklist whilst
confirmation was sought from the respondent. This same
technique was used when interviewing riverine producers,
only with them the conversations tended to be longer.
Collecting quantitative data from the ranchers
proved to be difficult because they seldom reside on
their holdings. I was, however, able to persuade a .lawyer
undertaking a survey of 180 ranches on the savannah to
collect data on ranchers' participation in garimpagem.
This survey was commissioned by the Indigenous Council of
Roraima (CIR), and the relevant information was actually
collected from Indian villages next to the ranches. As
most of the villages contained members who worked on the
ranches in question, they were able to provide accurate
data on their neighbours' involvement in mining and other
activities. The only shortfall here was not having
comparative data from ranchers in the forested part of
the state, and so, while the responses are useful they
cannot be taken to be a representative sample of
Roraima's ranching population as a whole.
At the final count therefore, quantitative
information concerning individuals' participation in the
gold rush had been gathered from: 288 colonist
households, 137 ranchers, 71 riverine households, and 53
Macuxi villages. As there is no accurate record on the
numbers of people who practise these different land uses
in the state, it is hard to know what percentage of the
respective populations have been sampled. A rough
estimate extrapolated from the 1985 agricultural census
(IBGE 1990) suggests that there are approximately 6000
smallholders, 2000 ranchers, 200 Macuxi villages, and 250
riverine households, yielding the following sample
populations; colonist households 4.8%; ranchers 6.8%;
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Macuxi villages 26%; riverine households 24%. In
addition, 66 wildcat miners (garimpeiros) were
interviewed entering a rapidly expanding gold mine on the
Rio Jatapu in 1991.
Micro-economic analyses are used occasionally to
illustrate the behaviour of certain people or groups. All
data on prices and monetary values are expressed in US
dollars in order to facilitate comparisons. Conversions
from Cruzeiros into US$ were made at the parallel rate
of exchange. Verbal data on local incomes or prices
during the filedwork period were converted according to
the rates published in the national press on the day
concerned, which is how transactions of this kind are
usually calculated in Boa Vista. Sums gathered from dated
published material, such as newspapers or government
documents, were converted according to a chart produced
by the Bank of Brazil. This then provides a crude
standard, in a highly inflationary economy, against which
transactions made at different times within the state can
be compared. However, due to its distance from the main
economic centres, the cost of living in Roraima tends to
be considerably higher than in other parts of both
Amazonia and Brazil. Furthermore, one of the most notable
effects of the gold rush was to push up the prices of
this already inflated local economy even further. Thus,
it is problematic to compare the economic data presented
in this volume with similar information gathered
elsewhere. The principal exception concerns the data on
gold miners' incomes which is expressed in quantities of
gold. The price of gold has fallen from US$ 18.3/g in
1987 to US$ 12 in 1991 and so all conversions of gold
during the study period are calculated at the rate of
US$1 = 15 grams. All measures of weight and distance
referred to are metric unless otherwise stated.
The quantitative surveys drew out the main points
for further discussion, and helped identify key
respondents for more detailed interviewing. Individuals
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who had experience of a specific area of interest were
usually selected for these longer conversations. They
were asked to recount their life-histories, and specific
situations mentioned within this context were discussed
to illustrate their behaviour at certain times. 20 hours
of discussions were recorded with 34 respondents from the
various groups, and the tapes were subsequently
transcribed. In many cases these interviews are the
product of relationships which took months to build up
and the interviews were frequently steered around points
that were familiar to both of us. As a result they form
some of the most valuable fieldwork data on how
individuals respond to the changes going on around them
and I make no apologies for drawing freely upon them in
the course of this thesis.
Fieldwork was conducted over a sixteen month period
from November 1990 to March 1992. Much of this time was
spent making visits to colonisation projects, ranches,
Indian villages, and garimpos (informal sector mines).
For the most part these trips were about two weeks long,
and only two out of a total of fourteen visits exceeded a
month in duration. I often returned to certain
communities two or three times, and maintained contact
during the interval through the rural-urban network
described above. I soon learnt that while friendships
were formed by spending time in certain communities, they
were strengthened in a new way by returning even months
later. Coming back to a place symbolised an altogether
different type of commitment. Thus, structuring the
fieldwork in this way permitted the collection of data in
some depth from a number of different social groups.
The whole experience of being immersed in the field
of study for a prolonged period fosters an understanding
which can not be easily labelled. Through listening to
the local radio, reading the newspapers, and talking to
people in the queue at the bank, I was continually
absorbing information about the people and the region.
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Much of the data gathered about the dynamics of the gold
rush itself came from talking to garimpeiros over a drink
in Boa Vista. There is a whole social geography of the
bars they frequent and it is only the most influential
mine owners and mineral dealers who are absent from this
street life. Manual gold miners would always be.
encountered in the wooden stalls around the market place
during the early evening. Alternatively, garimpo pilots
usually passed their time in a series of snack-stands
around the airport. Other centrally-located bars along
the river attracted a clientele of wealthier miners and
petty mineral dealers, who were themselves in regular
contact with colleagues throughout the garimpos of
Amazonia.
The thesis is structured in three main parts. The
first section provides relevant background and historical
information. Here, a brief overview of the fieldwork has
been presented to illustrate how data was collected. The
first chapter outlines the research objectives and the
reasons for selecting Roraima as a fieldwork site, before
introducing the social and geographical context of the
study. Chapter 2 then looks at the history of mining in
Roraima, focusing specifically on the 1987-1990 gold rush
on the lands of the Yanomami Indians.
The second section of the thesis considers the
impacts that this mining boom has on other Amazonian
land-uses. Chapter 3 deals with its influence on
smallholder agriculture offering insight into the
movements of labour attributable to the garimpo. In
chapter 4 the focus turns to capital flows, and the
relationship between the gold rush and ranching is
assessed in this light. The following chapter (5) looks
at the response of Indian and riverine peoples to the
opportunities provided by the garimpo illustrating that
although many of them did not participate directly in the
gold rush it nonetheless affected their livelihoods.
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The third and final section of the thesis considers
this largely empirical data in its wider context. Chapter
6 assesses the political changes precipitated by the
growth in the Amazonian garimpo over the 1980s. By
gaining an insight into the forces that shaped the turn
of events both in Roraima and elsewhere the structures
which determine the allocation of Amazonian mineral
resources are exposed. The penultimate chapter (7)
distils the principal research findings into a framework
which illustrates the various impacts of the garimpo on
Amazonian land development processes. It is here that
some of the theoretical and practical difficulties of
undertaking such research are discussed. Finally, a brief
look at the metal markets in chapter 8 suggests that
informal sector mining will continue to influence land
development processes throughout the humid tropics over
the forseeable future.
Chapter 1. Introduction
During the 1980s wildcat mining has been one of
the most significant catalysts for development in
Amazonia (Pereira 1990), 'no other factor has produced
as large a migration of people to the Brazilian Amazon
in so short a time as gold-fever' (IDB/UNDP/TCA 1992:
38) . Its significance in shaping regional land-use
changes has grown relative to public sector investment
in ranching, road building, and colonisation which have
underpinned Amazonian development since the 1960s. A
sharp rise in the price of gold in the late 1970s
sparked a mineral boom in the Brazilian Amazon which
outstrips the American Klondike rush both in terms of
production and employment (Cleary 1990). However, the
exact scale of the gold rush can only be guessed at,
and there is considerable divergence between the
relevant data provided by the government mining
department (DNPM) and the Union of Amazonian
Garimpeiros (USAGAL). Somewhere between one million
(Feijao & Pinto 1990) and 240 000 (DNPM 1990) people
are directly employed in garimpagem in the Brazilian
Amazon and the true figure may well be around the 400
000 mark 1. But these estimates only tell part of the
story, because for every person working directly in the
mines, there are at least as many again who depend on
the mining economy indirectly. This has led one
authoritative source to suggest that 30% of Brazil's
Amazonian population are either directly or indirectly
1 A survey of garimpos carried out by DNPM in 1990 registered 400 000 garimpeiros working
throughout Brazil, of which 240 000 reside in Amazonia, but this is probably conservative.During
an interview in September 1991 Antonio Feijao suggested that there are between 400-500 000
garimpeiros working in Amazonia Legal. He conceded that USAGAL's official estimate of
1,000,000 is a 'political figure', which is high .
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engaged in the activity (IDB/UNDP/TCA 1992: 37).
Production data is equally elusive. USAGAL believes
that 100 metric tons of gold are produced annually in
the garimpos of Amazonia Legal, but other sources
(Dourojeanni & Padua 1992) have suggested it could be
three times this figure. Be that as it may, one
indisputable point emerges from these hazy estimates;
garimpagem is currently one of the principal earners
and employers in contemporary Amazonia.
Notwithstanding this considerable influence,
informal sector mining has attracted only limited
academic attention. There are only two principal texts
on the subject; Cleary's doctoral thesis (1990)
provides a pioneering ethnography of life in the
garimpos focusing on the complex social and economic
relations within them; Pereira's masters thesis (1990)
subsequently analysed the macro-economic processes that
influence garimpagem, and argued that a 'mineral
frontier' has characterised the occupation of the
Brazilian Amazon during the 1980s. Although more recent
work recognises the significance of the garimpo in
shaping regional development processes (Schmink and
Wood 1992, Abers 1992), the exact nature and extent of
this relationship still remains poorly understood. The
research presented here seeks to address this knowledge
gap.
Recent events in Roraima offered an excellent
opportunity to investigate this topic. As figure 1.1
illustrates, Roraima is one of ten major gold producing
regions throughout the Brazilian Amazon. In common with
most of these other sites, it has a long history of
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The discovery of significant gold and cassiterite (tin
ore) deposits on the Yanomami indigenous reserve
brought the cutting edge of the Amazonian mineral boom
to this remote area in 1986. By the end of the decade
Roraima was producing an estimated 10% of all gold
extracted in the Brazilian Amazon (Feijao & Pinto
1990), fuelling a rapid expansion of the local economy.
Large numbers of people and considerable amounts of
capital flooded into the state from all over Brazil,
but the prosperity was unexpectedly short-lived.
Government intervention seeking to prohibit access- to
the Yanomami homelands on which the clandestine placer
mines were situated, inflicted a sharp contraction of
the local economy in 1990. The net result was a brief
but very intense gold rush, which had a clearly defined
impact on the social and physical landscape of Roraima.
The objective here is to assess how the people and
land-uses of Roraima were shaped by this rush as it
swept across the region 2. The crux of such a study
lies in understanding how a wide range of different
social groups reacted to the rapid socio-economic
changes precipitated by the mineral boom. This
perspective not only affords a privileged insight into
the relationship between garimpagem and other land-
uses, but it also sheds light on a wider debate of
global significance;
'One of the key potential contributions from
social science to the conservation and
development fields is in the analysis of local
responses (by specific social groups in
2 Hecht & Cockburn (1989: 205) favour this approach arguing that
it is important to study 'the economic forces that have swept over
the region and shaped its people and land uses'
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particular ecosystems) to macro-level economic
and political changes' (Schmink 1991: 2).
But, rather than fulfilling a trait in
contemporary Amazonian research of examining
individual social groups in isolation of one another,
this work considers the interactions between several
groups in a particular place, Roraima. The bulk of
what follows therefore is essentially a regional
geography, designed to highlight the complex
interrelationships between people and the land which
characterise modern Amazonia. This local information
is then placed into its broader context by referring
to events in other Amazonian states (notably Para,
Rondonia, and Mato Grosso) which have been documented
in depth. In this way, wider-reaching development
processes can be identified without divorcing them
from the heterogeneous landscape in which they
operate.
The first step in this analysis is to identify
the dominant Amazonian land-uses, and recognise who
practises them. Currently, sizeable parts of the
Amazon basin are not managed. But in the areas that
have been altered by human activity most of the land
is subject to three principal management practices.
These can be broadly categorised as Indian and folk
land-uses, ranching and smallholder agriculture.
Although no precise data is available, other land-uses
such as mining, urban areas and hydro-electric
reservoirs affect a much smaller land area 3. Timber
extraction is an increasingly important activity, and
in certain areas like Para, and Rondonia which are
3 Fearnside (1991a) p. 16 provides some relevant information on areas deforested by hydro-electric
projects, but similar data for urban areas and mineral developments is unavailable. Altogether
these land-uses probably do not affect more than 2% of the Amazon land surface.
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particularly rich in valuable hardwoods (most notably
mahogany; Swietenia spp. Meliaceae), logging has been
identified as a catalyst for development (Uhl et al.
1991) . Nevertheless, in most parts of Amazonia,
including Roraima, sawn timber remains a secondary
product resulting from forest clearance for ranching
and agricultural use, and for this reason logging will
not be given separate consideration in this study.
As it is people who are the agents of change, our
attention will focus less on the land-uses themselves
than on the individuals who practise them. In this
respect rural producers take centre stage but not to
the extent that their urban counterparts are ignored.
Large numbers of people move between these two sectors
of the Amazonian economy, and developments in one
sphere cannot be studied without frequent reference to
the other. The remainder of this chapter introduces the
land-users who practise the principal Amazonian
management strategies outlined above. Recognising the
position of individuals in relation to environmental
constraints and economic pressures is of primary
importance to subsequent analysis. With this in mind,
the historical development of each activity in Roraima,
as well as the origins of the social groups who
practise them are traced. This not only illustrates the
degree to which Roraima's producers are either similar
to or different from other Amazonians, but it also
provides an understanding of the particular context
against which the gold rush took-off.
1.1(a) Indigenous land-use practices.
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Indigenous peoples are the only original Amazonian
land-users, and their management techniques have
evolved in relation to their local environment over a
longer period than any other group. As a result,
indigenous land-use strategies are so well adapted to
local ecosystems that their impact is often
indistinguishable from the legacy of nature herself.
The full extent of Indian management is therefore
poorly understood, and its influence on the
distribution of certain tree species and soil types is
only recently becoming apparent (Posey & Balee 19B9).
Balee (1989) estimates that anthropogenic forests of
palm, bamboo, Brazil nut, and liana, together with
forest islands, and caatinga vegetation comprise at
least 11.8% of the legally defined Amazon (Amazonia
Legal). The extent to which native strategies alter the
environment are further illustrated by the Kayapo
Indians of Para whose management techniques improve
soil fertility, and enhance the expansion of the forest
into areas of savannah (known as cerrado) (Anderson &
Posey 1989) 4 . The important point made by these and
other studies (Irvine 1989, Smole 1989) is that
indigenous peoples have developed extremely
sophisticated management techniques, enabling them to
support considerable populations on nutrient-poor soils
over thousands of years (Roosevelt 1992) . It has been
argued that these practices actually enhance, not
degrade, the fertility and biological diversity of
ecosystems.
The land-uses employed by indigenous peoples are
as diverse as the region's natural resources but, even
4 Although these findings are controversial; see Parker (1990)
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so, a number of common elements may be identified among
them 5. Essentially they combine a variety of different
activities such as fishing, swidden agriculture,
hunting, and vegetable extraction within an overall
management strategy. The importance of each activity
alters in accordance with seasonal and spatial
variations in resource availability which may also
determine migratory patterns (Moran 1989). Furthermore,
the social organisation and cosmological beliefs of
native peoples have been shown to be closely related to
their management strategies and frequently regulate
patterns of resource exploitation (Ribeiro & Kenhiri
1989) .
The area of Amazonia managed by Indians is
*
decreasing rapidly in spite of the aptitude of their
management techniques. This trend dates from the
discovery of Amazonia by Europeans in 1492 and
continues to the present day. It is the result of a
sharp contraction in the size of native populations due
to the introduction of old world diseases, coupled with
an often violent expropriation of their lands by
European settlers. The number of Indians in the Amazon
basin has fallen from over seven million in 1492 to a
current population of between 1-2.5 million
(IDB/UNDP/TCA 1992: 27). In the Brazilian Amazon alone,
there are 213,300 Indians who represent less than 2% of
the total population (17 million), and indigenous
reserves currently encompass only 1.6 % of the five
million square kilometres of Amazonia Legal (ibid).
Many of the surviving indigenous groups in Amazonia
live in upland areas (terra-firme), and are either
5 Clay (1988) and Eden (1990) both provide overviews of indigenous management practices
throughout the Amazon basin.
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communities that have traditionally inhabited those
areas, or have migrated there in the colonial period
from more fertile flood plains to avoid contact with
European settlers.
The history of Roraima's Indian populations is
illustrative. Throughout the eighteenth century slave
traders raided the numerous Arauak and Carib-speaking
tribes who inhabited the cerrado. Carmelite
missionaries from Airao (then called Santo Elias dos
Tarumas) and Manaus (then called Fort Barra),
considered Roraima's grassland tribes to be 'easily
tamed' and for this reason they sent numerous slaving
expeditions up the Rio Branco. Roraima's Indians
represented a particularly important source of labour
to them during the first half of the eighteenth century
as their access to other groups in the headwaters of
the Rio Negro was blocked at that time by the
aggressive Manao tribe who lived at the current site of
Barcellos 6. The Amerindian slave trade was outlawed in
1750 but reforms pioneered under the Marquis of
Pombal's Directorate Programme (1757-1799) proved no
less damaging to the native population. Instead of
control by missionary groups these settlements were
placed under the management of village overseers who
frequently exploited their authority to the detriment
of the Indians. This led to uprisings which were put
down with brutal measures including deportation. In the
early 1790s three of the six villages of the Rio Branco
were fully transferred to other Directorate settlements
hundreds of kilometres distant on the Solimoes,
Madeira, and Amazon rivers. A few years later a further
6 Most of this data comes from Hemming 1990a, p 301-302. Farage (1991) provides a more
detailed and exhaustive account of the early occupation of Roraima.
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rebellion occurred as the Carib-speaking Paravilhana
and the Arauak-speaking Wapixana confronted the
director of their village. The Portuguese responded
with a punitive expedition which slaughtered numerous
Indians on the shores of the Rio Branco at a site that
became known as the bloody beach (Praia de Sangue).
This was the final event in a series of violent
incidents that left Roraima virtually depopulated by
the start of the nineteenth century.
The state's contemporary Indian population
therefore differs greatly from that which existed in
the seventeenth century. The Carib-speaking Paravilhana
and Sapara tribes which inhabited the cerrado at that
time no longer exist today. However, the population of
the cerrado tribes that did survive initial contact has
grown in more recent years. The Macuxi and Wapixana
have tripled in size since 1950, principally as a
result of healthcare provided by Catholic and
Protestant missionaries, but probably also due to their
increased resistance to disease. The Carib-speaking
Macuxi are now the most numerous group in Roraima with
12 000 members, while their traditional adversaries the
Wapixana (Arauak) have a total population of about
5000. Two smaller Carib-speaking groups also reside on
the cerrado; the Taurepang and Ingariko number 550 and
500 people respectively (Hemming 1990b) (see fig 1.3
for a map of the current indigenous reserves).
As these cerrado groups have had such a long
history of contact with colonial society, most of their
members now speak Portuguese. The Wapixana and Macuxi
are integrated within the local economy and large
numbers of them currently reside in Boa Vista (Ferri
1990). Those who remain on the cerrado typically
maintain a subsistence livelihood by fishing, hunting,
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Fig 1. 2 Roraima - principal vegetation types
100 km
Source: FIBRE / Gov. do. Ter. Fed. de Roraima (1981) P.19
11
and practising swidden agriculture, which is dominated
by the production of manioc (Manihot esculents). Many
of them, particularly young men, choose to supplement
this income by engaging in waged employment on the
surrounding ranches or in the local diamond garimpos.
The Macuxi are therefore active participants in a
distinct cerrado economy, which receives greater
attention at a later stage in this chapter.
The marked geographical division between the
northern savannah plains and the remaining forested
area (see fig 1.2) has strongly influenced the human
occupation of Roraima during the colonial period. Many
of the indigenous groups, who either lived on or fled
to the upland (terra-firme) forested areas and the
dense montane forests, were less affected by the
activities of eighteenth century missionaries which
tended to be restricted to the flood-plains and the
cerrado. There are currently three Indian groups in the
forest; the Carib-speaking Wai-Wai (population of 170)
who straddle the Guyanese border, the Waimiri-Atroari
(332) who are two culturally distinct tribes that now
share the same Indian reserve on the boundary with
Amazonas state; and the Maiangong who live along the
Uraricoera basin in the Northwest corner of the state.
Yanomama is the only other indigenous language of
Roraima, which is spoken by the Sanuma, Yanomam
(Waika), Ninam or Yanam (Xiriana, Xirixana, and Jawari)
peoples (Migliazza 1978). Even though there are
cultural and linguistic variations between these
groups, they are collectively referred to as the
Yanomami. They inhabit the watershed which separates
the Orinoco in Venezuela from various tributaries of
the Rio Negro and Rio Branco in Brazil. FUNAI et al.
(1991) estimate that there are 9000 out of a total
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population of 20 000 Yanomami living on the Brazilian
side of the national border in both Roraima (7000) and
Amazonas (2000) . Because of their isolation, the
Yanomami have had very little interaction with non-
indigenous people until a new phase of Amazonian land
development dating from the 1960s brought them, and
other forest dwelling groups, into contact with the
rest of Brazilian society. This, in conjunction with
the gold rush under study, should be interpreted as one
further step in a process of contact between Amerindian
and Old World societies which now has a five hundred
year history.
1.1(b) Folk strategies; caboclos.
Contact with the Indians in Amazonia also gave
rise to a distinct folk culture which was born from the
collapse of Pombal's Directorate at the end of the
eighteenth century 7. By settling indigenous peoples in
villages, the Directorate effectively created a new
detribalised Indian known as the tapuio (Ayres 1992
P. 83) . In the aftermath of the program these
disenfranchised survivors of the Indian tribes, many of
whom were of mixed blood, dispersed along riverine
areas to live in fragmented settlements. Although their
livelihood was predominantly subsistence, they also
extracted various forest products and traded them along
an extensive network of riverine commerce. They were
the first generation of caboclos, the Amazonian
backwoodsmen, distinguished from their truly Indian
relatives by mixed blood descendancy, limited
commercial activity and dispersed settlement pattern.
Caboclos came to inhabit the same flood-plains from
7 This historical analysis of Caboclos is taken from Ayres 1992, and Parker 1989.
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which their ancestors had been displaced by the
Portuguese. In general terms therefore, they have
adopted land-use practices appropriate to the riverine
ecosystem, while the remaining Indian groups have
confined themselves largely to managing inaccessible
areas of terra-firme.
The Amazonian riverine economy was transformed by
the rubber boom of the nineteenth century. Initially,
this brought a marked population increase to rural
Amazonia as thousands of Northeasterners were drafted
into remote parts of the Amazon to extract rubber.-The
majority of them left the region following the collapse
of the wild rubber market in 1916, but a large number
stayed on and became incorporated within the local
caboclo population through miscegeny. The rubber boom
also altered the economic basis of the riverine
extractive economy as a new work-relation emerged
linking the caboclo extractor through debt to river
traders. Typically, a trader advanced the necessary
food and equipment to the caboclo for the extraction of
certain forest products. In order to service this debt
the caboclo was obliged to sell the extracted produce
to the same trader, who usually set such unfavourable
prices that the caboclo was prevented from repaying the
original credit. More goods would be advanced on credit
for the following season's work and in this way the
trader maintained control over the caboclo 's labour
through debt peonage.
Vestiges of this work-relation (known as
aviamento) still exist in parts of rural Amazonia, but
it is seldom as powerful as it once was. Its influence
currently appears to be waning along the lower reaches
of the Rio Branco and its tributaries. Here, many of
the caboclos are indebted to their traders, but
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declining prices of the principal extracted products
make the latter increasingly reluctant to advance
further credit. Rubber, which is artificially supported
by a government subsidy, does not feature in their
account books because the tree from which it is
extracted (Hevea brasiliensis) is rare in Roraima 8.
Instead, sorva (the latex of Couma guianensis) and
Brazil nuts (Bertholletia excelsa Humb.) are
historically the two most important extracted vegetable
products in the state, although small amounts of lianas
and copaiba oil are also traded. Other sources of
income derive from the production of manioc flour, as
well as the sale of salted fish (notably Pirarucu and
Tucunare) and river turtles (Podocnemis expansa,
P.unifilis, and Peltocephalus dumerilianus) . As the
majority of these products are marketed by river
traders in Manaus, the caboclo economy has
traditionally gravitated more towards the state of
Amazonas than that of Roraima.
The impacts of the gold rush on Indian and folk
management practices in Roraima will be examined in
chapter 5. The response of the Macuxi to the new
opportunities afforded by the rapidly expanding gold
economy will be compared to that of Roraima's caboclos.
Clearly, the land-uses practised by these two social
groups are completely different, as one manages a
riverine environment in the forest, while the other
manages a savannah plain on terra-firme soil. But the
significant point is that broad similarities exist in
the strategies on which these different management
practices are based. In essence, they combine a variety
8 Although a related species, Hevea benthamiana, does grow in the locality, it is less productive
and its latex is not as highly prized (Barros in press).
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of activities for subsistence production which is
supplemented by a modest cash income derived from
production for, and employment in the market economy.
It is interesting to look closely at how such
strategies are formulated and practised in relation to
other activities because they are frequently at the
root of land-use practices that exploit the natural
ecosystem without destroying it.
1.2 Ranchers.
Amazonian beef producers can be categorised as
either traditional rural oligarchies, urban
entrepreneurs, capitalised colonist farmers, or
corporate entities. The origins of the first group date
from the seventeenth century and their domain extends
across the most accessible terra-firme savannahs of
Amapa and Roraima, as well as the inundated grasslands
of the Ilha de Mara jo and the lower Araguaia. This
first wave of ranching was therefore restricted to
areas of cerrado which covers approximately 30% of
Amazonia Legal (Eden 1990). The other categories of
ranchers are more recent arrivals, having entered the
region from the late 1960s when government road-
building programmes and fiscal incentives attracted
investments in the Amazonian ranching economy. For the
most part they established ranches on the forested
areas of terra firme and planted artificial pasture for
beef production. These more capitalised enterprises
expanded rapidly in eastern Para during the 1970s and
in Rondonia during the following decade. Their growth
was closely related to the development of speculative
land markets along new highways.
This recent expansion of ranching into the forest
is a very rapid process. Throughout the 1970s and
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1980s, ranching has been the principal cause of
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. From 1966-75
beef ranching was responsible for 38% of forest loss in
Amazonia Legal. Colonist agriculture caused 31% of the
deforestation in the same period, road building 27% and
forestry 4% (IBDF figures cited by Hall 1991 :145) .
Livestock production therefore generates a number of
adverse environmental impacts. These include the loss
of biodiversity, the release of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and soil
degradation. It is therefore not surprising that" the
conversion of forest to pasture has been identified as
the most ecologically destructive of all the principal
Amazonian land-use types (Goodland 1980).
Ranching may also have detrimental social
repercussions as it provokes land conflict in certain
parts of Amazonia. This has largely been restricted to
an arc across the southern and eastern Amazon where
pastures occupy large areas of Maranhao, Para, Goias,
Mato Grosso, Rondonia, and Acre. In the Eastern Amazon
one cow hand is usually employed for every 250-850
hectares of ranch land (Hecht 1982), whereas the same
land under agriculture would typically support one
colonist household for every fifty to one hundred
hectares. Thus, the expansion of ranching tends to
cause conflict if a peasantry is evicted from their
holdings in areas where access to land is already
impeded. This is exactly what happened in Southern Para
during the 1970s and 1980s; squatters (posseiros) were
removed from the land by the expansion of corporate
ranching in the area and denied access to alternative
holdings .by the local elite's tight control over the
Brazil nut forests known as the 'Poligino das
Castanhais' (Hine 1991).
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Roraima's first ranches were established by the
Portuguese army on the cerrado in 1780 and, in the
course of the following century, beef production came
to replace extractivism as the principal non-indigenous
land-use in the state. Thus, the earliest Portuguese
settlements such as Fort Sao Joaquim (1776), were
sustained by the beef economy and, to this day,
ranching remains an important vehicle for regional
occupation. In spite of the cerrado's acidic nutrient-
poor soils and highly seasonal rainfall, it is very
attractive to ranchers. For not only does it represent
440 000 square kilometres (19% of Roraima's land
surface) of free grazing, but, perhaps just as
importantly, it is inhabited by an attentive indigenous
labour force. An extensive ranching system has evolved
to exploit this situation profitably, requiring
minimum investments in either capital or labour. A
local phrase candidly expresses the benefits which
accrue to the land owners under these circumstances;
'in Roraima the rancher does not create the beef herd,
it is the herd that creates the rancher'.
Extensive beef production therefore lies at the
heart of the cerrado economy, but ranching is itself
often practised in conjunction with informal sector
diamond mining. Since 1912 diamonds have been extracted
together with small quantities of gold from the
alluvial deposits of the principal cerrado rivers; the
Mau, Cotingo, Saupi and Quino (see fig 5.2 for a map of
this area). A handful of politically-influential
extended families have historically dominated both
activities 9 and the Macuxi Indians have provided them
9 The most prominent being the Alves-Reis, Cruz, Brasil, MagalhSes, and Mota families. The
changing fortunes of this landed oligarchy are examined in chapter 6.
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with the necessary labour to do so. As a result, the
proceeds of diamond mining have often been invested in
ranching, facilitating the expansion of the ranches
across the traditional homelands of the Macuxi. Complex
interactions have evolved between ranching, mining and
indigenous land-uses on the cerrado, which are
regulated by a peculiar set of social and economic
relations between the ranching-cum-mining elite and the
Indian population.
Managerial skills are contracted through a system
called sorte (literally meaning luck), under which-the
rancher pays the overseer a set percentage of annual
livestock production. This is typically one quarter of
new born calves, although on some ranches the ratio
falls to one fifth 10. On large ranches, this may amount
to a substantial revenue, but from this income the
manager is obliged to employ local cow hands, who are
usually Macuxi, to undertake daily tasks 11. In
contrast, this labour is usually contracted on non¬
monetary fixed wages, receiving for example a pair of
reproductive cows or a horse for each year of service.
A manager often works for a rancher until they have
gained a sufficiently large herd from the sorte system
to establish their own independent ranch nearby. By
constantly spawning new ranches in this way, the sorte
system was instrumental in expropriating cerrado land
from its native inhabitants.
Ranching in the southern part of the state has a
very different history. The recent expansion of the
activity into this forested area follows a pattern that
10 The sorte system originated in the Northeast of Brazil. Its application in Roraima is described
in greater detail by Riviere (1972), and Kelsey (1972).
stuuy of 178 Fazendas w.i the cerrado in 1991 revealed that Macuxi labour accounted for
58% of the total non - familial workforce (CIDR 1992).
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is common to Amazonia as a whole and stems from highway
developments in the 1970s under the Programme of
National Integration (PIN). It is important to
understand the motives behind the construction of these
roads because they totally transformed the geography
and structure of the local economy. The expansion of
the highway network embodies a geopolitic which sought
to occupy remote parts of Brazil and integrate them
within the national economy. A comprehensive survey of
the Amazon's natural resources called Projeto
RadamBrasil, preceded a massive programme of road
building in the region. Having recognised the
considerable economic potential of Amazonia's natural
resources, the military government was concerned that
other countries might lay claim to the region, unless
Brazil herself developed it. Roraima merited particular
attention because the RadamBrasil survey had identified
it as a mineral rich state (DNPM 1975). The study noted
the presence of radioactive materials and strategically
important minerals such as columbite, tantalite,
molybdenum, and ilmenite. Thus, the authorities felt
the need to assert Brazilian sovereignty over this
remote area in case either Venezuela or Guyana started
encroaching upon their neighbour's geological wealth.
To fulfil such objectives, the BR 174 highway was
constructed between Manaus and Boa Vista and, shortly
after its completion in 1977, work began on the
ambitious Northern Perimeter Highway - the BR 210. Both
roads were driven into the heavily forested terra-firme
areas which were the ultimate refuge of Roraima's
Indian societies, bringing disastrous consequences to
those populations. Attempts by the Waimiri-Atroari to
prevent the BR 174 crossing their lands in the early
1970s were countered by military intervention which has
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been held primarily responsible for a dramatic decline
in the tribes' population. Having boasted over 1000
individuals in the late 1960s, the Waimiri-Atroari
numbered only 332 in 1983 (Baines 1991: 75) 12. The BR
210 (Perimitral Norte) cut into the lands of the
Yanomami in the West and the Wai-Wai in the East, and
although neither group suffered the violence inflicted
upon the Waimiri-Atroari, they both experienced the
introduction of old world diseases to which they had no
natural resistance. The painful irony is that this
disruption was caused by a 'road to nowhere',- as
financial constraints prevented the Perimitral Norte
from running its intended course across the northern
Brazilian Amazon from the Atlantic coast to the
Colombian border. Its truncated arms do not currently
extend beyond Roraima to either Para in the East or
Amazonas in the West.
In 1974, a governmental directive called
POLAMAZONIA ('Amazonian ranching and agro-mineral
poles') directly linked the expansion of the ranching
frontier to the new road developments. Just over half
of Roraima was identified as an economic growth pole
under this programme, and funds were allocated to
stimulate its expansion through the Amazonian
development agency SUDAM. Although the programme
outlined four principal objectives - to support the
construction of the BR 174 and its associated
colonisation projects; to develop the ranching sector;
to research mineral resources; and to expand trade with
Guyana; - only the first of these has been achieved
with any degree of success. Twenty years after the
12 Also see Carvalho for a detailed account of these events, and history of the Waimiri-Atroari's
contact.
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formulation of POLAMAZONIA, Roraima's ranching sector
remains largely decapitalised, mineral resources are
poorly mapped and trade with Guyana is minimal (though
perhaps likely to expand now that a road between Boa
Vista and Georgetown has been completed in 1992).
The government was clearly unsuccessful in
attracting capital into the state's ranching economy.
Only six of Roraima's largest ranches received SUDAM
grants and most of these were already in existence
prior to the POLAMAZONIA initiative. Corporate finance
was more easily drawn to the south and eastern Amazon
where better communications linked the ranching economy
to the principal markets. This trend was not reversed
by an INCRA directive in 1977 which established a 600
000 hectare ranching district to the North of the
western branch of the BR 210 in the municipality of
Mucajai (see fig 1.3). Although 247 plots (each of
about 3000 hectares) were delimited, only 34 names were
registered as recipients, and of these, only two
individuals proceeded to develop modest ranching
enterprises. As it turned out its inability to attract
larger capital preempted a potential land conflict,
because an 8000 hectare section of this ranching
district overlapped with the intended Yanomami Reserve
(Silveira & Gatti 1988). Instead, many ranchers were
attracted to more accessible land available in the
margins of the newly constructed BR 174 and BR 210
highways. In this way, numerous smaller ranching
enterprises were established on amalgamated holdings
which were originally intended for agricultural
development. Be that as it may, the salient point here
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Fig 1.3 Roraima - Roads Principal Colonisation Projects and Indian Reserves
Essa Current Colonisation Areas
*//! Indian Reserves
• Settlements ft Iq
so 100 km
Source: adapted from Silveira and Gam (1988) PJ1
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is that the post-1970 ranching economy in Roraima was
never highly capitalised, nor was it underpinned by the
intensely speculative land market which emerged in the
southern Amazon.
1.3 Smallholder agriculture.
In 1980 agricultural crops covered 49 851 hectares
or 5.9% of Amazonia Legal, of which annuals accounted
for 5% and perennials the remaining 0.9% (IBGE 1983).
Agriculture, like ranching, has been supported by
government initiatives since the 1970s, and these - two
land-uses together with mining and timber extraction
form the basis for the occupation and economic
development of the region. After ranching, agriculture
is the second principal cause of forest destruction in
Amazonia. However, it is important to recognise that,
unlike cattle raising, agriculture does provide a
livelihood for hundreds of thousands of people in the
region. So the environmental costs of the activity are
to some extent offset by the social benefits that
derive from it.
Distributing Amazonian land to landless farmers is
an effective mechanism for defusing rural social
tensions in other Brazilian states. In the 1970s such
pressures were most intense in the Northeast and
Centre-South of Brazil 13, and migrants flooded into the
Amazon from these areas to acquire land in the
government's recently established colonisation
programmes. Settlement projects now exist along the
highways in all of the Amazonian states, the largest
Throughout this volume the Northeast' refers to the states of MaranhSo, Piauf, Ceara,
Pemambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Parafba, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia. The 'Centre south' refers
to Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina, S3o Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul,
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numbers of farmers residing along the BR 364 in
Ronddnia, and the Transamazonian Highway in Para.
Migrant families are typically allocated 50-100 hectare
plots of forested land on terra-firme soils. These
plots are connected to the highways by dirt 'feeder'
roads. Migrants usually input minimal amounts of
capital and grow rice, maize, manioc and a small
quantity of beans, among a wide variety of other
cultivars such as bananas, black pepper, coffee, and
sugar cane.
In Roraima, a small number of colonisation
projects established by the state government
agricultural secretariat in the 1940s and 1950s predate
the more recent expansion of agriculture along the BR
174 and BR 210 (fig.1.3). The first three colonisation
projects of Fernando Costa (at the current site of
Mucajai established in 1944), Braz de Aguiar (at
Confianga est. 1952) and Coronel Mota (at Taiano est.
1955) were founded on the forest/savannah border in the
hinterland of Boa Vista. Here a total of 270 immigrant
families were settled on 25 hectare plots of the most
readily accessible fertile soils. Notwithstanding these
favourable edaphic conditions and the proven
agricultural experience of the colonists, poor
communications and inadequate health facilities led to
a gradual abandonment of virtually all plots by the mid
1960s (Silveira and Gatti 1988) . Despite the failures
encountered in these early projects, many of the same
problems continue to plague more recent colonisation
programmes in the state. This reflects a pattern
observed not only in the Amazon, but throughout many
other parts of the humid tropics as well.
In 1975 the federal government land agency INCRA
was established in Roraima to administer both the
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colonisation of the BR 174 and BR 210 and the
regulation of land titling in the state. INCRA was
ceded a 100 kilometre swathe along the new federal
highways in which to mark out, distribute and register
land holdings for the incoming colonists. The principal
differences between INCRA and state government projects
relate to their administration and location, and not to
the level of infra-structure provided. Location is
nonetheless an important determinant of soil quality
because fertile 'terra roxa' Alfisols cover only 0.03%
of the state, and by 1975 virtually all of the good
land had already been allocated under earlier state
government settlement schemes. The INCRA projects were
for the most part situated on poorer Ultisols and
Oxisols, which predominate in Roraima, accounting for
the state's limited agricultural potential. The most
authoritative land-evaluation survey undertaken in the
state concluded that a third of Roraima does not have
'natural conditions that justify agrarian development'
and only one half of the land area (47.2%) was
considered 'appropriate for mechanised or semi-
mechanised agriculture' (SUPLAN 1980; 11).
The composition of migrants in each settlement
project is related to the date of the project's
initiation. Settlements established before 1980 tend to
be dominated by migrants from the Northeast of Brazil,
most notably those originating in the state of
Maranhao. These include some of the more recent state
government programmes like Alto Alegre (1978),
Sorocaima (1978) and the earliest INCRA schemes created
along the BR 174; Nova Colina, Martins Pereira, and
Novo Paraiso, which are all incorporated within the
wider settlement project of PAD Anaua (1979). A study
of INCRA records showed that 63% of settlers in this
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project are from the Northeast, with 41% originating in
the state of Maranhao (Silveira & Gatti 1988) . An even
higher figure is obtained from the project of Alto
Alegre established one year earlier, where 75% of
current settlers are of Northeastern origin (my
fieldwork based on INCRA records 1991). At this stage
INCRA colonisation schemes were planned around a
comprehensive package of infra-structural support for
the arriving migrants who were distributed land in what
are known as 'directed settlement projects' (PAD-
Projeto de Assentamento Dirigido).
A small percentage of colonists from the Brazilian
centre south were settled in these early projects, and
although they still represent the minority of colonists
in Roraima, their numbers began to increase after 1980.
This was due to a process of secondary migration to
Roraima by farmers who had been settled in Rondonia's
POLONOROESTE project during the 1970s. A study of the
only available migration data reveals that migrant
households, originating predominantly in the Northeast
and Centre South, came to Roraima via Rondonia at the
start of the 1980s (Silveira & Gatti 1988) . Many of
them were allocated land in the project PAR Juaperi
(1982) along the eastern branch of the BR 210 which
INCRA was settling at that time. A survey of colonists
in this area (SUDAM 1984) confirms this, noting that
38% of colonists settled along the BR 210 had
previously farmed in Rondonia and, more strikingly,
that 62% had moved 3-5 times prior to their arrival in
Roraima. Roraima therefore inherited a population of
smallholders who had a long history of migration,
suggesting that their customary response to
difficulties was to move away from them.
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It officially contravened INCRA regulations to
allocate new land to families that had already
abandoned or sold a plot, but the bureaucracy which
should have enforced this legislation was poorly
applied at that time. This is because INCRA had adopted
a new policy of rapid settlement (PAR-Projeto de
Assentamento Rapido) as a pragmatic response to the
slow land allocation procedure. Regrettably, this
objective was achieved at the expense of the migrants,
many of whom were settled in projects before the basic
infra-structure had been assembled. Two areas were
principally affected; PAR Juaperi, which extends along
the eastern branch of the BR 210, and includes the
colonies of Caroebe, Sao Joao de Baliza, Sao Luiz, and
Vila Moderna; and PAR Barauana, situated south-east of
Boa Vista covering the projects of Confianpa I, II, and
III. Even so, the experience of migrants settled in
these schemes was probably not dissimilar to those of
households obtaining land elsewhere. For people who had
been given plots in the more organised projects found
that the infra-structure which they were promised was
seldom provided in full. In other areas situated
outside the official colonisation schemes, a growing
number of migrants started laying claim to the land
spontaneously, having received no government support at
all.
This lack of assistance for colonists undermined
the authority's attempt to establish a dynamic rural
economy in Roraima. The problems encountered in
attracting significant capital into the ranching sector
during the late 1970s have already been noted, but this
was exacerbated by a contraction in the agricultural
economy itself during the early 1980s. Healthcare,
education, credit lines, technical advice and transport
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facilities were all scarce, reflecting a widely
recognised shortfall with Amazonian colonisation (Smith
1982; Moran 1981) . In response to low agricultural
incomes, smallholders began to supplement their
earnings by extracting Brazil nuts from the forest,
renting out small pastures for grazing and even
migrating seasonally to Rondonia for the rice harvest
(SUDAM 1984). Others abandoned or sold their land
holdings and moved to informal sector mines or nearby
urban areas - particularly Manaus and Boa Vista.
Between 1980-1985 a decline in the area devoted to
annual crops coincided with the rapid growth of Boa
Vista (Abers and Pereira 1992), suggesting that
contractions in the rural economy stimulated rural-
urban migration.
The government of Roraima encouraged immigration
by placing advertisements in the national press (Veja
13 April 1983), but the flood of colonists never
acquired the same proportions that were recorded in
Rondonia. During the 1970s its population had increased
from 111 000 to nearly 500 000 (an average annual
growth rate of 15.8%) and then doubled again to
approximately one million in 1990 -averaging 7.8% per
annum (Fearnside 1989). Roraima's demographic boom is
smaller in comparison and occurred about a decade
later. The state's population doubled from a modest 40
885 to 79 159 throughout the 1970s with an annual
average growth rate of 6.3%. During the 1980s, this
increased at a rate of 9.5% to give a population of 215
790 in 1991 (IBGE 1992) . The colonisation programme
clearly contributed to this population growth, but it
was the private sector mineral boom in the latter half
of the 1980s which attracted by far the greatest
proportion of migrants to Roraima over the decade. On
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average 2400 migrants arrived each year during the
height of the colonisation program (Silveira & Gatti
1988: 56). In comparison, an estimated 40 000 people
were directly involved in the 1987-1990 gold rush, and
many more worked in related activities. Thus, a
conservative estimate, which recognises that a
proportion of this figure was already resident in the
state and also accepts that the government census of
agricultural migration may not be complete, still
suggests that the migratory pull of the gold rush was
at least double that of the colonisation programme. -
1.4 Summary.
This historical perspective shows that although
Roraima experienced similar developments to those
occurring throughout Amazonia, recent processes did not
reach the same intensity as elsewhere. Roraima's
geographical isolation from the principal markets of
central and southern Brazil ensured that highway
construction in the state was not accompanied by the
explosive land speculation and agrarian violence
witnessed in Rondonia and Para. The government's
efforts at stimulating the state's rural economy had
failed. At the start of the 1990s Roraima still has the
lowest land values and population density of any
Brazilian state (FUNATURA 1992, IBGE 1992).
The ranching and agricultural developments
associated with the highway building of the 1970s were
important factors underpinning the subsequent expansion
of the Amazonian mining sector. While this is clearly
seen in Para, Rondonia, and Mato Grosso, the spatial
proximity of mining to other activities and the
simultaneous boom in the local land market present
difficulties in deciphering the complex interactions
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between mining and other land-uses in these states. In
contrast, Roraima offers a clearer perspective because
here a marked temporal divide separated the gold rush
from other changes in the rural economy precipitated by
the road programme. Besides, the mining occurred in the
remote Yanomami reserve, removing it spatially from
other land-uses in the state. Surprisingly, this
historical and geographical distance between the
garimpo and other developments in the rural economy
actually serve to clarify its relationship with them.
In effect, the cats-cradle of causal linkages is opened
out so that the particular processes under study are
highlighted more distinctly against the landscape in
which they operate.
This then is the background from which the gold
rush of the 1980s emerged. Far from being a new arrival
on the Amazonian stage, garimpagem has been practiced
throughout the region since the eighteenth century.
Over this period, it has provided a livelihood for a
whole range of social groups, illustrating that there
is nothing exceptional in the long mining histories
shared by Roraima's Indians and ranchers. Communities
of escaped African slaves were Para's most prolific
garimpeiros during the last century, as were
smallholders and plantation workers in the Gurupi of
Maranhao. The point is that garimpagem is just as
intrinsic to Amazonia and its inhabitants as say rubber
tapping or Brazil nut gathering. And the activities'
deep roots in the social and economic fabric of the
region, must be recognised if more recent events in the
Amazonian informal mining sector are to be interpreted
accurately.
The following chapter offers an historical account
of garimpagem in Roraima, in order to expose why the
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activity acquired such prominence during the 1980s. An
examination of the rush on the homelands of the
Yanomami Indians between 1987 and 1990 lies at the
centre of the discussion. Not only does this shed light
on the mechanics behind a significant episode in the
current phase of Amazonian occupation, but it also
provides an insight into the internal dynamics of
garimpagem itself. This is a necessary prerequisite for
subsequent analysis, because understanding how the
garimpo works is the first step towards evaluating its
impacts on other Amazonian land-uses.
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Chapter 2: The mining history of Roraima with
particular attention to the 1987-1990 gold rush.
The myth of El Dorado lured eighteenth century
travellers across the cerrado plains of the Guyana
Shield in search of spectacular mineral wealth.
Nonetheless, the geological resources of Roraima
remained unexploited until diamonds were discovered
in the sediments of the Rio Mau in 1912 (see fig
5.2). Since then, a number of diamond garimpos have
been established along the rivers of the cerrado
which drain from Monte Roraima. Small quantities of
gold are recovered together with diamonds from all of
these mines, but for most of this century the price
of the metal has been so low that it was regarded as
an insignificant by-product of diamond mining until
the 1970s 1. The diamond economy was itself dominated
by production from a garimpo established on the table
mountain Serra de Tepequem in 1938. This garimpo
expanded throughout the 1940s and 1950s, drawing
labour from the more established mining areas along
the rivers Mau, Cotingo, and Quino of northeastern
Roraima (fig 5.2) . The westerly drift in mining
activity from the cerrado into the forest continues
to the present day. From the late 1950s prospectors
filtered up the rivers Uraricoera, Uraricaa and
Erico, establishing a number of small diamond
garimpos west of Tepequem (see fig 2.3), the most
significant of which is Santa Rosa, dating from the
mid 1970s.
Notwithstanding this long history of mineral
extraction, Roraima's geological resources remain
poorly understood. The RadamBrasil natural resource
survey provided the first geological maps of the
state in the 1970s (DNPM 1975), published at the
' Some garimpeiros testify that gold was simply discarded as nobody would purchase it until
the late 1960s.
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reconnaissance scale of 1:1 000 000. Although this
level of mapping is insufficiently detailed to
provide anything other than a crude indication of the
principal deposits, it did suggest that Roraima's
subsoil was of considerable economic value. Two
principal findings of the RadamBrasil survey are
relevant to this study because they have influenced
the subsequent development of the state's mining
economy (DNPM 1975: 101-107).
Firstly, RadamBrasil noted that the origin of
gold and diamonds is associated with the
decomposition of the ancient Guinea shield. More
specifically, it mapped the geography of the Roraima
Conglomerate (a type of greenstone belt) which is the
secondary matrix of the original material,
representing the mother lode of these two minerals.
Its brief to prospectors was that gold and diamonds
should be encountered in river sediments which drain
outcrops of Roraima Conglomerate. Figure 2.1
illustrates the distribution of these economically-
significant geological formations. Not only did this
confirm that the older garimpos below Monte Roraima
and Tepequem were on or draining areas of Roraima
Conglomerates, but it also suggested that previously
unexplored areas like the Serra de Surucucus, Serra
de Araca, and the confluence of the Parima and
Uraricoera rivers showed potential. These western
outcrops which straddle the Venezuelan border
generated even more interest, as the RadamBrasil
survey also noted that the quality of diamonds
generally improves the further west the source
material lies (DNPM 1975: 103).
The second important discovery was geology
favourable to the formation of cassiterite (tin ore)
in the same area. A granitic formation around the
Serra de Surucucus (henceforth referred to as the
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Fig 2.1 Geological formations of economic significance in Roraima, and garimpeiro reserves
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Surucucus granite) was identified as the source
material here, but together with the unexplored areas
of the Roraima Conglomerate, it was located in the
heart of the Yanomami lands. RadamBrasil itself
warned that the presence of the Yanomami, as well as
the inaccessibility of the area, demanded careful
planning prior to any mining in the region.
Nevertheless, it did recommend that prospecting for
cassiterite should be concentrated in the headwaters
of the Mucajai, Parima, Catrimani and Demini river
basins which are in the heart of the Yanomami lands.
Having whetted the appetites of larger mineral
groups with the RadamBrasil findings, the government
anticipated that private investment would be ploughed
into more detailed geological research under the
PoloRoraima program. However, it soon became apparent
that few companies were prepared to survey such
remote deposits, which lay within Indian land. By
law, claims for mining concessions on Indigenous
Reserves may be registered by DNPM, but companies can
only work in these areas with both the permission of
FUNAI and the consent of the relevant Indian group.
Notwithstanding the specific issue of Indian lands,
geological surveying in remote parts of Amazonia is
sufficiently expensive, and risky, to dissuade many
companies from investing in it. This system, both in
and beyond Indian Reserves, favours the registration
of speculative claims by larger companies which are
often legally upheld only after garimpeiros have
discovered economically significant deposits on the
site.
Private sector investment in geological surveys
within Roraima has been minimal, even though 197
claims to the state's subsoil are registered with the
DNPM, covering a total 1 927 831 hectares (Gama de
Silva 1991: 282). Most mineral companies preferred to
work in Para and Rondonia where RadamBrasil had
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identified more accessible deposits lying outside
Indian reserves. This paucity of private investment
in Roraima ensured that virtually all of the
subsequent geological mapping in the state was
undertaken by the government. The Companhia de
Pesquisa de Recursos Minerals (CPRM), DNPM's research
subsidiary, published three substantial geological
surveys between 1975 and 1985 2, but even these
failed to stimulate the anticipated flows of private
capital into the state's mining sector.
Consequently, Roraima's mineral resources rame
to be exploited almost entirely by the informal
sector and a greater knowledge of the state's subsoil
is currently retained in the minds of garimpeiros
than is available in any published documents. The
garimpeiros responded immediately to the RadamBrasil
findings, establishing a cassiterite garimpo on the
Serra de Surucucus by 1975. But the garimpo was
short-lived. In 1986, FUNAI expelled its population
of 500 miners arguing that the health and welfare of
the Yanomami were prejudiced by the mining. In spite
of this incident, there was growing interest in the
Surucucus cassiterite deposit. The Companhia do Vale
Rio Doce (CVRD) , who had a registered claim to the
site received permission from FUNAI to research the
geology of the area in 1979. The survey published by
its technical subsidiary DOCEGO is one of only a
handful of geological research projects ever financed
by the private sector in Roraima. Not surprisingly,
the DOCEGO report confirmed the existence of a 15 000
ton deposit of high grade tin ore (71%) at Surucucus
(Fernandes & Portela 1991: 5). But CVRD advised DNPM
to declare Surucucus a national mineral reserve on
the grounds that the economic benefits of developing
the site at that time did not outweigh its
2 These were the Projeto Rio Branco (1984) Projeto Molybdenum (1978), and Projeto
Catrimani-Uraricoera (1982)
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potentially damaging impacts on the Yanomami (CVRD
1980). Responding to the CVRD's apparent disinterest
in developing their claim, DNPM transferred part of
the Surucucus site into the hands of CODESAIMA, the
state government's development company. However,
various endeavours to extract tin from Surucucus by
both CODESAIMA and garimpeiros were thwarted by
FUNAI. Jose Altino, the head of USAGAL, was
responsible for one of the most daring attempts to
develop the site. In 1985 he was jailed briefly for
spearheading an unsuccessful invasion in which 60
garimpeiros arrived in 5 aircraft and tried to claim
the cassiterite-rich Surucucus plateau by force.
Despite the interest in this cassiterite deposit
during the early 1980s, it was gold, not tin, that
opened up the Yanomami lands. Indeed, following these
events, the Surucucus deposit remained virtually
untouched until the end of 1987, by which time
thousands of garimpeiros were already mining gold
within the Indian reserve.
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2.1 Causes of the 1987-1990 gold rush.
The price of gold increased seventeen fold from
1970-1980, before peaking spectacularly at US$ 850
per troy ounce in 1980 (see fig. 2.2). Roraima' s
garimpeiros responded by placing greater emphasis on
gold extraction over diamond mining. This was not a
difficult transition to make as many of the sites
they exploited yielded both minerals. Accordingly,
Roraima1s first significant gold production was in
the garimpo of Santa Rosa, which was the focus of- the
state's mining industry in the late 1970's. Its
location within the proposed Yanomami Reserve made it
illegal to mine, but the state government nonetheless
supported gold extraction in the area by
commissioning its own organisation CODESAIMA to work
there (Lobato de Azevedo 1991). Over the decade this
conflict between the objectives of federal and state
government ensured that few effective attempts were
made to reduce the social impacts of gold mining
which frequently occurred in close proximity to
indigenous communities.
The Maiongong and Xiriana, who reside along the
Uraricoera, Uraricaa and Ericb, were probably the
first Indian groups of western Roraima to come into
contact with garimpeiros. Initially, they encountered
diamond prospectors who had been venturing up these
rivers since the 1950s, and in subsequent years the
same people taught them how to extract gold. The
Xiriana were not only quick to seize the commercial
opportunities offered by gold mining, but they also
passed the technology on to other Yanomami
communities. In the early 1980s, a party of Xiriana
from the Uraricoera basin, visited the Yanomami
villages of the Couto de Magalhaes, a tributary of
the river Mucajai, to teach their relatives how to
extract gold manually. The modest quantities of gold
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produced by the Indians were traded, often by FUNAI
employees, in Boa Vista for hammocks, pans, fishing
hooks, knives, and other useful items to which the
Yanomami would otherwise have had only limited
access3.
While the Yanomami were learning the basics of
gold mining, pressure was mounting for the closure of
the Santa Rosa garimpo, and in March 1982 federal
legislation was passed that forbade access to the
proposed Yanomami reserve (GM/015 09/03/82) . As the
authorities clamped down on the mining operations,
many of the displaced garimpeiros either returned to
plots of land that they had previously owned, or
acquired land in recently- established colonisation
projects such as Apiau (founded in 1981), Confianga
(1982), and PAR Juaperi (1982) which is situated
along the Eastern branch of the Perimetral Norte. The
mining experience that they had acquired in Santa
Rosa equipped them well for mounting prospecting
trips during the agriculturally-unproductive summer
months. So, from the early 1980s colonist farmers
were working small manual garimpos along the rivers
Catrimani, and Apiau (most notably along its
tributary the Rio Novo), on a seasonal basis. There
were approximately 600 garimpeiros working in this
area during the summer of 1985, some of whom had
already come into conflict with local Yanomami
villages4. By 1986, the influx began to gain momentum
following the discovery of a sizeable gold deposit at
the garimpo of "Cambalacho" in the headwaters of the
Apiau river5 (number 73 on figure 2.3) .
3 For a detailed account of these events see Lazarin & Vessani (1987), and Ramos, Lazarin
& Gomez (1985)
4 CCPY 1985, and 1989 p.:s9
5 Events at Cambalacho provide an interesting example of what happens when an individual
tries to restrict access to a gold field, a process that is well described by Cleary (1990). A
garimpeiro called Paranazino is credited with the discovery of the site, but on realising the
potential wealth of the deposit, he refused other garimpeiros access. Given that he had a few
well-armed henchmen, and as there were alternative mines still producing nearby,
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Thus, all of the ingredients were present for
the start of a mining boom, reflecting many of the
processes which had shaped events throughout Amazonia
during the early 1980s. The unprecedented rise in
gold prices is only one of various factors
contributing to the explosive growth of the regional
mining economy. The existence of extensive alluvial
gold fields, which could be mined with very
rudimentary technology, proved to be just as
significant. A pivotal role was also played by the
road building programme of the previous decade.- The
highways not only improved access to remote parts of
the Amazon, but the migration stimulated by the roads
themselves and by the associated colonisation
projects also provided the necessary labour for the
rush. Furthermore, the political climate was
particularly favourable, as the new interest in
mining offered a further vehicle with which to fulfil
the government's mandate of regional occupation and
economic growth. Within this context two factors
further boosted gold extraction in Roraima. Declining
production in the garimpos of Para (notably Cuca,
Tucuma, and the Tapajos) during the mid 1980's
encouraged many small miners to look towards other
sites for work. Roraima was particularly attractive
since its dry season coincides with the wet season
elsewhere in Amazonia. Thus, garimpeiros from Para
and Rondonia could maintain production throughout the
slack months by migrating to the northern Amazon on a
seasonal basis. Having discovered the potential of
Roraima's gold fields, many of them stayed.
Garimpeiros with more capital arranged transportation
of their mining equipment to Roraima while
Paranazinho managed to hold his claim from the end of 1986 through most of the summer
months. However, by March of 1987, those whom he had repulsed were both sufficiently
angry and well-armed to kill him, thereby liberating access to the very productive garimpo of
Cambalacho.
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simultaneously negotiating a plot of land on which to
work.
The convergence of labour and capital on the
fledgling gold fields was fuelled by macro-economic
changes in 1986. As figure 2.1 illustrates, the
price of gold started to rise again from 1987 which
naturally made garimpagem a more attractive option.
Moreover, it drew further investment into gold
mining, mainly from the Amazonian ranching and urban
economies, both of which were in decline at that
stage. Government incentives for ranching were
reduced in the late 1980s and the urban economy also
underwent a sharp contraction due to the 'Piano
Cruzado' of 1986. This financial strategy was an
attempt by the Sarney government to reduce hyper
inflation through freezing wages and introducing
price controls with the result that labour and
capital shifted into the informal sector as the
formal economy contracted. Because garimpagem pays
tax-free incomes which are protected against
inflation, and imposes minimal restraints on
workforce mobility (Cleary 1990), it is a
particularly attractive option in such circumstances.
2.2 The scale of the rush.
An increasing number of people migrated to
Roraima from 1987 and the flow had acquired flood¬
like proportions by the start of 1988. Local
newspapers reported that 200 migrants a day were
entering Roraima 6 and although no precise figure
exists, it is estimated that about 40 000 miners were
directly employed in the garimpos of Roraima during
the gold rush (Albert 1992)7. As garimpeiros spend a
proportion of their time (and money) in Boa Vista
between mining trips, the numbers engaged in mining
6 The Folha de Boa Vista (08/01/1988).
7Although the World Bank 1990 put the figure at around 100 000. see Butler 1990 :2
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at any one instant could be as little as 50% of this
figure. For each person involved directly in mining,
many others were dependent upon the economic
opportunities that accompanied the boom so that the
employment it generated was extremely far reaching.
Almost all population growth was confined to Boa
Vista which was the principal logistical base for the
rush.
Be that as it may, very little is known about
the people who were drawn to this and other mining
booms in the region. Perhaps the most comprehensive
survey of Amazonian garimpeiros is provided by
Pereira (1991) who interviewed 168 miners in 6 of
Para's garimpos8. He observed that although people
came from all over Brazil to mine in Amazonia, the
regional garimpo workforce is dominated by migrants
from the Brazilian Northeast; 76% of his sample
originated from that region, with 60% coming from the
state of Maranhao alone. Roraima's mining workforce
appears to follow this pattern closely. In August
1991 I interviewed 66 garimpeiros entering a rush
(fofoca9) in the headwaters of the Jatapu river in
the southern part of the state. 53 (78%) of them
originated in the Northeast and the majority were
from the state of Maranhao (40 respondents or 61% of
sample)10. While it is probable that its exact
composition varies slightly between localities,
evidence from different parts of the Amazon confirms
8 The DNPM undertook a survey of all Brazil's garimpeiros in 1990 under the project Ouro-
Gemas. However, this data which should have been released in July 1991, remains
unpublished in March 1993.
9"fofoca" literally means gossip, but is used to describe a rush of garimpeiros to a particular
site, usually following a substantial strike. So the phrase "the fofoca of Jatapu" refers to the
initial rush of prospectors to the garimpo of Jatapu shortly after its discovery, and represents
the mine's heyday
The total breakdown is as follows; (n=66) Maranhao (40) Ceara (6), Parana (4),
Pernambucco (3), Goias (4), Para (2), with one representative from each of the states of
Paraiba, Minas Gerais, Bahia, Mato Grosso do Norte, Roraima, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do
Sul, and Santa Catarina.
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the dominance of Northeasterners in the garimpo
workforce (Coy 1991: 4, Cleary 1990).
As 85% of the garimpeiros interviewed in the
Jatapu survey had worked in the Yanomami reserve,
this sample is broadly representative of the earlier
influx to Western Roraima11. The Jatapu interviews
give some indication of the migratory routes existing
in Amazonia's garimpos, through which garimpeiros
arrive in Roraima12. A small number of the most
experienced respondents had worked in the Tapajbs in
the late 1970s, but they were drawn to Serra Pelada
and the other garimpos of south-eastern Para (notably
Cuca and Tucuma) in the early 1980s. A large number
of migrants were absorbed in the Amazonian mining
economy at that time and the majority of the
garimpeiros interviewed at Jatapu fall into this
classification. As the productivity of these gold-
fields declined in the mid 1980s, the larger part of
the workforce moved to northern Mato Grosso (around
Alto Floresta) and the Tapajos. A smaller number went
to Rondonia, either extracting gold along the Rio
Madeira, or mining cassiterite in Bom Futuro. And a
handful scattered across the northern Amazon, working
in northern Amapa (on the Oiapoque), and the Cabega
do Cachorro region of Amazonas (Rio Uaupes) (see fig
1.1).
The Roraima gold rush appears to have drawn its
workforce from all of these areas, with the majority
coming from the gold fields of northern Mato Grosso
and the Tapajos. A smaller, but nonetheless
significant fraction came from Rondonia. Garimpeiros
in Boa Vista note that there was a degree of
11 Although few of them had come directly from the reserve itself. In fact this survey
illustrates the power of the fofoca as the garimpeiros had migrated directly to Jatapu from the
following locations; 50 (76%) came from Roraima itself, 4 from Itaituba, 4 from Venezuela,
2 from Maranhao, and one each from Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Goias, and Ceari
12 This information derives from life-history interviews conducted with the Jatapu
respondants.
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segregation between these two groups. In general
terms, the Rondonia workforce veered towards the
Uraricoera river where mining was principally by
equipment mounted on floating rafts (balsas), while
the Tapajos/Mato Grosso garimpeiros dominated the
Mucajai, Apiau, and Catrimani rivers where land-based
mining prevailed. This reflects differences in mining
techniques between the garimpos of origin, as
extraction on the Tapajos tends to be land-based
while on the Madeira it is predominantly riverine.
But the distribution also suggests that garimperiros
prefer to work alongside people they already know.
Relocating into a new garimpo is an expensive and
risky operation particularly if equipment is being
transferred. These risks and expenses can be reduced
if trusted friends exist in the new garimpo; they
will lend money and equipment, facilitate the
acquisition of a labour force, explain the local
geology and help negotiate a plot on which to mine.
At this point the distinction between
'professional' and 'temporary' garimpeiros should be
recognised. Mining is the principal form of
employment for the former. Temporary garimpeiros are
those whose primary employment lies outside the
mining economy, often being in smallholder
agriculture, ranching, or employment in the urban
informal sector. They tend to be opportunists,
spending short periods in the garimpo in order to
supplement their income from other sources. Although
many of the temporary garimpeiros may work seasonally
in garimpos over a number of years, and thereby
acquire considerable mining experience, they have not
made the same commitment to the activity as their
professional counterparts. Professional miners often
invest a larger percentage of their revenue back into
the activity by purchasing equipment and financing
prospecting trips. Even so, no hard and fast rules
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can be made, and much of the initial prospecting for
the Roraima gold rush was undertaken by experienced
temporary garimpeiros who had land holdings in the
state's colonisation projects 13. In broad terms one
can think of a core of professional miners who
provided much of the air support, mining equipment,
and prospecting expertise, being complemented by a
large number of temporary garimpeiros who probably
represented the majority of the labour force.
Production estimates of the Roraima rush are
variable, but USAGAL believe that 36 metric tons of
gold were extracted in the state between 1988-1990.
During this period, the price of gold fluctuated
between US$ 12-18 US$ per gram, according an
approximate value of US$ 540 million to this quantity
of gold (calculated at an average of US$ 15 per
gram). The largest proportion of the metal would have
passed through the hands of Boa Vista's numerous gold
dealers, of which only 33 are officially registered.
Generally, they traded it on to more powerful
companies and financial institutions in Rio de
Janeiro or Sao Paulo, from where much of it would
probably have left the country. Enormous
opportunities for contraband existed14 and only
fifteen metric tons of gold were registered by the
government tax office (the 'Receita Federal') between
1988-1990. Even so, this accounts for over 40% of
USAGAL's estimated production, which seems very high.
It is therefore possible that USAGAL's figure is
conservative, and a more realistic estimate might be
49 tons valued at US$ 735 000 000 15.
This is because the rush itself did not attract the attentions of Amazonia's professional
garimpeiros until relatively late on.
14 Attempts to police this contraband were derisory and on one of the very rare occassions
that agents of the Receita Federal inspected the cargoes of light planes at Boa Vista's airport,
they confiscated 30 kilograms of gold in one day (Folha de Boa Vista 24/11/88).
13 A closer look at these figures reveals a number of discrepancies; USAGAL estimate a
peak production of 14 tons in 1988 of which the Receita Federal registered 1.3 tons (12% of
total production). However, the following year USAGAL believes that gold production
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2.3 The supportive role of the state.
Following the invasion of Cambalacho (which is
marked as point number 73 on fig 2.3), the intensity
of mining in the watershed of the Apiau river
increased as smallholders walked the two week long
trail from the Apiau colonisation project to seek out
new deposits. By July 1987, Manuel Luiz, a farmer
from Alto Alegre, had crossed the watershed and
discovered a gold mining operation belonging to the
Yanomami, in the middle reaches of the Mucajai basin.
Its owners were absent at the time, and so Manuel
claimed the site, christening it the garimpo of Novo
Cruzado. Accounts differ over what happened next. It
has been suggested that the Yanomami who returned to
the site a few days later came into immediate
conflict with the intruders. But some garimpeiros
argue that a working relationship was established
with the Yanomami owners and violence only broke out
when this agreement subsequently collapsed. Whatever
the case, a clash ensued which left 4 Yanomami and
one garimpeiro dead (Folha de Boa Vista 12/08/87) .
The Yanomami had reportedly expelled garjmpeiros from
that area on three previous occasions, (Albert, in
press) and relations between the two parties were
increasingly violent. But although this was by no
means the only incident of its kind, it did prompt
both FUNAI and the state governor Getulio Cruz to
threaten the closure of these clandestine mines. The
first plan to remove the garimpeiros (known as
declined to 11 tons, while the Receita Federal processed documentation for the increased
amount of 8 tons, representing 72% of total production. The figures for 1990 are 11 tons
produced (USAGAL) of which 6 were registered, giving a registration rate of 55%. There is
no evidence that the authorities succeeded in cutting down on levels of contraband, and so it
is highly unlikely that over half of total gold production was declared to the Receita Federal
in these ultimate two years. This suggests that the USAGAL estimate for total production is
conservative, and if it is assumed that only 40% of production was officially registered in
1989-1990 then the USAGAL estimate of total production can probably be increased by 13
tons to 49 metric tons with a total value of US$ 735 000 000 (calculated at an average of US$
15 per gram).
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Operagao Roraima) was launched in September 1987, but
its complete inefficacy simply demonstrated a lack of
political will to tackle the problem with conviction.
The garimpeiros became increasingly aware of the
authorities' reluctance to curtail mining activities
in the Yanomami reserve.
In fact the government and the armed services
were not only loath to intervene in the burgeoning
rush, but they actually endorsed it. A military
project known as Calha Norte (literally meaning
northern trench) provided the infrastructure that
greatly facilitated the garimpeiros' access to the
Yanomami reserve. This project was formulated in 1985
and encompasses all Brazilian territory lying north
of the rivers Solimoes, and Amazonas '24% of the
legally defined Amazon). The initial phase of Calha
Norte ran from 1986 to 1990, and it sought to
increase the occupation of the northern Amazon by
stepping up the military presence in this area. Among
other specified objectives, Calha Norte aimed to
improve the transport and energy network, to attract
new settlers and investment as well as to define an
appropriate Indian policy in the area. The most
polemic aspect of the Calha Norte project concerns
its impact on the Indian groups of the northern
Amazon. As one observer has noted;
'The rationale for Calha Norte, as a
project for "bringing poles of development
into the interior" under military control,
revolves around a strategy to reduce Indian
territories in order to facilitate the
access of large-scale mining companies and
placer-mining groups to the deposits located
in these lands' (Albert 1992 p.52).
Events at the airstrip of Paapiu provide a
candid illustration of this. Paapiu (number 50 on fig
2.3) is located beside the Couto de Magalhaes river,
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List of the airstrips marked on figure 2.3
The name of airstrip is given first and where the name of the owner is
different it is given in brackets afterwards (? = owner not known).




05 Fazenda Parima(Gaucho Animal & Vivi)
06 Nossa Senhora Aparecida(Roberto)
07 Jovair
08 Paulo Alceu
09 Luiz da Agropecuaria(Luiz & Olimpio)
10 Chico Jacare
11 Quincas Bonfim








20 Nova de Santa Rosa(?)
21 Osvaldo
22 Santa Rosa(Gov. of Roraima)
23 Tepequ6m(Gov. of Roraima)








32 TarzS (Chico Malaria)
33 Baiano Formiga
34 Americanos (MEVA -abandoned)




39 Gaucho Chapeu Preto
40 Paulista
41 Raimundo Nenem II
42 Miss3o de MEVA (FUNAI)





48 Caveira I (Ad§o Neguinho)
49 Caveira II(Ad3o Neguinho)
50 Paapiu(FUNAI- Calha Norte)









60 Comunidade(Osmar & Jurema)
61 Alexandre







69 Nova do Marcelo
70 Gaucho Animal(Cesar Greigar)
71 Marcelo
72 MineragAo(Antonio Rogdrio)
73 Cambalacho(Alex. & Robertino)
74 Botinha (Galdino Antonio)
75 Wando Acreano(Chico Ivanisio)
76 Helio
77 Rio Novo (Gov. of Roraima)
78 Nova do Apiau(?)





84 Rainha de Inaja(Dic5o)
85 Atatais(Lauro Texeira)
86 Parima (Jos6 Altino)
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which is a tributary of the Mucajai at the centre of
the region's gold fields. The airstrip was originally
constructed in the early 1970s by protestant
missionaries (MEVA) who went to the area on short
evangelization trips to catechise the Indians. A
permanent presence at Paapiu was not established
until 1981 when FUNAI built a post next to the
airstrip, which was itself extended in 1986 by the
Brazilian airforce (FAB) under the Calha Norte
project. Tenente Mota, a military policeman charged
with overseeing the airstrip, saw the garimpos that
the Yanomami were working manually nearby and
recognised the considerable mineral wealth of the
area. Informing other miners of his discovery, the
Tenente organised a group of well-armed garimpeiros
to fly into Paapiu and invade the airstrip in
December 1987. The Airforce, made no attempt to expel
the invaders and FUNAI subsequently abandoned its
outpost at Paapiu in 198 9 leaving the garimpeiros
with unrestricted use of the airstrip. The strategy
paid dividends for Tenente Mota, having negotiated
with Joao Davi Yanomami16, a local village leader, he
established his own garimpo in the vicinity.
Following this incident Paapiu became a small
settlement in the heart of the Yanomami reserve,
servicing some of Roraima's most productive garimpos.
Within five hours walk of the airstrip, Vando Preto
(a smallholder from the Apiau colonisation project)
had discovered a spectacularly rich grotto which
16 Joio Davi, Iaduce, and Marcelo Yanomami were three Indians from the Paapiu area who
spoke Portuguese and negotiated to varying degrees of success with the garimpeiros. Jo3o
Davi, being head of one of the Yanomami communities at Paapiu, charged the miners a
landing fee for use of the airstrip which generated a considerable income until his authority
ceased to be respected. In 1989 Marcelo became an outspoken supporter of garimpagem and
featured in media reports arguing for the continued presence of garimpeiros on Yanomami
land. Yaduce owned a set of mining pumps and having worked for a number of years in
partnership with various garimpeiros, he became disillusioned and bitter about his mining
experiences, claiming that he had been cheated. He was shot dead near Paapiu during an
argument with garimpeiros in January 1992 .
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earned both him and his partner over one hundred
kilograms of gold each17. Between the sites lay the
"igarape da Caveira" which also became a heavily
mined area next to which lay the garimpos of "Chico
Ceara", "Mestre Pedro", "Jonas Dias", "Rangel", and
"Dudu" (numbers 46, 38, 51, 53, and 52 on figure
2.3) . Thus Paapiu not only yielded access to a
strategically important auriferous zone, but its
opening-up also defined a new political climate of
support for the illegal activities of the
garimpeiros.
The gold rush enabled the military to fulfil
some of the principal objectives enshrined in the
Calha Norte project. The strategists were seeking to
promote the integration of western Roraima with the
rest of Brazil, and the 'living frontier' of
garimpeiros moving into this area helped them achieve
this goal. In supporting the rush the military saw an
opportunity to further their own geopolitical agenda,
though clearly at considerable cost to the local
Indian population:
'They [the military] decided to absorb
and attempt to control the dynamic
garimpeiro frontier in the Yanomami area,
in spite of its considerable ecological and
social costs, furthering the fundamental
objectives of the Calha Norte; the economic
and military occupation of northern
Amazonian frontier space to the detriment
of its Indian populations' (Albert, in
press: 43 - my translation).
For this very reason the gold rush gathered
momentum under an increasingly sympathetic political
climate. Potential objectors to events within the
Yanomami reserve, including anthropologists, health
teams, and missionaries, were expelled from the area
in 1987. This embargo, which lasted until 1990,
17 Correio de Garimpeiro Dec 1988.
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prevented interested third parties from closely
monitoring the impacts of the gold rush on local
people. The gold rush itself gained further support
with the appointment of the two subsequent governors
of Roraima, General Klein (12/10/87-16/09/88), and
Romero Juca (16/09/88-01/08/90), both of whom
vigorously defended the garimpeiros ' occupation of
Indian lands. In this way, a flagrant breach of the
Brazilian constitution was deemed politically
acceptable by both the federal and state governments.
2.4 Discovery of the Alto Mucajai gold fields.
At the end of 1987, the garimpeiros were well
established in the headwaters of the Apiau,
Catrimani, and Couto de Magalhaes rivers. But large
areas of the Yanomami reserve still remained to be
explored, and considerable sums were being reinvested
in prospecting expeditions. The following account
shows how the garimpeiros undertook this geological
research using light aircraft to support prospecting
in very remote areas. Although garimpagem varies
somewhat between different parts of Amazonia, a
number of common work relationships nonetheless
apply. For this reason, the central characteristics
of a garimpo's genesis and development, illustrated
in the case study below, are broadly representative
of garimpagem as practised throughout the Brazilian
Amazon 18.
Daniel, the owner of a 1200 hectare ranch along
the BR 210, came to Roraima in 1986 when his
construction company in Brasilia fell victim to the
economic contractions induced by the Piano Cruzado.
The difficult financial situation facing small
18 For a more detailed discussion of the internal social and economic relations of
garimpagem, see Cleary (1990). In Roraima, garimpagem most closely follows the model
established in the Tapajos and other areas like the Alto Rio Negro, where aircraft provide the
only means of access. This account is distilled from a series of interviews conducted in Boa
Vista in July 1991.
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ranchers prompted him to enter the garimpo of Novo
Cruzado in October 1987 although he had no previous
experience of garimpagem. By January 1988 he was
working manually in the fofoca at the garimpo of
Vando Preto and within a month he had borrowed a set
of two-way radios, pooled his gold earnings together
with four partners and organised a prospecting team
from Baiana Marcelo's recently constructed airstrip
at Novo Cruzado (no 59 on fig 2.3). While Daniel
coordinated the expedition from his base at the
airstrip, his partners spent two months testing -the
alluvium of the streams and tributaries along the
upper reaches of the river Mucajai.
After a month they required more supplies and so
cleared a patch in the forest with a chainsaw which
they carried with them. Passing their rough location
over the radio to Daniel, they arranged an airdrop at
a set time the following day (e.g. 7.00 a.m. 6 days
walk up the left bank of the Mucajai above the Melo
Nunes river). Daniel bought the necessary supplies
and chartered a light plane to fly over the area at
the designated time, being guided to their location
by a column of smoke from a fire which they had lit
in a corner of the clearing. Once overhead, Daniel
dropped the supplies after checking that their sign
of a blue and red hammock laid out in an "L" shape
was visible in the clearing below. This precaution
ensured that he did not inadvertently supply any of
the numerous other prospecting teams working in the
area with their provisions.
The team had luck, and like many other finds
along the Mucajai, they were led to a gold rich site
by a Yanomami whom they had befriended in the forest
19. Their find was made on Easter Saturday 1988 and
19 Being unaware of the historical events that introduced mining to the Yanomami
communities in the Mucajai', the garimpeiros believed that missionary groups working in the
area had taught the Indians to extract gold for the benefit of their religious institutions.
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was named the "Grota de Tarza" after the nickname of
one of its discoverers. Having each invested 800
grams of gold on prospecting, the partners would
recover 40 kilograms a head from the site. Two
members of the group stayed to start mining the
richest deposits manually, whilst the other two made
a direct route back to the airstrip at Novo Cruzado.
Simultaneously, Daniel, having been informed of the
discovery over the radio, borrowed some gold and
organised the provision by air of the necessary
supplies to the infant garimpo.
This behaviour attracted the attentions of other
garimpeiros at Novo Cruzado, a number of whom
accompanied Daniel and his two partners on the eight-
day walk back to the "Grota de Tarza". Having
discovered the site, the partners are automatically
recognised as owners (donos) of the new garimpo. In
accordance with this position they allocated plots of
land to the incoming garimpeiros on which they could
mine manually.
Gold mining in alluvial material is very simple.
A wooden sluice box is constructed and lined with a
sacking. Horizontal wooden bars known as riffles are
placed across the sacking, and the gold bearing
material is passed over the whole contraption with
large quantities of water. This itself will retain a
percentage of the gold particles, but rates of
recovery are greatly improved by the use of mercury.
As mercury amalgamates with gold, its increased
weight lodges more effectively in the sacking and
behind the riffles of the sluice box20.
Some of the earlier arrivals were engaged by
Daniel and his partners in a working relationship
known as meia-oraca. Under meia-praq:a the dono(s) of
the garimpo supply the incoming garimpeiros with food
20 The use of mercury and the issue of mercury pollution are discussed in greater detail in
chapter 7.
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and a plot of land to mine in return for half of the
gold extracted by the contracted garimpeiros. During
the first four months of the "Grota de Tarza", 400
garimpeiros were working manually in gold extraction,
of whom only 30 were engaged in meia-praga work
relations. The rest mined under a different work
relationship literally termed 'at one's own expense'
(por conta prdpria) . The distinction rests more on
the provision of food than anything else, but it does
affect the distribution of gold income among the
workforce. Garimpeiros working 'at their own expense'
are responsible for their own catering arrangements,
but are nonetheless obliged to give 40% of their gold
production to the donos do garimpo in payment for the
plot of land that they have been allocated. However
in remote garimpos, such as those of western Roraima,
the donos have a monopoly over the supply of all
foodstuffs which they then sell at considerable
prices to the garimpeiros21. This constituted an
important source of revenue for Daniel and his
partners, together with the taxes they levied on gold
production. From their income, they not only
contracted gunmen to police the garimpo and extract
their dues, but they also had to re supply the site
by air at a cost of 200 grams of gold per airdrop.
Once the most easily accessible deposits had
been exploited manually, the donos ceded their right
to construct an airstrip to a mutual friend called
"Chico Malaria". In August 1987, Chico invested about
four kilograms of gold with his partner to finance
the construction of the airstrip, which took twenty
labourers forty five days to complete. For every
plane or helicopter that touched down on the strip,
Chico and his partner charged the standard 10 grams
21 On the whole, basic foodstuffs in the garimpos such as sugar, salt, rice, beans, and manioc
flour all cost three to four tenths of a gram of gold per kilogram (US$4) Luxury items were
more expensive; a can of beer was half a gram, while a pack of 6 batteries for a radio, or a
packet of cigarettes would each cost 1 gram. (Cruz & Costa 1989)
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of gold landing fee and throughout the summer months
the garimpo regularly received over thirty flights a
day22. The completion of the airstrip also acted as a
springboard for further prospecting, but even before
it had been commissioned, a number of important finds
had been made in the vicinity. Groups that had been
prospecting near the site at the time of Tarza's
discovery rapidly focused their attentions on the
surrounding area. "Baiano Formiga" passed the site
four days after its discovery and within the week he
had struck gold nearby. The principal garimpos of" the
Alto Mucajai such as "Jeremias", "Pedro Jacaranda",
and "Popunha" were all established in a similar way
during this period23 (nos 31, 28, 29 on fig 2.3)
The construction of an airstrip in a garimpo is
a mixed blessing to the garimpeiros, for while it
greatly facilitates the transport of people and
provisions, it also heralds the arrival of machinery
which may replace a large proportion of the manual
workforce. In semi-mechanised garimpagem, teams of
five to six people (including a cook) are employed
operating a set of diesel-fuelled pumps. The jet from
one of the pumps is used to blast into the sediments
which are then sucked up by a large tube connected to
the other pump. The material is then passed over a
sluice box to separate out the gold in exactly the
same way as in manual extraction. In fact, Daniel had
airlifted the first such set of equipment into the
"Grota de Tarza" by helicopter over a month before
work had begun on the airstrip. Even though it cost
him over two kilograms of gold to install the
machinery in this way, it allowed him to exploit some
of the most concentrated deposits before the site was
22 As time passed, the "Grota de Tarza" was more frequently referred to as the "Pista de
Malaria" (Malaria's airstrip); it is usually only when the dono also constructs the airstrip that
the garimpo retains its original name (e.g. garimpo de Raimundo Nenem).
23 This region is well described by Monbiot (1992) who visited the area in 1990.
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opened up to other more capitalised garimpeiros24. On
completion of the airstrip the donos installed a
further seven sets of mining pumps. They also sold
off two large patches of land to two wealthy
garimpeiros called "Bigode de Cavalho" and "Ze
Bigode", each of whom managed ten sets of the same
equipment on their plots. The garimpo therefore
employed between 166-196 individuals on 28 sets of
machinery, in comparison to the 400 who had worked
there manually.
Under the manual regime the garimpos often have
to close during the wet season when heavy rainfall
fills their mining pits, but the seasonal nature of
garimpagem is reduced once pumping equipment has been
installed. Garimpeiros often weigh up the benefits of
this extended mining calendar against their changing
economic prospects. For while employment on the
machinery still offers reasonable wages, the best
opportunities for striking it rich undoubtedly lie in
the very early manual workings at recently discovered
sites. Besides, conditions are often healthier before
machines are introduced to a site. The incidence of
malaria tends to increase following their
installation because mechanised mining rapidly
expands the area of standing water in the garimpo,
creating ideal breeding grounds for the anopheles
mosquito. For these reasons alone, non-capitalised
garimpeiros often prefer the harder option of manual
work in the earlier stages of a garimpo's life to
subsequent employment as machine operators.
The changing work relations incurred by the
adoption of semi-mechanised production are also an
important consideration in this equation. Generally,
the individual garimpeiro receives a lower fraction
24 In areas where no airstip has been constructed, machinery can only be transported by
helicopter. In such circumstances diesel fuel must be supplied by airdrop. The diesel is usually
injected into large gas canisters (which are more commonly used as containers for domestic
cooking fuel) to survive the impact.
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of the total gold extracted mechanically, but because
a far greater volume of material is being processed,
wage rates do not necessarily fall. The six person
crew operating a set of mining pumps share between
them thirty percent of the gold recovered from the
operation. The remaining seventy percent accrues to
the owner of the equipment (dono de maquina) , from
which the running costs and catering expenses are
deducted. A set of the same mining pumps may also be
mounted on a raft (balsa) to extract gold from river
sediments. A team of four divers rotate two hour
shifts, sucking up material from the river bed with a
vacuum-pumped hose. Their return for undertaking this
more dangerous work is a 40 percent share of the gold
production, split between them. Again, this leaves
the owner (dono de balsa) with the remaining larger
portion, from which catering and operating expenses
are deducted. In both situations, garimpeiros are
effectively engaged under the meia-praga arrangement,
in so far as their food and accommodation is supplied
by the owner of the machinery.
The salient point emerging from this discussion
is that while the garimpo workforce receives a
reasonable fraction of the gold they extract, a
sizeable proportion of total production is
concentrated in the hands of the donos.
2.5 The drift towards Venezuela, and the expansion of
tin production.
Prior to the completion of Chico Malaria's
airstrip, Amadeus, one of the team that had
discovered the "Grota de Tarza", resolved to continue
prospecting. He was paid his share of the profits
from his partners, some of which he invested in a
ranch in Para. Amadeus then undertook a 5 month long
prospecting trip along the Venezuelan border around
the base of the Surucucus plateau, and along the
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Parima river which drains the upper reaches of the
Uraricoera basin (see figure 2.3). Although he was
not fortunate enough to uncover a second large
deposit, his journey is interesting because it traces
the path of the developing garimpos25. The
garimpeiros drifted into the headwaters of the
principal rivers, searching for the source material
of the secondary deposits they were mining. This
movement into the watershed brought them into the
area which is most densely inhabited by the
Yanomami26. But while this itself increased pressure
from Indian rights groups for government intervention
in the gold rush, the garimpeiros gained new
political adversaries when they crossed into
Venezuela and started to mine in the upper reaches of
the Orinoco catchment. As this frontier is not
clearly defined, the Venezuelan government reacted
aggressively to the construction of various garimpo
airstrips (notably "Sadam Hussein", "Constituinte",
and "Rainha de Inaja" numbers 83, 82, and 84) along
the border. Tensions heightened when the Venezuelan
National Guard shot down a light plane that was
servicing these garimpos in January 199227.
Concern over the activities of Roraima's
garimpeiros was mounting simultaneously from other
quarters. One significant development during the
latter part of the gold rush relates to the increased
production of cassiterite. Due to its density, tin
ore is extracted gravimetrically using the same
technology employed in gold mining. In 1987
25 Amadeus' behavior is also interesting as it reflects som^, garimpeiros'ability to turn their
back on huge quantities of wealth and reject a comfortable lifestyle for adventure.
26 This movement was observed by technicians from the Brasilian space institute (INPE) working
on a FUNAI project to monitor the gold rush using T.M.Landsat images (Liu et al. 1990)
27 The exact line of the frontier was under review in 1991 and this shooting incident, which
resulted in the death of two Brazilians, occurred while a bi-national surveying team was
mapping the border. Evidently, the high military presence on either side of the frontier, the
mineral potential of the soil, the international attention focused on the Yanomami as well as
the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of armed garimpeiros in the area, formed a
tense political backdrop to the boundary survey .
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garimpeiros working gold in the Alto Mucajai usually
discarded cassiterite on account of its comparatively
low value-to-bulk ratio. Subsequently however, donos
do garimpo started to buy the mineral at cheap prices
from garimpeiros (from both manual and mechanised
production) and transported it back to Boa Vista
whenever space was available in any returning
aircraft. By 1989 a number of garimpeiros had begun
to specialise in cassiterite production working
around the Surucucus plateau. Typically the tin ore
was dried and stockpiled before being sold- to
freelance intermediaries who negotiated with larger
companies such as "Paranapanema" and "Best Metals and
Solders". These middlemen usually arranged road
transport of the mineral to Manaus or the South of
Brazil.
The high costs of transporting tin ore and the
limited number of potential buyers ensured that
cassiterite (unlike gold) was handled mainly by donos
do garimpo, pilots or dealers. Not surprisingly
therefore, an oligopoly rapidly emerged over the
production of the mineral. According to cassiterite
dealers in Boa Vista, two ventures backed by
different sources of multinational capital started
extracting and transporting large quantities of tin
ore from Surucucus towards the end of 1989. The
donos of these two operations came to dominate tin
production in Roraima, airlifting tons of the mineral
in DC. 3 aircraft from airstrips over a kilometre in
length, constructed in the Yanomami reserve. In both
cases, they stockpiled the ore on ranches between
Alto Alegre and Boa Vista before passing it on to
their creditors as repayment for their initial loans.
The increase in cassiterite production was of
great concern to the Association of Tin Producing
Countries (ATPC) . The ATPC aims to maintain a high
and stable price for tin on the world market by
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encouraging its members to accept production quotas.
World tin prices plummeted by sixty percent between
1985 and 1990 (see fig. 2.1)28 following the collapse
of the International Tin Cartel (ITC) in October
1985. By the end of the 1980s the ATPC was struggling
to restrict production in the face of a contracting
world market as the industrialised countries entered
recession. Although Brazil is only an observer at the
ATPC discussions, she does accept a voluntary
production quota and has come under increasing
pressure from the Association to control informal
sector tin production in Amazonia 29. The tin trade
was in such a precarious state during the late 1980s
that the prospect of high quality Surucucus
cassiterite flooding on to international markets is
accredited with depressing world tin prices in the
second half of 1989 (DNPM 1990). Clearly, it was the
larger producers such as the Brazilian national
Paranapanema30 who had most at stake and so they too
began to lobby the government for the closure of the
garimpos in western Roraima.
2.6 The impact on indigenous communities.
The direct impact of this gold rush was absorbed
by the Yanomami, one of the world's most isolated
28 This slump in world tin prices has been exacerbated by the USA releasing 13 000 tons of
strategic reserves on to the market in 1991. These stocks had been built up during the cold
war and were sold at a time of economic recession . As the principal steel consuming
countries such as Japan and West Germany were simultaneously experiencing reduced
economic growth, this action by the USA coincided with decline in world demand for tin.
29 The pressure on Brazil to restrict informal sector tin production is clearly noted in the
'Summary of the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Session of the Executive Committee of Tin
Producing Countries' (ATPC Canberra Australia 15-18 Oct 1991). At this meeting Brazil
agreed to accept a voluntary production quota of 34 000 tons (metric) in 1992 and to limit
her exports to 28 000 tons, she was also encouraged to become a fully participating member
of the ATPC. The text emphasises that Brazil will continue to exercise control over the proof
of origin of all tin concentrates sold. DNPM legislation which seeks to enforce this has dealt
a severe blow to Amazonian cassiterite dealers who act as the middlemen between the
earimpos and the formal sector companies.
30 Paranapanema is one of the world's largest tin producers, responsible for 13% of global
production in 1987 (Andrade 1989).
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indigenous groups. The invasion of their lands by
garimpeiros was accompanied by the introduction of
malaria and other diseases, such as leishmaniasis, to
which they had no natural resistance. It is
particularly disturbing that the Brazilian government
denied health teams access to the Yanomami reserve
during this critical period. Physical violence
between garimpeiros and the Yanomami probably
accounted for a smaller number of deaths than
disease. A lawyer for the Indigenous Council of
Roraima (CIR) has specific records on the murders of
14 Yanomami between 1987-1992 (CIDR 1992). But many
more incidents probably went unrecorded as it is
taboo in Yanomami society to refer to the deceased.
The consequences were devastating. Between 1988 and
1990, an estimated 15% of the Yanomami population
died (FUNAI/CIMI/INESC/NDI 1991) . Medics were not
allowed back into the area until the end of 1990, by
which time government intervention had considerably
slowed the gold rush. A concerted attempt to provide
emergency healthcare was made in the following year,
although logistical difficulties, inconsistent
funding and poor co-ordination reduced the efficacy
of the project (known as the 'Yanomami Health
Project'). In essence, the provision of health care
to the Yanomami in their hour of greatest need can be
summarised as 'too little too late'.
The welfare of the Indians was also prejudiced
by the environmental degradation accompanying the
gold rush. Hunting [notably of tapir (Tapirus
terrestris), agouti (Agouti paca) and peccary
(Tayassu pecari) ] became increasingly difficult in
the vicinity of the principal mining centres as game
was shot by the garimpeiros and was also scared off
by the mining activity. Habitat destruction itself
should be qualified as garimpagem is not directly
responsible for widespread deforestation. While
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trees are removed to gain access to deposits, the
concentration of work in confined sites ensures that
the total areas deforested are small, particularly
when compared to other land uses in Amazonia.
Nevertheless, virtually all the vegetation is
stripped from areas of intensive mining and as this
is usually along streams, localised water courses are
totally transformed31. The churning of river sediments
not only pollutes the drinking water, but it also
disrupts the reproductive cycle of fish which are the
principal source of protein in the Yanomami diet.-
It is possible that these physical alterations
may be ameliorated over a relatively short term
following the termination of mining activity.
However, mercury contamination of the aquatic
ecosystem could continue for decades. The use of
mercury is common to all types of gold mining
technology employed in the garimpo. As well as
placing mercury in small reservoirs within the
equipment, garimpeiros often mix the metal with gold-
bearing sediments in the mining pit (barranco)
itself. The miners periodically stop washing the
sediments over the sluice boxes to recover their
haul. The riffles are removed, and the gold-mercury
amalgam which has lodged in the sack lining of the
sluice box is swept down into a metal prospecting
dish. Here any excess mercury is carefully separated,
and poured back into a storage bottle for future use.
A gold-mercury amalgam remains in the bottom of the
prospecting dish and this is then heated (usually
with a blow torch) so that the mercury vaporises,
leaving only the gold. The mercury therefore may
31 Dourojeanni & Padua (1992) note that on average, one cubic meter of sediments is
processed for every 2 grams of gold recovered under mechanised extraction, but they give no
indication of how this calculation has been made. Moreover, geological variations prevent
the use of a formula calculated in one area to evaluate mining impacts elsewhere.
Nonetheless, it does give some indication of the scale of sedimentation caused by the
extraction of tons of gold.
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enter the watercourses directly or as rainfall when
the vapour is condensed out of the atmosphere.
Initially it accumulates in stream and river
sediments in an inert metallic state, but it is
subsequently transformed into an organic form through
a process known as methylation. This process is
generally accelerated in acidic waters which have
high rates of conductivity (Malm et al 1990). Having
undergone this transition, the organic mercury may be
absorbed by aquatic biota and accumulates in the food
chain, typically attaining highest concentrations in
the tissues of predatory fish and caiman.
While mercury vapour may be inhaled directly by
garimpeiros and gold traders32, surrounding
communities are often contaminated by consuming fish
from the polluted rivers which drain the mining
areas. The symptoms of mercury contamination are in
many ways similar to those of malaria, thus
complicating its diagnosis. These include trembling
of the extremities, headaches, poor vision and, in
extreme cases, unconsciousness and death (Silbergeld
1989) . Analysis of hair samples from 162 Yanomami in
1990 recorded above-average levels of mercury from
villagers living around Paapiu and Surucucus 33. But
no samples exceeded the World Health Organisation's
(WHO) maximum permissible concentration of 6 (j^g of
methyl-mercury/g of hair (Castro et al 1991).
However, a detailed study is required of Yanomami
dietary habits (to provide data on levels of mercury
uptake), as well as accurate information on the
degree to which the aquatic ecosystem is already
32 Dealers both in the garimpo and in urban areas always heat gold with blow torches before
weighing it to ensure that all of the mercury has been driven off. When this process occurs
within the garimpo, the broad hats that garimpeiros typically wear may exacerbate the
absorption of the toxic vapour as it billows around their faces.
33 40% of the population in these areas registered concentrations of mercury greater than 6.0
ppm. These are relatively low levels of contamination compared to those noted in more
traditional mining areas such as the Tapajds and Madeira, reflecting the relatively short
period of gold mining in Roraima.
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contaminated, before the full implications of mercury
discharges on the health of the Yanomami can be
accurately assessed (pers. comm. Bruce Forsberg
1991) .
The changes mentioned above refer to the
physical effects of the gold rush on the Yanomami,
and can be measured. But its impact on Yanomami
social organisation and cosmology will probably never
be fully comprehended. The Yanomami, in common with
many indigenous peoples, believe that spirits dwell
in the natural environment around them. Davi Kopenawa
Yanomami explains that the detrimental consequences
of the gold rush therefore extend into the spiritual
world. 'Xawara', a spirit manifest as a vapour, is
released from the subsoil during mining and is
responsible for the ill health that afflicts both the
Yanomami and the garimpeiros. Ultimately, 'Xawara'
threatens to undermine the protective spirits
'Hekurabe' which support the sky and preserve the
forests. The consequences of continued mining are
apocalyptic for both the Indians and garimpeiros
alike, as the demise of the Hekurabe heralds the end
of the world (Agao Pela Cidadania 1990).
2.7 The decline of the gold rush.
Even though domestic and international pressure
was mounting for the expulsion of the garimpeiros
from the Yanomami lands, a series of laws were
passed which legitimised their activities within the
area. The inter ministerial decree 250/88 Of
10/11/1988 reduced the intended continual Yanomami
reserve of 8 million hectares to 2.4 million
hectares, composed of 19 separate islands. The area
surrounding these isolated Indian reserves was
designated a national forest within which garimpeiros
were free to operate. Two subsequent presidential
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decrees signed on 25/01/90 and 16/02/90 went one step
further by designating three areas specifically for
garimpagem within the recently established national
forest. These were the three garimpeiro reserves of
Uraricoera, Uraricaa-Santa Rosa, and Catrimani-Couto
de Magalhaes, which are marked on figure 2.1.
Although these were created to appease strong
lobbying by garimpeiros, the impressive gold fields
of the Alto Mucajai, as well as the tin ore deposits
of Surucucus, lay outside these areas. Even so, the
garimpeiros started to shift their operations into
the designated reserves where a number of donos made
heavy investments in prospecting, constructing
airstrips, and installing equipment. Encouraged by
the government's legal recognition of their work,
they aimed to secure a major share in what appeared
to be a promising future.
The situation changed dramatically in March 1990
shortly after Fernando Collor de Melo replaced Jose
Sarney as President of Brazil. He immediately revoked
the decrees signed by his predecessor and, under a
blaze of publicity, declared his resolve to expel the
garimpeiros from the whole area that had originally
been proposed as a Yanomami reserve (9.4 million
hectares). The operation "Selva Livre" ("free
forest") was implemented and teams of federal
policemen were ordered to destroy the clandestine
airstrips and remove all garimpeiros from the area.
The temporary garimpeiros were the first to be
squeezed out by this action, mostly returning to
their alternative forms of employment. However, a
large number of the professional garimpeiros stayed
on, repairing the damaged airstrips which the police
had blown up. Ironically, this intervention actually
increased the economic opportunities presented to
many of the garimpeiros- particularly those who owned
sets of pumping equipment (donos de maquinas) . This
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is because the monopoly exerted by the donos do
garimpo was effectively destroyed when their
airstrips were dynamited. Garimpeiros who continued
working in these areas were therefore no longer
obliged to pay fees or buy land off the donos de
garimpo.
Towards the end of 1990, a more convincing phase
of Selva Livre was implemented and federal police
forces started to destroy the motors of any mining
equipment they encountered in the garimpos. This
crippled many of the remaining operations, but more
significantly, it drained the momentum of the gold
rush which had been sustained by a rapid reinvestment
of earnings in prospecting and equipment. Some of the
more resourceful garimpeiros avoided this action by
moving further south within the Yanomami reserve to
mine around the Pico de Neblina in northern Amazonas
34 or by drifting west into Venezuela, although the
Venezuelan National Guard were also trying to evict
them from that side of the border. Nevertheless, a
large number of professionals did leave the reserve,
principally heading for the diamond garimpos on the
cerrado of Roraima and Guyana (Monbiot 1992), as well
as returning to the gold fields of the Tapajds and
Alto Rio Negro.
In spite of its forceful intervention, the
government never fully succeeded in halting mining
within the Yanomami reserve. Throughout 1992 there
were approximately 2000 people working in the area at
any one time and this number had risen to an
estimated 11 000 by early 1993 (Financial Times
20/02/93). The government's inability to prevent this
re-invasion illustrates the power of the socio¬
economic pressures that fuel garimpagem in
34 CCPY 1991 notes a proliferation of garimpo activity in the headwaters of the Mapulau,
Toototobi, Demini, and Tarau rivers. One of the more prominent garimpeiros who moved to
the region of Pico de Neblina in 1991 was Marlon Pinheiro of Serra Pelada fame .
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contemporary Amazonia. If there are no significant
political changes in the immediate future, the number
of garimpeiros working in western Roraima will
probably continue to fluctuate in response to the
intensity of police vigilance, the price of gold, the
time of year, the cost and availability of fuel, and
variations in other sectors of the regional economy.
Roraima's garimpos are not exceptional in
provoking government intervention. A similar response
restricted production in Para's Serra Pelada in 1983,
and in Rondonia's massive cassiterite garimpo of- Bom
Futuro in 1991. In both of these cases, the rights of
garimpeiros to exploit the deposits were being
contested by the formal mining sector. Nor was the
Roraima rush a unique event that brought garimpeiros
into direct conflict with Indians. The Kayapd of
Para, the Waiampi of Amapa and the Tukano of Amazonas
have all shared similar experiences to the Yanomami
in this respect. Furthermore, it is likely that the
invasion of Indian lands throughout the Amazon will
continue as more accessible gold deposits are mined
out. The significant point is that the Roraima gold
rush reflects the salient features common to
informal sector mining as practised throughout
Amazonia.
The government's inability to stop the Roraima
rush convincingly is particularly relevant both to
this discussion and to the analysis that follows. It
suggests that the very phrase 'gold boom' gives the
misleading impression that mining is abandoned when a
natural cycle comes to a close. Both historical
evidence and contemporary events prove this not to be
the case. For example, mining continues to thrive in
Roraima's diamond garimpo of Tepequem, even though
its boom days terminated half a decade ago. There is
a tenacity here that is seldom recognised, but which
is nonetheless reflected in other activities. Perhaps
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the most obvious parallel is to be found in rubber,
which continues to be extracted eighty years after
the rubber boom ended. Just as significantly, rubber
tappers are still visible as a distinct social
category on the Amazonian stage. Their history
suggests that neither garimpeiros, nor their trade,
will simply disappear when the heady boom days pass.
Far from it, they will continue to fulfil a role,
albeit a less conspicuous one, in the diverse social
and economic landscape of Amazonia.
The following chapters look in greater detail at
how garimpagem and its protagonists fit into their
regional context. But this is not simply a case of
slotting a piece of a jigsaw puzzle neatly into its
designated space. Rather, a much more organic
scenario arises from the complex social and economic
interactions of modern Amazonia. Any hard edges to
our jigsaw pieces are rapidly eroded as we witness
considerable flux between a wide range of social
groups and a diversity of livelihoods. The objective
here is not to define and categorise the different
actors in the theatre, but to interpret the
relationships and interchanges between them that
ultimately create the play.
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Chapter 3 Just keep on digging away;
smallholder agriculture and garimpagam in Amazonia
An estimated three million smallholders now live
in the Brazilian Amazon (Richards 1992: 2) . Many of
them were given land along the federal highways in
government colonisation projects during the 1970s. This
planned agricultural settlement model was developed for
the Transamazonian highway in Para and was subsequently
modified in the POLONOROESTE project along the BR 364
in Ronddnia, before being extended to other areas..All
the states in the Brazilian Amazon possessed
government- administered colonisation schemes by the
mid 1980s. Throughout the region the number of
households settled in directed projects is paralleled
by a large population of smallholders who have settled
'spontaneously' without government assistance.
This chapter examines the relationship between
smallholder agriculture and informal sector mining in
Amazonia, arguing that the two are frequently
interlinked. But even before the smallholders arrived,
Amazonian agriculture had already been strongly
influenced by plans aimed at expanding the mineral
sector. Regional economic development was one of the
principal rationales behind the construction of the
highway network, and potential mineral deposits which
had been identified by the geological survey of the
RadamBrasil project influenced the course of the
planned roads (Fearnside 1984: 47) . Some of the
colonisation projects established along these highways
are therefore close to substantial mineral deposits
[e.g. Maraba (PA), Tucuma (PA), Altamira (PA), Alto
Floresta (MT) , Ariquemes (RO), Presidente Figueiredo
(AM) 1
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Labour was subsequently drawn out of these
settlement areas and employed in mining nearby, but it
is hard to argue that this was officially engineered.
Although the state saw corporate mining as the
principal vehicle for mineral exploitation in Amazonia,
its emphasis on capital intensive production ensured
that the formal mining sector offered hardly any
employment to the local agricultural labour force1.
Instead it was through the informal sector that mining
becomes most closely intertwined with the local
agricultural economy. There is evidence from all over
the Amazon of smallholders engaging in informal sector
mining (Cleary 1990, Maennling 1987, Milliken 1991,
Filho 1984, Hecht 1987) . Indeed, Pereira (1990) has
gone so far as to argue that the agricultural frontier
of the 1970s has given way to a mineral frontier, which
has shaped the occupation of Amazonia throughout the
1980s. Although other authors might be reluctant to
conceptualise such developments in terms of frontier
processes2, there is a significant dynamic operating
between the two activities which merits detailed
research.
The life-histories of garimpeiros recorded
throughout the Amazon reveals that a large proportion
of them have previous agricultural experience. The data
presented in table 3.1 is taken from three surveys of
the socio-economic backgrounds of garimpeiros from
three different Amazonian states over the past decade.
1 For a detailed analysis of formal sector mining in the Amazon see Hall (1989)
^ see Cleary in press








CLEARY (1990) MA. 100 53 (53%) 47 (47%)
PEREIRA (1990) PA 168 135 (80%) 33 (20%)
MACMILLAN RR 66 54 (82%) 12 (18%)
TOTAL 334 242 (72%) 92 (28%)
There is a considerable degree of overlap between
the two activities. Half of the garimpeiros interviewed
in each survey had previous experience in agriculture,
and two thirds (72%) of the aggregated sample (334
people) have agricultural backgrounds4. This suggests
that at least half of the workforce employed in the
garimpos of Amazonia is drawn from the agricultural
sector.
Even so, this gives no indication of the
considerable seasonal movement between mining and
agriculture. Pereira (1990) has collected most
information on this topic. A third (32%) of the 168
garimpeiros he interviewed said that they returned to
agricultural work during the rainy season. Another
third (35%) continue mining (usually in other parts of
Amazonia or Brazil) all year round and can therefore be
considered professional garimpeiros, while the
3 All three studies are based on life history interviews in which garimpeiros were asked about
their previous forms of employment. My survey was applied in Entre Rios to garimpeiros entering
the garimpo of Jatapu in 1991; respondents were classified as having agricultural experience if
they had worked in agriculture for at least one year. To avoid bias in interviewing garimpeiros
working near a colonisation project area, garimpeiros who came from within 100 kilometres of
Jatapu were excluded from the survey. As those excluded numbered 11 people, it can be estimated
that local smallholders represented approximately 15% of the Jatapu garimpo during its early
days.
4 The remaining 28% come predominately from cities, the majority having had employment in
the informal sector of the urban economy.
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remainder tend to gravitate towards the urban economy
when not mining.
Thus, evidence from a range of different sources
suggests that there is considerable interaction between
mining and agriculture throughout the Brazilian Amazon.
But the exact dynamics of this relationship remain
virtually unknown. Even so, this is a relevant subject
which is central to ongoing debates about the
livelihood strategies and migratory behaviour of the
Amazonian peasantry. As a contribution to these
discussions the remainder of this chapter looks in
detail at why smallholders go mining.
3.1 The fieldwork survey of colonist farmers.
A survey was undertaken to assess the involvement
of Roraima's smallholders in the gold garimpos of
western Roraima between 1986 and 1990. 288 colonist
households were interviewed from February to September
1991 in the four government colonisation projects of
Alto Alegre, Apiau, PAD Anaua and Caroebe (see fig
1.3). Although questions were directed at both male and
female members of the household, most women were very
reluctant to respond either when alone or when
accompanied by men. They often said that it was not
their duty to discuss such matters and suggested that
it was more appropriate to converse with the male head
of the household. Consequently most of the information
was provided by men, although women were often present
and sometimes participated in discussions.
The four colonisation projects were selected for
analysis because they were considered to be
representative of Roraima's settlement programme as a
whole. All of them are located on Ultisols
(predominately red-yellow podsols), which are common to
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Amazonia. They also display the herringbone pattern
characteristic of Amazonian colonisation schemes, with
farmsteads established every 200 to 300 metres along
both the spinal access road and along the feeder roads
which transect it perpendicularly at five kilometre
intervals. In the case of PAD Anaua and Caroebe the
spinal access road is a federal highway. Although there
are some differences in the infrastructure of each
colonisation project, the single most important variant
to the smallholder is probably distance from the
principal market of Boa Vista. Projects nearest -Boa
Vista, like Alto Alegre and Apiau, are serviced by a
government lorry which transports colonists' produce to
the weekly urban market5. More distant settlement
schemes, like PAD Anaua and Caroebe, lie beyond the
catchment area of this free lorry service and farmers
in these schemes often have to accept disadvantageous
prices set by private merchants who have a monopoly on
transport. Although farmers from these two southerly
projects were better placed to sell produce in Manaus,
the mining economy had made Boa Vista a more favourable
market during the latter part of the 1980s and early
1990s, and so much of their agricultural output was
trucked north.
The four colonisation projects, like others in
both Roraima and elsewhere, are dominated by migrants
from the Brazilian Northeast. In Alto Alegre, 85% of
holdings were originally allocated (in 1978) to
northeastern households (INCRA records; Boa Vista).
Subsequent land sales had reduced this figure to 75% in
1991. PAD Anaua was initiated by the federal government
5 This transportation service was initiated in 1985, but received only limited support from the
various state governors, and was abandoned for the best part of the gold-rush until 1991 when
Ottomar de Souza Pinto took office and resucitated the scheme. Roraima's smallholders are
exceptionally fortunate in Amazonian terms in benefitting from this transportation service.
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in the same year, but has a slightly lower proportion
of Northeasterners (63%). Apiau and Caroebe were
established in 1981 and 1983 respectively, and although
they too are dominated by Northeasterners (63% in the
case of Caroebe according to SUDAM 1984), they contain
a larger percentage of families who originate in the
Centre-South of Brazil. Their occupation coincided with
the second wave of colonisation from Rondonia
identified in chapter 1. As INCRA cannot say with
accuracy how many households currently reside within
the colonisation project areas, this prevented a sample
stratification on the basis of migratory origin. Even
so, the sample taken appears to broadly represent the
origins of smallholders in the state as a whole. Of the
288 households interviewed 199 (66%) originated from
the Northeast, 42 (15%) from the Centre-South, and 55
(19%) came from other states.
Sampling in colonisation project areas is far from
straight-forward because out migration and land sales
ensure that colonist lots are often unoccupied, though
rarely disowned. Silveira and Gatti (1988) estimate
that 23% of those initially settled in PAD Anaua had
abandoned the project by 1986; similarly, a survey
(SUDAM 1984) of agricultural settlement along the
eastern section of the BR 210 (which included the
project of Caroebe) noted that 16% of the holdings had
been sold within four years of the road's
construction6. The trend is for an initially even
distribution of households in colonisation projects to
become less populous along feeder roads as producers
with greater capital amalgamate several holdings and
establish small ranches of 200-500 hectares in these
6 Even so these are far lower than rates of colonist attrition recorded in Rondonia and along the
Transamazonian highway (which vary between 13-67% according to Hecht 1987)
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areas (Coy 1987 :260 reports a similar trend in
Rondonia). Because differences in the wealth of
smallholders may acquire a spatial manifestation in
this way, it was important to stratify the sample to
avoid bias. Approximately half (46%) of the households
interviewed were resident along the central axis road
of the colonisation project, and the remaining 54% were
situated along the less accessible feeder roads.
Another distortion comes from the tendency for
migrants from a particular state to cluster along
certain feeder roads. Land holdings along one feeder
road may be dominated by a tight group of migrants who
all flocked to the area on the advice of a relative or
friend from their original community. It therefore
becomes important to gain a detailed knowledge of the
settlement process of any colonisation project before
identifying the areas from which respondents are to be
selected. In theory, random sampling of all feeder
roads in any one colonisation project should be
undertaken to avoid these problems, but in practice
such a strategy may be prohibitively time consuming,
particularly if the research is undertaken on foot. For
not only does it entail travelling long distances to
interview a handful of people on each feeder road, it
is also likely that many of the land holdings randomly
selected are either permanently abandoned, temporarily
vacant, or annexed to another farmer's land.
Instead of using random sampling, a stratified
systematic approach was adopted for this study in
response to the problems outlined above.
Familiarisation with the colonisation project was
gained by spending a few days in its infrastructural
centre talking to extension workers, INCRA
administrators, and colonists. In this way, feeder
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roads and a segment of the trunk road were identified
along which interviews would be conducted. The
familiarisation process afforded an opportunity to
explain the nature of the research and to gain
necessary introductions and offers of accommodation in
the relevant areas of the colonisation project. This
gave access to localised social networks which greatly
facilitated interviewing. Instead of appearing
unannounced on a smallholder's doorstep, the researcher
is introduced by a neighbour, and is informed of the
times and places at which it would be most convenient
to meet respondents. This is particularly useful
because many of the farmers who reside in the project's
administrative centre travel daily to work on their
holdings. Perhaps more importantly, this method permits
the continual cross-checking of an individual's
responses against discussions with their neighbours and
relatives, a procedure which is not possible under
random sampling.
Information on previous employment in the garimpo,
migratory experiences, and the origin of households was
collected through life history interviews. This was the
only data that was systematically gathered from
households who had no garimpo experiences in the Apiau
and Caroebe projects. But in the projects of Alto
Alegre and PAD Anaua more data on land tenure and off-
farm income formation was recorded from all the
households interviewed (n=98). Further information was
gathered in all of the colonisation projects from
households that did have a member participating in
garimpagem. The quality of this information was
variable; in some cases people were reluctant to
discuss the matter, and in others the relevant
individual was away and poor quality data was provided
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by other members of the family. Having discarded any
problematic responses, 94 accounts of smallholders'
experiences in the gold rush remained, giving details
of 184 journeys made to the gold mines of western
Roraima between 1986-1990. These accounts included
information on the garimpos visited, the time spent on
each trip, gold earnings recovered, diseases
contracted, and subsequent investments (or
disinvestments) made.
3.2 Smallholder farming and migration to the garimpos.
Agriculture in Roraima is a highly seasonal
activity. This is because most smallholders concentrate
on the production of only four annual crops; rice,
manioc, maize, and to a lesser extent beans. In common
with colonist agriculture throughout Amazonia, rice is
by far the most important of these crops, typically
accounting for half of the area devoted to them, and
representing approximately 60% of their total harvest
value (IBGE 1990) . Except for a growing number of
farmers who plant bananas in response to favourable
prices, the use of perennial crops is very restricted,
even though the extension service ASTER encourages
their cultivation.
It is particularly important to understand the
seasonality of the agricultural year because it
determines the ease with which mining can be integrated
with farming. Smallholders typically practise annual
slash and burn cycles, clearing a patch of 2-4 hectares
of either forest or regrowth between January and
February. The prepared area (ropa) is fired once it is
sufficiently dry and is planted at the onset of the
first rains in March/April. Farmers frequently sow
grass seed am^ng their annual crops so that a pasture
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is established on the site after the harvest. This
practice is adopted even by the considerable number of
smallholders who do not own cows, because it increases
the value of their land holdings. The crops are tended
throughout the wet season until harvesting, which is in
July for maize, and August/September for rice and
beans. Manioc is usually left for 15-18 months before
harvesting and does not follow any defined cycle.. The
demand for labour fluctuates in accordance with the
seasonality of the agricultural year so that extra
labour is often contracted at peak times of clearing
and harvesting. In contrast, householders may be under
employed on the land holding during the dry season
(October to January in Roraima) , which is the most
productive mining season.
The gold rush, therefore presented an excellent
opportunity for farmers to supplement their
agricultural incomes during the slack summer months. In
49% of the 288 households interviewed, an individual
who was previously employed on the smallholding went to
work in the gold garimpos between 1987 and 1990 (see
table 3.2). An even higher proportion of households had
contact with the gold economy via relatives employed in
other activities, but since these individuals had not
moved directly from agriculture into the garimpos, they
were not recorded in this survey.
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In most households the male head was usually the
only person to go mining (86%), although in 15% of
households it was younger men who went (usually sons of
the household head)7. Both the father and son migrated
to the garimpos together in only two households and
female participation was equally rare8.
The degree of smallholder participation in
garimpagem is closely related to individual's state of
origin. Northeasterners are more likely to go mining
than migrants who originate in the Brazilian Centre-
South9. The colonists themselves use cultural
distinctions to explain this disparity, arguing that
garimpagem is in the blood of the Northeasterner.
Certainly the Brazilian Northeast does have a much
longer history of mineral extraction than the Centre-
south, but these culturally-defined assertions are
questionable. The proportion of Centre-southerners that
did participate is not insignificant and evidence from
other parts of Amazonia (notably Mato Grosso and
Rondonia) also notes that they may be equally
enthusiastic miners 10.
A more likely explanation is to be found in the
different agricultural practices of migrants from the
Northeast and Centre-south (Fearnside 1980 :117). The
suggestion is that migrant farmers from central and
southern Brazil tend to make higher capital investments
in their land holdings than their northeastern
7 The apparently small percentage of sons registered by the survey as working in the garimpo
reflects a tendency for young men to leave the landholding at an early age.
8 In both cases the women went to work as cooks, one of them was single and went alone on the
invitation of a friend who was a dono de maquina, the other was a widowed head of household
who entered the garimpo with her two sons.
9 55% of the 191 northeastern households interviewed had a member who went to the garimpos,
compared with 21% of those from the Centresouth (n=42), and 46% of those originating in other
states (n=55)
*0
pers. comm. Antonio Feijao 1991, though centre-southerners tend to be more capitalised
donos according to Cleary pers. comm. 1992
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colleagues. In many cases they arrive in the Amazon
with more capital at their disposal, having sold land
in the South. The detailed analysis of the Alto Alegre
and PAD Anaua projects is confirmatory; 95% of the
Centre-southerners had actually bought their land
holdings in these projects, whereas the majority (63%)
of migrants from other states (including the Northeast)
had acquired their land free (mostly from the original
government distribution of holdings). Half of the
Centre-southerners also had alternative sources of off-
farm earnings, which is a primary determinant- of
disposable income. This suggests that they were
wealthier than most of the northeastern farmers and
that they had incomes to see them through the
agriculturally unproductive summer months. For this
reason the opportunity cost of a trip to the garimpo is
probably higher to Centre-southerners than it is to
Northeasterners.
The survey also raises an interesting question
over the spatial patterns of smallholder migration to
the garimpo. Although Apiau and Alto Alegre are the
colonisation projects closest to the garimpos, rates of
smallholder migration from these areas were actually
lower than from the more distant projects11. It seems
surprising that a higher percentage of farmers left the
remote projects to go mining but, interestingly enough,
exactly the same observation has been made of colonist
behaviour on the other side of the Brazilian Amazon:
'With the discovery of garimpos in
Rondonia numerous colonists have abandoned
at least temporarily their agricultural
plots within settlement areas... According
to local informants many of those that
1 * 52% of smallholders in Caroebe and PAD Anaua went to the garimpos, compared to 48% from
Alto Alegre and Apiau.
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rapidly migrated tn the garimpo [at Rio
Massagana 1 were members q£ colonist
households fxem distant settlement areas '
(Milliken 1991 p.124 - my emphasis)
Rates of smallholder participation in garimpagem
therefore do not decline sharply with distance. Perhaps
this is because the garimpo is such an attractive
prospect to smallholders that the concept of 'distance-
friction' scarcely applies to their migratory
behaviour. But this is only part of the explanation as
the garimpos' effect on the structure of local markets
is also relevant. Cleary (1990) has noted in Maranhao
that the garimpeiros' demand for foodstuffs may boost
the local agricultural market, creating favourable
prices for smallholders nearby. It is therefore
improbable that the farmers who benefit from this
locally-improved market will sacrifice such favourable
economic circumstances to go mining. Instead, they are
likely to enter the local market either as agricultural
producers or providers of services (notably
entertainments), secure in the knowledge that a
considerable demand exists for their products in situ.
This option is clearly not available to smallholders
situated in more distant colonisation projects, and for
them migration to the garimpos is probably the most
obvious strategy for increasing income in the short
term.
The garimpo therefore creates the rare conditions
that place producers in direct contact with a buoyant
rural market, denying rural-urban traders their
privileged position in local commerce. The nature and
extent of this local market is closely related to
events in the garimpo and is highly dependent upon
lines of access to it. For example, the trunk road at
Apiau was the principal route into all of the Roraima
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gold garimpos during the early stages of the rush. At
that time many of the smallholders residing there were
able to sell produce (notably rice, beans, poultry,
beef, and manioc flour) on their doorsteps at
favourable prices to garimpeiros. But subsequently,
airstrips were constructed in the garimpos and access
to them was by air. Even though a new airstrip was
built at the end of the. Apiau trunk road to service the
mines, most pilots preferred to operate from Boa Vista
or Alto Alegre, so the interaction between Apiau and
the mining economy declined. Alto Alegre, on the other
hand, which had not previously been an important
through-route to the mines, benefited greatly from the
shift towards air traffic. The subsequent proliferation
of bars, restaurants, and grocery stalls testify that
local smallholders were quick to capitalise on the new
demand for foodstuffs and entertainments in the town.
It is important not to allow these more specific
observations to eclipse the overall picture. From the
outset, the mines drew virtually all the casual
workforce (mainly formed by sharecroppers) from the
colonisation projects, leading to a rapid contraction
of agricultural labour. A number of the landed
smallholders also left for the garimpos in these early
stages particularly single men, or those with previous
mining experience. But the exodus from the colonisation
projects gathered pace following the unusually wet
summer of 1988/89. The heavy rainfall prevented many of
the smallholders from burning their clearings (ropas)
successfully, encouraging them to turn to mining
instead12. By this stage diesel pumps were installed in
12 The subject of burning is complex and difficult to substantiate in the absence of the neccessary
rainfall data. It appears that few of the colonists from the Caroebe and PAD Anaud in the south of
the state acquired satisfactory burns on their clearings over the two dry seasons 1988/89 and
1989/90. The increased area of planted manioc relative to the overall decrease in areas planted
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many of the garimpos, permitting the activity to
continue throughout the wet season. As the rush swelled
there were few clear distinctions between the people
who were drawn into the mines.
It is surprising that security of land tenure does
little to slow out migration to the garimpos. One of
the stated aims of Amazonian colonisation is to 'fix
people to the land' and giving landowners secure title
to their holdings is usually regarded as the most
effective means of achieving this. But the evidence
here suggests that this is not the case because even
those colonists who did have registered land titles
(Titulos Definitivos) migrated to the garimpo at the
same rate as those smallholders who had no legal claim
to their land13. Presumably those without security of
tenure are less keen to leave their holdings for the
garimpos as they run the risk of returning to find
somebody has taken their land.
The sudden movement of labour from agriculture
into mining led to a dramatic decline in the amount of
land devoted to food production. Figure 3.3 illustrates
that the area under cultivation with the four principal
crops (bananas, rice, maize and manioc) fell by 34%
between 1985-1990. Yet over the same period, the
state's population expanded by 73% so that the ratio of
cultivated land per head of population diminished by
63% in the interim.
under annual crops is indicative, as manioc, unlike rice and maize still produces reasonable yields
on unburnt land (see appendix to fig 3.3 ). The effect of the heavy rain was less dramatic further
north, and it is clear that many of the colonists who remained on their lots in Alto Alegre and
Apiau managed to get good burns, whilst those who had been in the garimpos failed to do so,
having not returned sufficiently early to prepare their land for burning.
13 The only complete data on registered land titles was from the Alto Alegre project where 44%
of colonists held Titulos Definitivos to their holdings.
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Appendix to fig 3.3. Table comparing the area planted under annual crops
with population in Roraima 1985-1990.
AREA PLANTED UNDER ANNUAL CROPS (HA) 1985- 1990
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
CROP TYPE
banana 500 2419 2504 3005 1859 1989
dry rice 9124 8238 5546 5728 3855 3000
irrigated rice 602 1200 1341 1490 2775 3025
maize 8665 6044 6753 6952 3807 3318
manioc 1537 2583 1177 1567 1974 2132
total 20448 20484 17321 18752 14271 13439
1985=100 100 100 85 92 70 66
POPULATION 159600 163571 177693 233422 275082 276322
1985=100 100 103 111 146 172 173
PLANTED AREA/POP 0 .128 0.125 0.097 0.08 0.052 0.048
1985=100 100 98 76 62.5 41 37
Source: Secretaria de Agricultura and SUCAM Boa Vista
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Ironically, local farmers met only a small proportion
of the huge demand for foodstuffs that accompanied the
gold rush. Most of the garimpeiros found it more
convenient (and reliable) to supply their mining
operations with provisions purchased in the
supermarkets of Boa Vista. These retailers were
themselves freighting goods directly from the south of
Brazil. Thus, the state's most dynamic phase of
economic expansion was matched by a growing dependence
on imported agricultural produce.
Poor local transport prevented smallholders from
competing effectively with these corporate retailers
for a share of the booming urban economy. It was only
in the immediate hinterland of Boa Vista that the
favourable economic climate of the rush was felt. The
only noticeable demand-led land-use change occurred in
this zone as a number of capitalised smallholders moved
into horticultural production. They provided the salads
and fruits to meet the increasing demand for restaurant
food in Boa Vista. Although this was restricted to a
small number of producers, it proved to be a highly
profitable venture for those involved, with incomes
sometimes exceeding US$ 150 per week during the peak
dry season.
3.3 Gold mining and smallholder economics.
Smallholders planned their trips to the garimpos
with care and usually restricted their absences from
their holdings to periods of about three months. It is
hard to evaluate the degree to which women participated
in the formulation of such decisions. On the whole,
proposed mining ventures were initially discussed among
groups of male farmers who knew one another, and their
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suggestions were only subsequently aired to the
remainder of their households. The outcome was that
bands of farmers co-ordinated their migration to the
garimpos and entered the mines together. Within such
groups novices were introduced to garimpagem by their
more experienced colleagues and wealthier farmers often
advanced money to other members of the group for the
costs of the journey. Even though women were seldom the
first to be consulted over the matter it is wrong to
assume they accepted the situation passively.
Matriarchal figures appear to dominate a number- of
households and it is clear that they would not have
allowed such significant migratory decisions to be made
without voicing their concerns.
A trip to the garimpos is not cheap. Although
costs vary according to the transport used, an
excursion may demand a substantial outlay relative to
the income of most smallholders. Before 1987, access
was either on foot or, in fewer cases, by boat.
Smallholders would need to provide all of the necessary
food, medicine and equipment (including fishing tackle,
hunting gear and prospecting materials) for the
fortnight-long trip. Farmers interviewed at Entre Rios
(near Caroebe) typically spent between US$ 50-100 to
equip themselves for a walk of similar length into the
garimpo at Jatapu. Following the construction of the
first airstrips, most people entered by light aircraft.
But expenses usually doubled as a result with a return
trip typically costing 15 grams of gold (approximately
US$ 225, although usually only ten grams were paid in
advance) . In some cases flights were paid by donos,
especially if the colonists had agreed to work for them
on arrival. In the majority of cases though, it was the
smallholders themselves who provided this capital,
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which was often raised by selling livestock, grain,
bicycles or occasionally land. As the value of a cow
was roughly equivalent to ten grams of gold or the cost
of a flight into the garimpos, smallholders with
livestock often sold a cow to finance a mining trip
with the objective of purchasing more on their return.
These outlays only acquire a significance when
compared to the returns from gold mining. Figure 3.4
illustrates the quantities of gold brought back to the
household by 94 colonist farmers who made a total of
184 trips to the gold garimpos between 1986 and 1990.
It is important to realise that the data does not
represent garimpeiro incomes directly as it includes
net costs to the colonist, such as air flights and
other expenses within the garimpo. Real garimpeiro
earnings are at least 5 grams per month higher, given
that a return flight costs 15 grams and a three month
stay is the average length of time spent between
flights. Even so, real wages can not be directly
extrapolated from the gold earnings brought back to the
colonists' household, because different individuals may
spend varying amounts of gold on entertainments in the
gold fields. Travelling salesmen, prostitutes, drug
dealers, bar owners, and photographers are all kept in
employment within the garimpos. It is difficult to make
general rules about an individual's expenditure, but it
is probably fair to say that colonists tend to be more
conservative than professional garimpeiros in their
spending habits, particularly as many of the former
entered the garimpo with the specific intention of
bringing cash back to the household.
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The data presented in figure 3.4 provides an
understanding of the distribution of gold earnings and
illustrates the levels of income which are subsequently
incorporated into household economics. But before
starting to interpret these findings, there are two
points which merit consideration. Firstly, a
distinction is drawn between journeys that did not
produce sufficient gold to cover expenses (termed
"losses"), and trips in which gold earnings were
sufficient to break even but resulted in no net gains
to the colonist (termed "zero"). Secondly, land sales
in the colonisation projects are likely to
overemphasise somewhat the proportion of smallholders
who earned higher levels of income in the garimpo. This
is because some colonists who ended up broke (blefado)
in the garimpos sold their lots to wealthier
garimpeiros, and often moved to unclaimed land (terras
devolutas) on the fringes of the colonisation projects
areas where they cleared new holdings. Conversely,
colonists who recovered substantial amounts of gold in
the garimpos rarely sold their lots even if they did
invest a proportion of their wealth elsewhere14.
Garimpagem is a risky business as figure 3.4
shows. In 31% of the journeys made, smallholders failed
to bring any gold back to their homesteads. Of these
unsuccessful journeys only one third (32%) yielded
sufficient gold to cover the overheads of the trip, the
remainder (68%) resulted in a net loss to the
smallholder. These unsuccessful trips must be evaluated
against the large number of lucrative journeys made.
Half of the trips made by smallholders yielded earnings
of over 20 grams a month. Furthermore, in a very small
14 Throughout the whole survey, (288 respondents) only one incident was recorded of a colonist
selling his lot having struck it rich.
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number of cases incomes were considerable. 3% of the
mining ventures recorded here produced over half a
kilogram of gold per month. This proves that although
garimpagem is undoubtedly a risky option, the majority
of trips yield a respectable income and the potential
gains may be very high.
All of the smallholders who were interviewed
initially went to the garimpos either to work manually
or as machine-hands for others. Six of them later
became owners of their own sets of garimpo equipment
(donos de maquina) . It is usually only those colonists
reinvesting their gold earnings back into the garimpo
who become donos de maquinas. One of the most common
ways of doing so is to finance prospecting trips, but
this is probably the riskiest activity in the mining
economy. Here previous experience is advantageous but,
it is not determinant as the occasional discovery of
large deposits by inexperienced prospectors testifies.
Besides, the unpredictable distribution of gold among
the sediments of Western Roraima ensures that pure luck
is never excluded from the equation15. It is hard for an
individual to insure against unstable mining incomes by
seeking alternative forms of employment in the garimpo.
Even though a number of jobs are remunerated by fixed
wages (cooking, constructing rafts [balsas] on which to
mount equipment, carrying out mechanical repairs and
building airstrips), they represent only a small
fraction of total garimpo employment. Consequently,
colonists rationalise their excursions in terms of the
highly variable nature of garimpo incomes. They accept
in this respect Roraima differs from Southeastern Pari, where (according to the garimpeiros)
the gold was more uniformly distributed in the subsoil. The garimpeiro rationalise this by saying
that gold shifts around under the ground and only makes itself available to those who deserve it.
Hence a site which was mined unsuccessfully by one person can be reworked at a later date and
yield gold to somebody else.
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with resignation unsuccessful trips, recognising that
all of their previous losses may be recuperated from
only one lucky visit to the garimpo.
The opportunity cost of any one excursion relates
to the profitability of an individual's agricultural
enterprise, as well as the timing of their absence in
relation to the farming year. Most smallholders go
mining during the summer months, and they usually
transfer their reduced workload at this time onto other
members of the household. Thus, although farm income
may diminish, it is rarely altogether lost. Rough
calculations made during the relatively productive year
of 1991 suggest that a smallholder tending 2 hectares
of rice, maize and manioc, with one further hectare of
bananas, could expect a monthly cash income equivalent
to 29 grams of gold (CR$ 134 800 or US$ 337) 16. This
is taken to be the best case situation for smallholders
in Roraima, who are neither capitalised horticultural
producers nor small ranchers. The higher value of gold
on world markets during the principal years of the gold
rush (1987-89), coupled with the very bleak outlook for
Roraima's agriculture at that time, suggest that an
excursion to the garimpo which yielded 20 grams a month
or more was probably recompensatory.
Employing the same standard to interpret figure
3.4 indicates that exactly half of the trips made
generate favourable returns. But these calculations do
not consider the financial implications of contracting
a disease in the garimpos, where ill health is rife.
Half (49%) of the smallholders that went mining
contracted an illness (predominantly malaria) on at
16 This is cash income only from sold produce, and does not include the considerable value of
familial consumption. In fact, it is rare for colonists to plant as much as a hectare with bananas,
which explains the relatively high income that this farmer earned. The calculations here are made
at a rate of USS 12 = 1 gram of gold, which applied during 1991.
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least one of their journeys, with 29% of excursions
resulting in sickness. A bout of malaria is in fact
easy to cure if the strain of Plasmodium is identified
by microscope early in the development of the disease.
However, the necessary equipment and trained personnel
are rarely present in the garimpo where treatment is
not only inadequate but often leads to the development
of resistant strains. Most garimpeiros take a limited
pharmacy with them, but its efficacy is compromised by
their inability to identify the specific type of
malaria contracted. A garimpeiro with malaria has three
main options; they can attempt to treat it in the
garimpo (which normally costs over 30 grams of gold 17) ,
they can fly out (which costs between 5 to 10 grams and
will obviously put a stop to their garimpo income) , or
they can choose to continue working, albeit at a lower
rate of productivity. A dose of malaria may therefore
incur significant costs, and colonists often have to
spend a large percentage of their mining incomes on
treating the disease. This not only drains gold
earnings, but also influences the farmer's subsequent
productivity on the smallholding. A number of colonists
mentioned that on returning from the garimpos with
malaria, they were too weak to prepare a sizeable area
for cultivation the following year.
Notwithstanding the costs to the individual
concerned, the movement to and from the garimpos can
increase disease transmission within the colonisation
projects where women and children often sustain
themselves on poor diets in the absence of their men
folk. A gradual decline in the incidence of malaria in
Roraima since 1983 was temporarily reversed during the
17 Within the garimpo a daily dose of quinine costs one gram of gold, and each intravenous
serum pack is four to five grams
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gold rush years. This problem is compounded because the
incorrect administration of anti-malarial drugs in the
garimpo creates strains of malaria that are
increasingly resistant to chloroquine-based treatment.
In 1989, the incidence of malaria in Roraima rose to
79.7 positive cases per thousand population (SUDAM
1991). This is significant as the expansion of land for
agricultural production, which is usually associated
with increases in malaria, had slowed in the state
since 1986, with only one small colonisation project
being established during this period (Trairao near
Tepequem).
The provision of public health care in the
garimpos could have done much to reduce the spread of
malaria in the state. But while this would have been
beneficial to both the garimpeiros and the Yanomami, it
was a politically unacceptable option. The presence of
government health workers in the garimpos would not
only serve to legitimise the illegal invasion of the
Yanomami reserve, but it would also have made gold
mining even more attractive option to smallholders by
removing one of the most significant outlays from their
operating costs.
The gold rush therefore had a considerable impact
on the geography of disease transmission in Roraima.
Clearly, any economic evaluation of either garimpeiros'
incomes or garimpagem as an activity must take into
account the very real costs of disease.
3.4 Colonist farmer's decision-making and risk-
evaluation
In view of these findings, it might seem
surprising that so many colonists go mining. Half of
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the journeys that they make are not profitable and many
of them actually incur expenses which need to be met
from very limited incomes. Add debilitating diseases
and extortionate hospital bills to the equation and it
seems that mining may not be such an attractive option
after all. So why do large numbers of smallholders
migrate to the garimpos, especially when it is widely
believed that risk aversion strategies lie at the heart
of peasant economics?
Some of the answers lie in the way that
smallholders make their decisions. Firstly, as -the
consequences of their economic strategies are
unequally shared throughout the household, a gender
bias is incorporated within the decision-making
process. There are clearly exceptions to this
observation. But in general terms, women and children
tend not to dominate the formulation of decisions, even
though they are usually obliged to undertake an
increased workload if men from their household migrate
to the garimpos. In the absence of their menfolk, some
women continued to work in agriculture, while others
moved to the towns and engaged in petty trading to take
advantage of the booming urban economy. In both cases
women became responsible for the provision of household
income, fulfilling a crucial role that permitted the
temporary exodus of male labour from the smallholding.
For the men, a trip to the garimpo is undoubtedly hard
work, but it is nevertheless an adventure, and it does
represent a welcome break from the monotony of
agricultural work. Besides, during these trips away,
farmers enjoyed a financial and social independence
that they rarely experienced on the smallholding. It is
therefore not surprising that in a few cases their
responsibility towards family welfare waned on entering
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the predominantly male working environment of the gold
fields.
Secondly, colonists seldom appraise either garimpo
incomes or the health risks of mining in a realistic
fashion. In part this stems from ignorance, as the
majority of farmers interviewed had no previous mining
experience prior to the rush. But even those
smallholders who mine regularly tend not to evaluate
these points accurately. Contrary to the findings of
the malarial agency SUCAM, smallholders argue that
there is an equal chance of contracting malaria in both
mining and agriculture. In this way disease is
effectively discounted as a relevant factor in weighing
up the two options. Similarly, the possibility of
making a big strike is often exaggerated by
smallholders, who are drawn to the garimpo not only by
the modest wages they are likely to receive, but by the
faint possibility that they might hit the jackpot
(bamburrar). Every colonisation project has a
smallholder who hit the big time in the garimpos. Their
large house and sizeable herd of cows stand as a
continual reminder to other colonists that the garimpo
can deliver the goods to whoever is prepared to take
the risk. The really important point is that this is a
possibility which simply does not exist in agriculture.
Although farming offers greater security, is less
disease ridden, and provides a subsistence living, it
offers absolutely no prospects for getting seriously
rich.
But smallholder migration to the garimpos can
only be interpreted with accuracy if it is considered
in its context as a livelihood strategy. Colonists are
constantly on the look out for sources of off-farm
income and here the garimpo is only one of various
100
alternatives available to them. In Roraima, these
include the extraction of forest products (SUDAM 1984),
urban employment (Abers & Pereira, 1992), public sector
positions, and waged work in other agricultural
enterprises. The detailed analysis of off-farm income
formation in the Alto Alegre and PAD Anaua projects
showed that only 15% of the 157 colonist households
interviewed depended upon agriculture for their sole
source of income. Of the remainder, 31% had non-
agricultural incomes and did not participate in the
garimpos, 16% had non-agricultural incomes but also
went mining, while 38% had no source of off-farm income
other than garimpagem 18. This suggests that although
farming does offer a subsistence livelihood, most
smallholders regard agriculture on its own as being a
pretty unsatisfactory means of making a living.
This is why colonists are often very reluctant to
invest the limited capital that they gain from other
sources back into farming. Of the 94 colonist
garimpeiros interviewed, only 19 (20%) said that they
had invested a proportion of their gold earnings on
their land holdings 19. For the most part, the colonists
regarded their garimpo incomes as a windfall profit,
permitting the purchase of substantial items which they
seldom had the resources to buy. So other than a
proportion being spent on entertainments (particularly
by single men), a considerable amount was invested in
consumer durables (refrigerators, radios, gas stoves,
beds, T.V.s), as well as being used to pay off
outstanding debts, buying means of transport, or
This data is based on the economic activities of colonists over the three year period 1986-
1990; their engagement in off-farm activities was usually seasonal.
19 This may be conservative for smallholders tended to note only tangible items when discussing
the expenditure of their garimpo earnings. They seldom assessed the often considerable outlays
made in employing casual labour, until prompted.
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financing specialised hospital treatment for ill
members of the family. Thus, even though it has been
argued that a lack of financial resources is often a
principal constraint on colonist agriculture (Fearnside
1980), smallholders are often more interested in
investing the limited capital that is available to
them, elsewhere.
Furthermore, colonists were given no advice on how
their gold could be invested so as to yield
agricultural incomes over the longer term. In this
respect extension workers missed a rare opportunity to
encourage smallholders to adopt perennial cropping
systems that are more closely tuned to local ecology.
Thus, most (15 out of 19) smallholders who did invest
gold in their holdings purchased cows, some of which
were sold shortly afterwards. Livestock tends to
increase in value gradually relative to inflation, is
easily transported and is readily sold at any time of
the year20. But above all, as cattle-raising places
minimal demands on household labour, it does not
prevent smallholders from pursuing alternative economic
strategies. Indeed, owning livestock may actually
enhance their ability to take risks. Buying and selling
cows, relative to high-risk ventures like garimpagem,
is an effective way of riding out the large
fluctuations in income which characterise such gambles.
The latter point receives greater consideration in the
following chapter, but at this stage it is worth noting
that smallholders' agricultural management is often
shaped by their desire to keep alternative options
open. This offers an insight into why colonist farmers
20 For a more detailed review of the reasons why smallholders like buying cows see Feamside
1989.
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might be reluctant to adopt longer-term cropping
systems21.
3.5 Can garimpo migration be managed through
appropriate agricultural policy?
All of these findings illustrate that garimpagem
makes good economic sense to smallholders throughout
the Amazon. Unfortunately this suggests that, the
pressure on mineral rich Indian lands is likely to
continue for the forseeable future. This is
problematic. In attempting to police such areas -the
government is battling to restrain hoards of rural and
urban poor from pursuing what is one of the few
economically viable options open to them. It is hardly
surprising that the authorities have been unable to
prevent garimpeiros entering Indian reserves as they
are essentially addressing the effects, and not the
root causes, of the problem. A long-term solution can
only be found if policy is directed at the underlying
socio-economic forces that currently fuel the invasion
of Indian lands.
Having examined the motives behind smallholder
participation in the gold rush, and having recognised
that farmers account for over half of the Amazon's
garimpeiros, it is interesting to explore whether
garimpo migration can be regulated through changes in
agricultural policy. Perhaps the key question here
concerns the relationship between landlessness and
migration to the garimpos. It is well known that an
increasingly inequitable distribution of land in the
Brazilian Northeast has been primarily responsible for
21 For the difficulties of promoting tree cultivation in Amazonian settlement schemes see
Milliken's evaluation of perennial crops in Rondonia's POLONOROESTE project. Milliken
(1991)
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fuelling migration into the Amazon, and many of these
landless migrants have subsequently joined the garimpo
workforce. But although this is certainly true, it is
wrong to infer from this, as some people have (de Silva
et al. 1986: 25, Butler 1990 : 5), that garimpeiros are
for the most part landless rural workers.
Table 3.5 presents data on the land tenure status
of 234 garimpeiros interviewed in Para and Roraima.








PEREIRA (1990) PA 168 81 (48%) 54 (32%) 33 (20%)
MACMILLAN RR 66 20 (30%) 15 (23%) 31 (47%)
TOTAL 234 101 (43%) 69 (29%) 64 (27%)
In both studies garimpeiros were classified either
as land owners (irrespective of whether or not they
have land titles), the offspring of landed parents (but
not owning land in their own right) , or as completely
landless (neither respondent nor parent possessing
land) . The key observation is that over half of the
respondents in both surveys either have their own land,
or have access to the land via their parents' holdings.
If the data from both studies is aggregated, then 43%
of respondents are landed, and only 27% can be
considered truly landless.
It is likely that many of the migrants who flooded
into the Amazon, having been squeezed off their
holdings in the Northeast, subsequently acquired land
whilst moving throughout the basin with the 1980s gold
rush. Although strong pressures on land in south¬
eastern Para and Rondonia probably afforded few
opportunities for landless garimpeiros to acquire
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holdings in these areas, there is an abundance of
relatively accessible land around other mining centres
such as the Tapajos and Roraima. Indeed the garimpeiros
union in the Tapajbs actually co-ordinates the
distribution of agricultural land to landless
garimpeiros in the area (Alberto E.C. da Paixao
[SEICON] pers. comm. Jan. 1992).
But there is more to this story. We have already
seen that for every person working in the garimpo
itself even more people are employed in related
activities in urban areas. Abers' research in Boa Vista
(Abers 1992- which is discussed in greater depth in
chapter 5) shows that many of the people currently
employed in this informal urban economy were originally
rural producers from the Northeast. They moved to the
cities, having been pushed off the land either
violently or by unfavourable economics, and now form
part of a transient labour force which moves from city
to city as new opportunities arise. Thus, the largest
proportion of landless migrants who moved into the
Amazon during the last two decades probably ended up,
not in the garimpos themselves, but, in the informal
sector of the gold boom cities. This explains why the
concentration of land in the Northeast, which clearly
fuels migration into the Amazon, is not reflected in a
higher proportion of landless garimpeiros.
Before proceeding it is important to recognise
that the following discussion is based on the results
of only 234 interviews. While this does allow for some
new interpretations of the migratory processes related
to garimpagem, it is clearly not a sufficient basis on
which to formulate policy. Here these findings are
analysed, but perhaps the most important point is to
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recognise the need for greater data collection on this
subject.
Ironically, while many of the people currently
involved in the Amazonian informal mining economy have
at some stage been shoved off land in the Northeast, it
is questionable whether land reform will do much to
slow down migration to the garimpos. The real issue
here is not that people have no land but that they are
not using the land which they have as their only form
of employment. The evidence from Roraima suggests that,
while agriculture does provide a subsistence
livelihood, farmers will seize any opportunity to
invest their labour and, albeit limited, capital
outside the agricultural economy if favourable
opportunities arise. Witnessing large numbers of landed
farmers, including those with land titles, going to the
garimpos indicates quite clearly that Amazonian
agriculture, as it is currently practised, does little
to 'fix people to the land'.
The crux is whether appropriate agricultural
policy can prevent those farmers who already own land
from migrating to the garimpos. Certainly, the
desperately low agricultural incomes and lack of
infrastructural support for Amazonian smallholders
suggest that there is scope to make the agricultural
option more favourable. Furthermore providing
smallholders with accurate information on average
garimpo incomes, and encouraging them to consider the
true costs of malaria when appraising the economics of
mining, might somewhat reduce their enthusiasm for
garimpagem. But none of this will have much impact in
slowing rates of garimpo migration unless an
agricultural system is developed which absorbs more
labour in the dry season. Reducing the seasonality of
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agriculture in the Amazon is one of the first steps
required to make it a viable livelihood that need not
be supported by other forms of income.
Such measures are aimed at reducing the need for
impoverished farmers to survive by exploiting mineral
resources illegally. But even so it is by no means
clear if policies aimed at addressing rural poverty
will necessarily slow down rates of migration to the
garimpos. The Danteesque images of garimpeiros toiling
away in pits of mud gives the false impression that
they mine because it is the only livelihood available
to them. As we have seen the relatively small fraction
of professional garimpeiros are the only ones in the
pit who depend entirely upon that form of employment.
Everybody else is there as a means to supplement their
other forms of income, whether they are farmers,
builders, street sellers, rubber-tappers or even
ranchers. The point is that deterministic forces may
not play as much of a role here as is often believed,
and for this very reason reducing poverty will not
necessarily be reflected in smaller numbers of
garimpeiros. Even if fewer people need to go mining to
survive, it can equally well be argued that more of
them will chance their luck in the gold mines once
their alternative incomes become more secure. No doubt
migration to the garimpos will continue as long as gold
mining offers the slim possibility of striking it rich.
3.6 Conclusions.
1. Contrary to some conceptions, garimpeiros are
not necessarily landless peasants. Indeed a high
proportion are either landowners or have access to land
and see the garimpo as an opportunity to supplement
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their income. Thus, it is misguided to assume either
that land ownership prevents migration, or that a
redistribution of land is the key to reducing Amazonian
garimpo populations.
2. Garimpo earnings represent an important source
of off-farm income for Amazonian smallholders. Their
land management strategies, as Hecht (1988) notes,
often reflect the wider socio-economic context in which
they operate.
3. Garimpo earnings are highly variable. But even
so, half of the trips made by Roraima's smallholders
into the garimpos of the Yanomami reserve exceeded
normal agricultural incomes.
4. Making small farmers aware of the reality of
garimpo life, health risks and the true nature of gold
earnings would allow them to assess their migration to
Amazonia's garimpos on a well informed basis.
Documentary film work and radio programmes made
accessible to small farmers in the Northeast and
Amazonia, could do much to enhance their understanding
of the realities of garimpo life. (pers. comm. B.
Forsberg, May 1991) .
5. A stronger emphasis on the planting and
marketing of perennial crops may enhance smallholder
security by preventing the drastic falls in income
associated with an unusually heavy rains during the
'dry season'. Such climatic events have swollen
garimpeiro populations not only in Roraima, but also in
Araguaia, Para (Filho 1984), and Madre de Dios, Peru
(Maennling 1986).
6. A lack of imaginative agricultural extension
work ensured that an opportunity was lost for colonists
to invest their gold earnings in longer-term
silvicultural or agroforestry projects which might
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reduce risk and are more closely tuned to natural
nutrient cycling systems. The small percentage of
garimpo earnings that was invested in the land was
banked via the purchase of cattle.
7. The provision of health care in the garimpos
would increase gold earnings brought back to the lot by
small farmers as well as reducing the transmission of
malaria further afield. Although the government may be
reluctant to set up health posts within the garimpos,
malaria might be reduced by distributing mosquito nets
to embarking garimpeiros and using radio broadcasts to
outline preventative healthcare.
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Chapter 4. The Golden Cow ? Ranching and Garimpagam in
Amazonia.
Having examined the migration provoked by
garimpagem, we now turn our attentions to the exchanges
of capital associated with informal sector mining. The
focus is on the relationship between ranching and
garimpagem in Amazonia, and the synergy that exists
between these two activities is illustrated in the
context of Roraima. But, before examining how ranchers
responded to the gold rush, it is first necessary to
take a closer look at the differences between ranching
practices on the cerrado and in the forest. As was
mentioned in the introduction, the centre of gravity of
the state's ranching economy has been shifting
gradually from the cerrado into forest areas since the
1970s.
4.1 Current Ranching Practices in Roraima:
The limited availability of nutrients is one of
the principal constraints on livestock production on
the cerrado. Not only are the soils themselves highly
weathered, acidic and very infertile, but the grasses
that they sustain are similarly poor. The cerrado bunch
grasses, such as Trachypogon pulmosus, are
characterised by extreme phosphorous deficiency and are
usually low in calcium, potassium and cobalt (Eden 1990
:13 8) . These edaphic constraints, and the highly
seasonal rainfall of the cerrado, have been overcome
traditionally by allowing the cattle to roam freely
over large areas in search of more palatable grasses
and available water. Consequently, an extensive
ranching system is practised on large land holdings
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which are rarely less than 1500 hectares in size and
occasionally exceed 10 000 hectares.
These physical limitations have been ameliorated
somewhat by the provision of mineral supplements to the
livestock and by the construction of small dams on the
cerrado. Furthermore, cross-breeding with more hardy
Guzerat and Nellore cattle, has improved the original
Criollo stock, and many of the diseases which affected
the herd, such as brucellosis, rabies and foot and
mouth, are now being controlled by widespread
vaccination programmes. In spite of these post-war
improvements, stocking rates on the cerrado remain
extremely low (7-10 hectares per animal unit) and
productivity is minimal (6 kilograms per hectare per
annum Gianluppi 1991 :1). For the most part, ranchers
have been slow to adopt more progressive management
practices, such as selective breeding, artificial
insemination, (the standard herd reproduction rate is
still only 40%), and pasture improvement. Of 178
ranches studied in a recent survey, only 26% had
planted pasture, and 33% had no type of enclosure in
which the livestock could be herded (CIR 1992) .
This reflects the long tradition of ranch
management practices based on minimal capital inputs.
The 'sorte' system allowed Roraima's ranchers to expand
their land holdings over the cerrado, without obliging
them to make substantial investments in their ventures.
As more labour and land were taken into production,
Roraima's herds became sufficiently large to supply
both Boa Vista and Manaus with beef. It was the
previous occupants of the cerrado, the Macuxi and
Wapixana Indians, who fuelled this growth by supplying
the 'sorte' system with its primary inputs of land and
labour at minimal cost. Yet, although indigenous labour
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still accounts for over half of the non familial
workforce employed on the cerrado ranches (CIR 1991),
there is increasing animosity between the Indians and
ranchers over land rights. Tension between the two
parties has been growing for decades and has caused
violent clashes in recent years. FUNAI is legally
obliged to establish an indigenous reserve for the
Macuxi on the cerrado before November 1993, and since
the mid 1980s it has been engaged in a seemingly
continuous appraisal of the situation. This drawn-out
and ill-defined demarcation procedure is largely
responsible for the current escalation in land conflict
on the cerrado as both parties see the opportunity to
influence the size of the proposed reserve by actively
reasserting their claims to the land.
The outcome of this contest is of great
significance to the state's ranching sector because it
will determine the future availability of land and
labour on the savannah. There are two main areas of
the cerrado which are currently registered as proposed
Indian reserves for the Macuxi together with a smaller
number of Wapixana, Ingariko and Taurepang. The first
is entitled Sao Marcos, which covers 707 459 hectares,
and was originally established as an Indian Colony
(Colonia Indigena). This area should automatically
become an Indian reserve by law in 1993. A more
contentious issue concerns the demarcation of the
proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve, (covering 1 347
810 hectares) . Within this area there are 178 ranches,
many of which have been in existence for over half a
century, it also includes virtually all of the states'
productive diamond garimpos. The two areas together
represent about half of the cerrado and their
demarcation is being strongly opposed by ranchers,
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garimpeiros, and local politicians who argue that it
will cripple the state economy. The Indigenous Council
of Roraima (CIR) , with the backing of the Catholic
Church, are defending the demarcations on legal
grounds. They counter the economic arguments of their
adversaries by arguing that livestock and diamond
production on the cerrado will be maintained by the
Macuxi. FUNAI are legally obliged to demarcate this
area by November 1993, but, following a substantial cut
in their budget, it is questionable whether the
resources will be available for this demarcation, even
if the political will exists.
Ranching in the forested area of the state does
not at present provoke land conflict. But it does have
much higher environmental costs than cattle raising on
the cerrado. A study of the edaphic impacts of
clearing forest for ranching, carried out near the Ilha
de Maraca in Roraima (Eden & McGregor in press), drew
similar conclusions to Hecht (Hecht 1982 : 667) . In
general terms, the soil receives a short term flush of
nutrients following the felling and burning of the
forest, with increases in pH, calcium, magnesium,
phosphorous, and potassium. However, once the trees
have been removed the soil nutrient status typically
declines, so that over the long term soil fertility is
compromised. Both studies noted greater soil compaction
and an increased susceptibility to erosion following
forest clearing, impeding the regeneration of forest on
the cleared areas. The Roraima study went so far as to
suggest that "the savannah [cerrado] may represent an
analogue for the outcome of long-term degradation of
land converted to permanent pasture" (Eden & McGregor
in press :18) .
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The ranches established in the forested zone are
smaller than those of the cerrado, typically comprising
500-2000 hectare holdings, though only a proportion of
the total area owned is actually grazed. Artificial
pastures of 'Quicuio da Amazonia' (Brachiaria
humidicola) and 'Coloniao' (Panicum maximum) are
usually stocked at rates of 1 animal unit per hectare.
Cattle raising in forest areas is therefore . more
intensive than on the cerrado and it is not constrained
by seasonal water stress to the same degree. Even so,
the considerably higher rates of productivity that
ranches in the forest obtain (60-90 kg of beef per
hectare per year) have to be weighed up against the
much higher investments per hectare that this type of
ranching demands. Forest clearing alone costs
approximately US$ 250 per hectare1, to which the price
of grass seed and fertiliser must also be added. The
greater amount of capital invested in these ranches is
however, partly offset by the sale of timber to local
sawmills, as well as by gradual increases in the value
of these roadside properties over the long term.
The social composition of ranchers in the forested
area differs markedly from the handful of politically
influential extended families who dominate the cerrado
economy. We have already seen that road building was
the catalyst for the expansion of ranching into the
forested southern part of the state since the 1970s.
But the road building programme was accompanied by
considerable public sector investment in the urban
economy as the administrative agencies charged with
overseeing the economic expansion of Roraima were
founded in Boa Vista. This effectively created a new
class of urban professionals, entrepreneurs, and
1 See Hecht's data from Para 1982 p. 164.
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retailers in the late 1970s. As they became richer,
they channelled profits from the urban economy into
small ranches along the recently constructed BR 174 and
BR 210^. in subsequent years, relatively wealthy
colonist farmers have emerged to form a second and
increasingly significant group of ranchers in the
forested zone. While the majority of colonists have
very limited access to capital, the previous chapter
illustrated that the small percentage that do manage to
accumulate some money, either from sources of salaried
income (often in the municipal government) or through
the garimpo, frequently invest in ranching. Typically,
these capitalised smallholders graze 30-100 head of
cattle on 1 to 5 amalgamated lots (100-500 hectares)
and tend to sell beef locally through informal outlets
in colonisation project towns.
Thus, there are three principal types of ranch in
Roraima; the large (usually 3000-10 000 ha.) low
intensity holdings of the cerrado which are owned by a
few wealthy families, the medium-sized units in the
forest (500-2000 ha.) which are market oriented and
receive most investment, and the small ranches (less
than 500 ha.) formed out of amalgamated lots in the
roadside colonisation projects (which are also in the
forested area of the state).
4.2 Rancher behaviour and capital flows:
Notwithstanding the considerable differences in
ranching on the cerrado and in the forest, certain
observations can be made about ranchers and their
^ This concurs with research findings from Rondonia. Of 100 public employees interviewed by
Torres (1988) in the urban area of Machadinho only one respondent did not own land or
demonstrate interest in purchasing a holding (noted in Milliken 1991 p.134).
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behaviour irrespective of the ecosystem in which they
operate. Perhaps the most obvious concerns the prestige
that land ownership still commands throughout Brazil.
Owning land frequently underlies political authority,
particularly in rural areas. A large proportion of
Amazonian politicians are landowners. The rancher's
union UDR claimed to have seventy five deputies and
twelve senators among its membership for the northern
region3. In Amazonia, the rancher is also considered to
be a frontier pioneer, furthering a national goal by
bringing new areas into production. For these, among
other reasons, Amazonian ranching continues to receive
government subsidies in spite of the social and
environmental costs of the activity.
The corporate tax incentives administered by
SUDAM, giving tax credits of up to 75% of investment to
approved projects, have been the most contentious
source of subsidised capital for Amazonian ranching
since the 1970s. They were eventually withdrawn in 1989
(Mahar 1989 :15), but cheap loans, typically at 5-8%
above the rate of inflation, are still available to
private ranchers from alternative sources of rural
credit. The most notable of these is a regional
development fund called the FNO (Fundo Constitutional
do Norte) which is administered by the Amazonian bank
BASA. In Roraima only six ranching projects were
approved by SUDAM (who had a total of 631 projects in
Amazonia Legal by 1985), and credit lines like the FNO
represent a more significant source of capital for the
state's ranchers. Although agricultural and urban
development also fall within the mandate of the FNO, it
is the ranching sector that receives the lion's share
3 Folha de Boa Vista 30/0b/67. In national terms, the 'northern region' (regido norte) covers all
the states whose land surface falls entirely within Amazonia Legal.
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of the available budget, 75% of which was allocated to
the beef ranching sector in 1991/92 (BASA pers. comm.
1992) .
Rural credit is an important item in balancing the
books of some ranches, but it is seldom the only source
of capital available to ranchers. Many of Roraima's
ranchers have alternative business interests, often in
the urban economy or the garimpos. 70 (53%) of the 137
ranchers with properties in the proposed Raposa/Serra
do Sol Indian reserve had sources of income other than
ranching4. Indeed, in many instances the ranch
represents little more than a mechanism to bank the
capital derived from these other ventures, as well as a
device to capture cheap loans from rural credit
programmes such as the FNO. Even though personal
connections are an important influence on the
distribution of rural credit, the agencies that provide
this capital rarely check to see how it is being
utilised, so that ranchers often allocate these funds
to other faster growing sectors of the local economy
(pers. comm. agriculture secretariat 1991)5.
So, just as smallholders transfer their labour
into other activities when agriculture is in decline,
ranchers tend to shift capital into alternative
ventures as new investment opportunities arise. This is
clearly illustrated in the behaviour of Roraima's
ranchers during the gold rush. Throughout the 1980s,
the local price of beef rose considerably due to demand
from the rapidly increasing migrant population. In such
4 28 (40%) of the 70 ranchers that had other business interests had investments in the garimpo,
15 (22%) in commerce, 10 (14%) held jobs as civil servants, 3 (4%) were doctors, 3 (4%) served
in the armed forces and 2 (3%) were politicians. The remaining 9 included two restauranteurs,
two garage owners, a lawyer, a businessman, a tourist agent and an independent freight merchant.
5 This process has also been observed by Wesche and Bruneau (1990 p.51) in Itacoatiara,
Amazonas.
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circumstances, one might expect ranchers to meet this
demand and respond to the favourable market for beef by
reinvesting a large proportion of the newly-raised
capital back into livestock production. But while the
first half of the eguation holds true, most ranchers
preferred to reinvest the capital they had raised from
carcass sales into other rapidly expanding sectors of
the economy, most notably the garimpo or the urban
retail and service sectors. In fact, some ranchers were
so eager to take advantage of this favourable economic
climate that they embarked upon an indiscriminate
slaughter of their herds, killing productive heifers
along with infertile beasts, in order to raise capital
at short notice (Gianluppi 1991) 6. The net result was
a 40% decline in Roraima's beef herd from 360 000 to
220 000 between 1980-1989, accompanied by impaired
productivity in the aftermath of poor management
practices (SUDAM/OEA/PROVAM 1991: 38)7. Within a
decade, the state had changed from being an exporter of
livestock to an importer of beef.
It is likely that the growing pressure to
demarcate the indigenous reserves for the Macuxi
exacerbated this trend as the uncertain future of this
area discouraged the reinvestment of capital in cerrado
ranching. By 1990, ranchers with holdings inside these
proposed reserves were barred from receiving rural
credit, and a number of them were looking to reduce
their herds and reinvest elsewhere. Even so, some of
those ranchers who had properties outside these
6 The percentage of clandestine slaughters also rose dramatically during the gold rush. Articles
in the "Folha de Boa Vista" estimate that 40% of all livestock was illegally slaughtered in the
state in 29/07/87, which then rose to 70% in 18/07/87. On 17/06/88 it was reported that the
government abattoir had not butchered a single beast for 30 days due to the lack of supply caused
by unofficial slaughterings..
7 However, even this estimate is probably conservative, records held by the state secretariat for
agriculture suggest that the total herd was already less than 180 000 strong by 1986.
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proposed reserves were slaughtering their herds at
unprecedented rates. This suggests that the rapid
growth of alternative economic opportunities, offering
considerable returns on short term investment, was the
overriding factor which drew capital out of the state's
ranching sector. Whatever the dominant process, the
economic changes associated with the gold rush led to a
rapid contraction of the state's beef herd.
4.3 The relationship between the garimpo and the ranch.
While the garimpo presented new investment
opportunities for the ranchers, some of the more
powerful garimpeiros sought to transfer capital into
ranching. Purchasing land is an attractive proposition
to wealthy garimpeiros because owning a ranch can
complement mining activities in three principal ways.
First, as was briefly mentioned in the previous
chapter, garimpeiros can ride out the large
fluctuations in mining incomes by buying and selling
livestock relative to their garimpo operations. In
effect, they are able to reduce risk across their total
portfolio by transferring capital from high-risk
investments into the more secure ranching economy.
Second, garimpeiros may purchase land with the
specific intention of getting access to mineral
deposits. Even though land ownership does not give
title to subsoil wealth under Brazilian law, such
claims are normally respected in the informal mining
sector. This means that the land owner is usually
recognised as the owner of any garimpos established on
his or her property. Consequently, garimpeiros may try
to buy land which they believe contains minerals, and
although there are a few examples of this happening in
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Roraima®, it tends to be most marked in areas where
agricultural and ranching activities are more closely
juxtaposed with mining. Indeed, in areas where this
does occur, such as in the Tapajos and south-eastern
Para (Butler 1985), land prices may come to reflect the
mineral, not the agricultural, potential of the soil.
Finally, as is illustrated below, a roadside land
holding represents an ideal base from which to co¬
ordinate mining operations. Food, mining equipment and
bulky minerals like cassiterite can all be stockpiled
on the ranch and may be transported by light plane
directly from the ranch's airstrip into the garimpos.
In the latter stages of the Roraima gold rush, ranches
situated within a 50 kilometre radius of Boa Vista were
of strategic importance in maintaining access to the
garimpos. They enabled garimpeiros to evade federal
police action which sought to control air traffic from
the city's airport^. The following account presents a
more detailed analysis of the relationship between
ranching and the garimpo and gives a clear indication
of how garimpeiros manege their ranches in relation to
their mining activities 10.
Robertino is a pilot who left his home
state of Minas Gerais in 1978 to work in Para.
Following a year's employment flying light
aircraft for ranchers, he became increasingly
8 One such example is however provided by the sale of an area of land along the banks of the Rio
Mau in 1990. Although the land was sold as a ranch ('Fazenda Capimj, this holding was bought
at a considerable price by garimpeiros, who were interested in its subsoil wealth.
9 Jose Altino's invasion of Surucucus in 1985 provides probably the best illustration of this.
Altino coordinated this operation which involved over thirty garimpeiros, from a fazenda located
30 kilometres east of Boa Vista. He continued to make use of the same ranch, which belonged to a
prominant local politician, Lourdes Pinheiro, throughout the gold rush as a support base for
cassiterite extraction.
10 This account is distilled from an interview recorded on 7/02/1992 in Boa Vista.
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attracted by the opportunities available in the
garimpos and worked for one year around
Redenpao and Itaituba before moving to Roraima
in 1981. Impressed by the state's mineral
potential, Robertino was one of the key figures
to provide capital in the early stages of the
gold rush and was responsible, together with
his partner Alexandre, for constructing the
first airstrip at Cambalacho in December 1986.
Unlike many less experienced ranchers, he
directly supervised his ventures in the-
garimpos, and estimates that his air-taxi
company and mining operations earned him
approximately 120 kilograms of gold from 1986-
1990 (US$ 1.8 million @ US$ 15 per gram) . He
re-ploughed about 65% of this revenue in the
state's garimpos. The remaining 42 kilograms
were principally invested in buying a new light
aircraft for his air taxi company, and
purchasing two ranches which had already been
established: one of 1000 hectares near Apiau
and a second of 1800 hectares near Mucajai (the
latter was sold with 120 head of cattle on it
and cost him approximately 6 kilograms of gold
in 1988).
During the gold rush, Robertino used the
Mucajai property, which is located 50
kilometres south of Boa Vista along the state's
only paved road, as a support base for his
garimpo operations. He installed workshops to
service both his aircraft and mining equipment
and supplied his garimpo workforce with beef
slaughtered on the fazenda. As his returns
increased, he improved the ranch infrastructure
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and expanded the size of his beef herd which
reached a peak of 250 head in early 1990.
Robertino channelled considerable
investments into the three garimpeiro reserves
that were established within the intended
Yanomami Indian area. To him, these legalised
mining zones appeared to offer a secure future
for his ventures. He commissioned another
airstrip, sponsored further prospecting
missions, and expanded both the capital and
labour that were employed in the extractive-
process itself. As gold had been borrowed from
other garimpeiros to finance these investments,
the subsequent closure of the garimpos left
Robertino heavily indebted. Obliged to repay
his creditors at short notice, Robertino sold
off mining equipment, lorries, a car, his ranch
at Apiau with 200 cows, and all bar 15 head of
his beef herd at Mucajai.
The example clearly illustrates that land-
management practices on the ranch may be closely
related to the co-ordination of garimpo operations.
Stocking rates and investment decisions on Robertino's
fazenda all varied in response to changing external
economic and political factors. Thus, the land
management practices he employed were totally divorced
from the economics of long term livestock production.
It is therefore important to place Robertino's
management strategy in its wider context, for if it
represents that of many other Amazonian ranchers, then
the processes noted here have widespread ramifications
for land-use throughout the region. Here the key lies
in evaluating the scale of capital flows from the
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garimpo to ranches throughout Amazonia. The extent of
such management practices are directly related to the
number of garimpeiros owning ranches.
Robertino himself was one of a select few
(probably less than ten individuals), who recovered
more than 100 kilograms of gold from the Roraima' s
garimpos. And although a modest Amazonian ranch
(something in the region of 1000 hectares) could
probably be purchased for 4-5 kilograms of gold (US$
50-75 000), only a small percentage of garimpeiros
accumulate enough capital to do this. We now enter-the
very uncertain world of pinning numbers to the informal
mining sector and it should be appreciated that the
following estimates represent little more than informed
guesses. Within the garimpo economy it is really only
those people who are either donos do garimpo, donos de
maquinas (including balsas and dragas) , owners of light
aircraft, owners of airstrips, or partners in gold
trading companies who are in a position to accumulate,
if lucky, five kilograms of gold (the price of a
ranch) . A very rough estimate suggests that in the
Roraima gold rush there were possibly 100 garimpos,
between 300-500 maquinas (including balsas and dragas) ,
25 registered gold dealers (though about the same
number were operating illegally), approximately 300
light planes, and about 80 airstrips (many of which
were jointly owned). These calculations suggest that at
the very maximum, possibly 1000 individuals or 2.5% of
the total workforce, would have had the potential to
accumulate 5 kilograms of gold or more. But this number
can probably be cut by half or even further reduced if
it is considered: first, that many of the garimpos,
airstrips, planes, maquinas and gold trading shops
belonged to che same people; and secondly, that the
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risks of mining, coupled with police intervention,
prevented a large proportion of these entrepreneurs
from obtaining five kilograms of gold. Even if we
accept that about 400 individuals, representing 1% of
the total workforce, obtained 5 kilograms or more, a
sizeable proportion of them will have chosen not to
invest their gold earnings in ranching.
Nonetheless, these rough calculations make the
crucial point that because the gold mining economy
employs so many people, even the very small percentage
of Roraima's garimpeiros who bought ranches with their
gold earnings can be counted in the hundreds. Besides,
this process is not restricted to Roraima alone. USAGAL
estimates that even during the peak years of the late
1980s, Roraima's garimpos were responsible for only 10%
of Amazonian informal sector gold production and
employed the same percentage of the total Amazonian
garimpeiro workforce (Feijao & Pinto 1990). There is
plenty of evidence that successful garimpeiros in other
parts of Amazonia invest their gold in ranching H. So,
on a regional level, the scale of investments from
mining into ranching may be ten times that observed in
Roraima. This then provides a broad understanding of
the size of capital flows into the ranching economy
from gold mining. But as we are interested in the
extent to which ranching management practices are
influenced by the mining sector, we must not neglect
from our calculations those ranchers who invested in
mining. It should be recalled that a large number of
ranchers, who had already established their properties
with other sources of capital, subsequently transferred
resources into the mining sector. Once again this is
extremely difficult to quantify, but it does
11 See Uhl 1992.
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nonetheless point to a significant relationship between
ranching and the garimpo which may have widespread
impacts on land-use and land management throughout
Amazonia.
4.4 Gold, ranching and deforestation.
In assessing the social and environmental impacts
of capital transfers from mining into ranching, it is
necessary to identify the areas in which garimpeiros
were buying ranches. However, as USAGAL have no details
of the land tenure status of their members and INCRA
have no records of landholders' occupations, it is
impossible to collect this data directly from official
sources. Nevertheless, some relevant information, which
is expressed cartographically in figures 4.1 and 4.2,
was provided by four influential garimpeiros in Boa
Vista who proved to be reliable and co-operative
respondents 12. Each person was interviewed in their
own house between January and February 1992 and was
asked to give details of their colleagues who had
purchased ranches in Amazonian states with gold
extracted from the garimpos of western Roraima during
the 1987-1990 rush.
Altogether 62 different garimpeiros were
mentioned, with details of the municipalities in which
their ranches were located. Data on the size of
holdings was less reliable, but the respondents
suggested that most of the properties would be between
800 and 2500 hectares in size. This was confirmed by
cross-checking the data given on 29 ranches (out of the
total of 62 mentioned) which were situated in Roraima,
12 The four respondents were: one owner of an air taxi company who also traded in cassiterite,
one dono do garimpo who also owned an airstrip, one mineral dealer; and one owner of an air taxi
company who was also dono do garimpo and owner of two airstrips. All of the respondents,except
for the mineral dealer, were also donos de maquinas and all of them were land owners.
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against the INCRA records held in Boa Vista. Although
only 24 of these properties were officially registered
under the names given, INCRA employees who were
familiar with the land tenure situation in the state
confirmed the details of three other properties which
had recently passed into the hands of garimpeiros but
had not yet been registered. The INCRA office was
unable to provide any information on two of the 29
properties that had been mentioned by the respondents,
and so these were omitted. Consequently, the details
and precise location of a total of 27 have been
confirmed and are plotted on figure 4.1.
This same exercise could not be undertaken for the
remaining 33 properties located in the other Amazonian
states. Even so, it may be assumed that the information
relating to land purchases in other states is probably
of similar accuracy to the data relating to Roraima.
Figure 4.1 illustrates that only a small number of
the ranches which were purchased by garimpeiros in
Roraima, are situated on the cerrado. As we have noted,
cerrado properties tend to be much larger than forested
holdings, probably making them less appealing to
potential garimpeiro purchasers. But pressure to
demarcate the Macuxi reserve on the cerrado was
probably the most important factor in dissuading any
potential investors from buying land in this area. This
meant that most of the capital that flowed from mining
into ranching was channelled into holdings located in
the forested part of the state.
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Figure d.i Map of Roriama showing the distribution of ranches purchased





























Garimpeiros with Ranches marked on Figure 4.1





























Ranchers in forested areas of Amazonia clear areas
of natural vegetation to plant pasture. Having observed
that a proportion of the gold from Roraima's garimpos
was invested in ranching in the forested part of the
state it is interesting to evaluate the impact of these
capital flows on deforestation. The removal of forest
cover will be examined in three different ways; First
we will look at the total area deforested, then the
rate at which forest is being cleared, before finally
considering the spatial distribution of deforestation.
Contrary to popular images, over 85% of the forest
cover in the Brazilian Amazon is still standing. Over
the past two decades, most of the clearing has occurred
in the southern part of the basin, notably in Rondonia,
Mato Grosso do Norte and south-eastern Para which have
been the foci of regional economic development. To
date, development has not proceeded at nearly the same
pace in the northern Brazilian Amazon (the states of
Roraima, Amapa and Amazonas) where over 95% of the
forest cover is still standing. The case of Roraima is
illustrative. By 1990 only 2% (3 800 Km2> of her
natural forest cover (totalling 180 000 Km2) had been
cleared (Fearnside et al. 1990) .
The issue is not that the Amazon has been
destroyed, but that it is in the process of being so.
And for this reason it is the rate of deforestation,
not the total area cleared, that demands closest
attention. Here the picture looks less rosy as the rate
of deforestation has accelerated sharply in recent
years. In the decade preceding the gold rush (January
1978-April 1988) 2 600 Km2 of Roraima's forests were
removed, giving an average annual deforestation rate of
260 km2 per annum. In comparison, 1 100 Km2 of
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Roraima's forests were cleared over the 16 month period
spanning the height of the gold rush (April 1988-August
1990) (Fearnside 1991a) . The point is that during the
gold rush, the average rate of deforestation in Roraima
increased markedly (by 184%) over that of the previous
decade. The opposite is true for states in the southern
Amazon (Para, Rondonia, and Acre) where the average
rate of forest clearance between 1988-1990 actually
slowed relative to that of the previous decade. Indeed,
as the same calculations made for Mato Grosso and
Amazonas indicate that their average rate - of
deforestation in 1988-1990 was more or less unchanged
over that of 1978-88, it is only in Amapa and Roraima
that a marked increase is observed. Interestingly
enough, garimpagem has been the principal agent of
development in both states during the late 1980s.
Observing that new fronts of gold mining are
associated with increased rates of deforestation
suggests that the movements of capital and labour
associated with the garimpos do exacerbate forest
clearance in their hinterland. But in order to
understand the nature of this, we need to look at where
the deforestation is located in relation to the mining.
The spatial distribution of deforestation in Roraima
was examined from LANDSAT TM images after the gold rush
(in 1991) anci was compared to the pattern of forest
removal as recorded by the government environmental
protection agency three years before the rush had
started (IBDF 1984). The study confirmed that in the
garimpos themselves only relatively small areas had
been cleared for mining operations and airstrips. Most
of the increase in deforestation was concentrated in
13 Five LANDSAT TM images held by the IBGE in Rio de Janeiro, were studied: 31/07/89
233x058, 31/12/89 232x059, 22/09/90 231x059, 22/09/90 231x060, 15/10/90 232x058.
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and around the colonisation projects and along the
roadsides. The only new front of forest clearance is to
the west of Alto Alegre near the edge of the Yanomami
reserve. Here, some ranches had been established along
the Apiau and Mucajai rivers, and squatters (posselros)
had simultaneously opened up an area along a forest
trail between the same two rivers. Interviews (in 1991)
with the posseiros revealed that many of them had been
involved in the gold rush before claiming land in this
area. The migration and capital flows associated with
garimpagem therefore may be responsible for opening up
new areas of the forest for agriculture and ranching.
But, as most of the newly cleared land (observed in
this study) was along the pre-existing road networks,
it appears that unless the garimpo actually stimulates
the development of new roads there may be little change
in the overall pattern of deforestation. The point to
recognise is that the garimpo can fuel forest clearance
even though it may not be responsible for opening up
large new areas. This is because (as figure 4.1
illustrates) much of the investment of gold earnings
into ranching (and to a lesser extent smallholder
agriculture) is not channelled into the establishment
of new holdings, but, into roadside properties that
already exist.
Even though land values in Roraima are still the
cheapest in Amazonia, the garimpeiros probably invested
even greater sums in ranches situated outside the state
where more favourable conditions prevail in the
ranching economy. Only a small proportion of the total
gold extracted from the Roraima rush remained in the
state, illustrating that capital flight often affects
development in economically peripheral areas. Figure
4.2 shows just i^me of the properties that Roraima's
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garimpeiros purchased in other Amazonian states, making
no mention of holdings which were also bought with
garimpo incomes beyond Amazonia, in areas like the
Northeast The distribution of these ranches mirrors
a swathe of agricultural development which curves like
an arc across the southern Amazon.
This band, stretching from Maranhao in the East to
Acre in the West, is widely referred to as Amazonia's
agricultural and ranching frontier during the 1980s.
Throughout the decade, improved road access and urban
infrastructure, have not only served to link these
newly occupied lands to growing markets, but have also
fuelled rapid increases in land values, making ranching
an attractive investment opportunity in these areas.
Not surprisingly, the most rapid rates of Amazonian
deforestation are concentrated within this zone as
areas of forest are brought into agricultural
production (Fearnside 1989 :14) . The data presented in
map 4.2 suggests that the garimpo economy is one source
of capital that is contributing to this deforestation
and has probably become increasingly significant,
relative to public sector funds, as government
subsidies for Amazonian ranching have diminished during
the late 1980s.
14 An example of this is provided by the garimpeiro 'Luizinho da Agropecuaria', who had been
mining in Roraima and Venezuela since 1973. By the late 1980s, he had become one of Roraima's
wealthiest garimpeiros, owning ranches both in the state and in his native Ceara, where he
farmed 5000 head of cattle on his 7500 hectare ranch at Inhamuns. He was a particularly
influential figure in the early stages of the gold rush, owning 1 helicopter, 2 light aircraft, and 14




Garimpeiros with ranches marked on Figure 4.2










10 . Ze Garopa
11 . Angelo Nadai
12 . Rolando Kohl Freitag
13. Gelicio
14 . Ze Anofre Robeiro
15 . Pe na Cova
16. Jose Martins de Fonseca
17 . Antonio Picao Neto
18 . Luiz Vilarinho
19. Ze Flavio
20 . Ze Bigode
21 . Alouizo
22 . Roberto Carlos
23 . Miguel & Cristovao Moleto
24 . Lauro Texeira
25 . Jovair
26. Arnaldo Jose de Oliveira
27 . Rubens
28 . Klaus Schultz
29. Pedrinho
30 . Adaiar Ruiz
31 . Santos Dumont
32 . Jose de Macapa
33 . Joao Neto
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4.5 Garimpagem and land conflict.
Altering the pre-existing pattern of land tenure
is perhaps the most significant impact that the mining
sector can have upon the rural economy over the long
term. Changing land ownership not only affects the
management of any given piece of land, but more
importantly it may alter the size of the productive
units. Unfortunately, the IBGE agricultural census
which would have been a useful source of data on this
subject was not undertaken in Roraima in 1990, as
planned. It is therefore difficult to assess whether
the overall trend during the period under study is
towards an increasingly concentrated, or fragmented,
distribution of land. The only alternative is to
evaluate the impact of the garimpo economy on land
tenure by examining the dynamics of the land market
during the gold rush.
In Roraima, the land market accelerated during the
late 1980s as both the supply and demand for land
expanded simultaneously 15. Land holdings came on to
the market at an increased rate both from large land
owners who wanted to capitalise on the rising land
values, and from other owners who were obliged to sell
land for economic reasons, often to pay off debts
incurred in the garimpos. Meanwhile, the demand for
land increased as successful garimpeiros looked to
invest newly accumulated capital in property, inflating
the local land market. As Figure 4.1 illustrates,
garimpeiros were particularly interested in properties
on the outskirts of Boa Vista, where ranches fulfilled
This discussion is based on an interview with a rural estate agent in Boa Vista in September
1991. However, neither his records, nor the available INCRA registers, permitted a quantitative
analysis of changes in the land market
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a strategic role in maintaining the flow of air traffic
between the city and the garimpos. Land values also
rose to the south and west of Boa Vista, notably in the
municipalities of Alto Alegre and Mucajai, because
these areas offered relatively cheap land serviced by
comparatively good roads. However, as the mining boom
had buoyed up the value of rural property, land prices
in certain areas reflected the strategic value of a
site more closely than its agricultural potential. It
is therefore not surprising that the bottom fell out of
this artificial market following the closure of -the
garimpos 16.
Although the rush only brought a temporary change
to the state's land market, it nonetheless had a
considerable impact on land tenure in this short space
of time. This was not only due to the accelerated rate
at which land changed hands, but it was also related to
changes in the pre-existing hierarchy of buyers and
sellers in the local land market. Prior to the mining
boom, public sector employees and urban entrepreneurs
(mainly retailers) were virtually the only members of
society with sufficient income to purchase land, and so
land holdings which came up for sale often passed into
their hands. The garimpos effectively broke this
oligarchy, because mining incomes offered previously
impecunious garimpeiros the chance to enter the land
market as buyers. The ranches mapped in figure 4.1
represent only the most spectacular examples of this
process. At the other end of the scale were numerous
garimpeiros who bought smallholdings with their gold
earnings.
16 At the average value of US$ 21 per hectare, land in Roraima is still considerably cheaper than
in any other Amazonian state (Funatura 1992 p.17)
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This is an important point as it indicates that
garimpo incomes were financing land purchases at all
levels of the rural property market. It therefore
becomes difficult to assert that the garimpo
necessarily exacerbates the amalgamation of land
holdings in its immediate hinterland. Roraima is
illustrative; a glance at figure 4.1 indicates that
some successful garimpeiros were purchasing large
blocks of land along roadside locations. Indeed, many
of these ranches were bought in the very colonisation
projects in which land was set aside for smallholder
agriculture. But on the strength of these observations,
it is wrong to argue that capital from the garimpo
necessarily leads to the amalgamation of colonist plots
into larger properties. For although some large
holdings were undoubtedly created in this way, many of
the ranches that the garimpeiros purchased had probably
been established by other land owners in the years
preceding the gold rush. While a proportion of these
were no doubt large holdings from the start, others
would have resulted from the gradual amalgamation of
smallholdings, financed by alternative sources of
capital. As we have already observed, Roraima's
colonisation projects have been steadily depopulated
since their inception. Therefore, in the years
preceding the gold rush, more capitalised landowners
had been taking advantage of this out-migration to buy
colonist holdings and merge them into small ranches.
The overriding impression is that this process of land
concentration was already well developed before gold
mining appeared on the scene. Many of the ranches which
passed into the hands of wealthy garimpeiros had
already been established by the time the gold rush
started.
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This is supported by evidence collected from the
colonisation projects of Alto Alegre and Villa do
INCRA, as part of the field survey described in the
previous chapter. Of the 38 multiple lot owners who
were interviewed, only 17 (44%) had been to the
garimpos, and most of them (9 out of 17) had in fact
expanded their land holdings with other sources of off-
farm income prior to the rush. Only 8 (21%) of the 38
multiple lot owners interviewed had actually expanded
their land holdings with proceeds from the garimpos.
Here it should be recalled that capital from -the
garimpos was not only providing some landless
garimpeiros with enough money to buy their own land
holdings, but it was also enabling numerous other
smallholders to resist the economic pressures which
traditionally lead to the abandonment of homesteads.
Thus, it may well be that the dominant processes
driving the accumulation of land holdings in settlement
areas up to 1985 were actually reversed during the gold
rush. It is therefore wrong to assume that the garimpo
necessarily leads to a de facto increase in the
concentration of land holdings in its hinterland.
This is not to negate that people are displaced
from their land holdings as a result of the garimpo
economy. Indeed, we have already noted that a number of
landowners, particularly the less capitalised
smallholders, were forced to sell their properties to
pay off debts incurred in the garimpos. Furthermore,
while it may not be as strong a process as certain
authors have argued (Filho 1984), it is nonetheless
true that some landholders do use capital from the
garimpo to expand the total size of their properties.
In Roraima, there are still large areas of unclaimed
lands (terras devolutas) so that landless people can
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simply move into the forest and stake out a claim to a
new patch. Although there are no official records, the
rate of spontaneous settlement in Roraima appeared to
be gathering momentum during the late 1980's.
Initially, these squatters (posseiros) were displaced
farmers and incoming migrants, but following the
closure of the garimpos in 1990, large numbers of the
expelled garimpeiros swelled their ranks ^ The
posseiros laid claim to land on the periphery of
official colonisation projects and established their
homesteads at regular intervals along trails which they
had cut through the forest. In replicating the
geometric layout of the official settlement schemes,
the squatters believed that the eventual titling of
their lands would be facilitated. By the early 1990s
the posseiros were responsible for bringing significant
areas of new land into cultivation and the government
agencies like INCRA, DNER, and SUDAM were following in
their wake, issuing land titles, constructing feeder
roads and spraying the homesteads with insecticide to
reduce malaria. In this way, the colonisation projects
of Apiau and Confianga expanded rapidly. It was during
this time that the land area between the Mucajai and
Apiau rivers (which was noted in the study of
deforestation above) was also being settled by
posseiros. But, due to its inaccessibility it did not
receive the same level of infrastructural support from
government agencies.
The availability of land and the government's
support for the posseiros probably helped defuse any
social tensions that may have arisen from processes of
17 This return to agricultural production was encouraged by the state government which made
large areas of iand available in i.e colonistaion projects in the immediate aftermath of the rush.
The reasons for this are discussed in greater depth in chapter 6.
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land concentration and from the closure of the
garimpos. Apart from the direct clashes between the
garimpeiros and the Indian populations on whose land
they were mining, there was virtually no evidence of
the gold rush causing land conflicts in the state. As
other Amazonian states typically have higher pressures
on rural land, the lack of violence witnessed in
Roraima is perhaps the exception rather than the. rule
for Amazonia as a whole. Throughout the 1980s, land
tenure changes in Rondonia, northern Mato Grosso and
especially south-eastern Para generated vicious
agrarian conflicts, as smallholders defended their land
claims from more powerful interests (Schmink & Wood
1992, and Hine 1991). Furthermore, because these areas
of rural violence are all in close proximity to
garimpos, a connection has sometimes been drawn between
the informal sector mining economy and agrarian
conflict. Even though it has been argued above that the
links between the garimpo and land concentration are
sufficiently complex to defy such a general assertion,
the subject does merit closer attention.
Figure 4.2 illustrates a clustering of ranches
bought by Roraima's garimpeiros in south-eastern Para
and along the state's eastern border with Maranhao and
Tocantins - an area which is renowned for its rural
violence. Here social conflict stems from the eviction
of a rural peasantry by more capitalised ranchers, a
process which had been fuelled by government incentives
to the ranching economy since the 1970s (Hine 1991).
However, even though the SUDAM administered tax
concessions for corporate ranches were withdrawn in
1990, there is little sign that rural violence in the
area has diminished. Indeed, data collected by the
Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) notes that Para hosted
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more rural violence than any other Brazilian state in
1991, two years after the SUDAM incentives to the
ranching sector had been withdrawn. Thus, the pressure
on land is as strong as ever, suggesting that, in spite
of diminished access to public sector capital, ranches
continue to expand to the detriment of smallholders.
The data presented in figure 4.2 shows that gold
from the garimpos of Roraima was one source of capital
being channelled into ranching in this area during the
late 1980s. Roraima's garimpeiros presumably saw the
ranching economy of Para and Maranhao as an attractive
option due to its integrated road network and proximity
to the major urban markets of Belem and Brasilia. But
their desire to purchase land in these states was
probably amplified by their previous knowledge of this
area. It was noted in chapter 2 that many of the
garimpeiros who worked in Roraima originated from
Maranhao and a large proportion had spent time in
south-eastern Para during the early 1980s. Given that
people usually buy land in areas with which they are
already familiar, the geography of gold investments in
ranching is undoubtedly related to the migratory
patterns of the Amazonian garimpo workforce. Incomes
generated from resource exploitation in northern
Amazonia are being repatriated to the fringes of the
eastern Amazon, from which many of the migrants
originated.
On the strength of the data presented in fig. 4.2,
it is virtually impossible to assess the real scale,
let alone the consequences, of capital flows from
Amazonia's garimpos into the ranching economy of
Maranhao and south-eastern Para. A couple of relevant
points can nonetheless be made concerning the nature of
this process.
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First, it has to be recalled that Roraima
represents only 10% of the Amazonian mining economy. If
garimpo revenues from the other mining areas throughout
Amazonia are also being channelled into the ranching
economy of the south-eastern Amazon, then the capital
flows under study are clearly not insignificant.
Secondly, attention should be given to the size of
ranch that garimpeiros are likely to own. It is
probable that their holdings are much smaller in size
than the large corporate ranches which received the
lion's share of SUDAM investments during the 1980s'. So
that although beef ranching in the area may still be
expanding, the macro picture probably masks a shift in
capital from larger to smaller ranchers. Clearly,
further research is required before the true extent of
this link between the mineral and ranching sectors of
the Amazonian economy can be understood.
4.6 Discussion and conclusions:
Capital is a prerequisite for economic
development, yet although public sector funds are often
closely monitored in Amazonia, scant attention is
currently paid to the sources and flows of private
capital in the regional economy. This is nonetheless a
relevant focus for contemporary research. As public
investment in development decreases, private capital is
likely to attain an increasingly important role in
shaping regional development processes. Most of this
capital is generated within the informal sector, not
only from the garimpo, but increasingly in the
Brazilian Amazon from the cocaine trade. Furthermore,
as this money is often banked in rural and urban
properties, rather than in financial institutions, a
large proportion of it never passes into the formal
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sector of the economy. In these circumstances, the
state's ability to define the pattern of regional
development is severely compromised.
If we are to obtain a realistic understanding of
the forces shaping land-use, greater attention must be
paid to the geography of capital flows between the
garimpo and other activities in the rural economy. In
this chapter we have seen that this relationship may
have a profound effect on the management practices of
rural producers. However, even though this is an
important process which shapes the extent of -the
garimpo's impact on the region's rural economy, it is
rarely considered in contemporary evaluations of
Amazonian development. A need exists for planners to
expand the remit of current environmental and social
impact assessments so that the consequences of capital
flows from one activity to another are no longer
ignored. For example, if the financial returns from
mining ventures (or logging operations) are invested
directly into ill-managed ranching, this information
should be incorporated into any analysis of the total
non-economic costs associated with the initial
development.
Finally, here we see ranchers tailoring their
management practices more closely to external economic
and political changes than to the internal productive
economics of cattle raising. This observation is of
particular concern to agronomists who are working
towards a more widespread adoption of long-term land-
use strategies in the region. Agroforestry and
silvicultural systems are being developed on the basis
of their sustained yields and are promoted in
accordance with the income that they generate over the
long term. But while such initiatives represent
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laudable attempts to reduce the environmental
degradation that accompanies current Amazonian farming
practices, they are poorly suited to the priorities
expressed by many of the region's land owners. In crude
terms, these concerns relate to protecting savings from
erosion by inflation and to the flexibility with which
capital can be either injected or withdrawn from the
system at short notice. Perhaps the largest challenge
for those concerned with the environmental impacts of
current Amazonian land-uses is to find an appropriate
alternative to cattle raising which fulfils these
objectives.
Summary:
1. There is evidence from all over the Amazon that
ranches are often used as vehicles for banking capital.
2. There were clear links between the mining and
ranching economies of Roraima during the gold rush.
Ranchers invested in the garimpos and garimpeiros
purchased ranches. This relationship is not exclusive
to the state in which the mining occurred.
3. The Roraima rush therefore came to influence
the management practices of ranchers throughout
Amazonia, which were often more closely related to
external socio-economic changes than to the longer term
productive economics of cattle raising.
4. Capital flows between the mining and ranching
economies have ramifications for the structure of land
tenure, and the rate of deforestation throughout rural
Amazonia. The extent and strength of these processes is
related to the precise geography of these capital
flows.
5. If the current trend of diminished public
sector investment in Amazonia is sustained, the garimpo
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and other sources of private capital are likely to
become increasingly important determinants of regional
development processes.
145
Chapter 5: Caboclos, Indians and garimpagem:
In the previous two chapters we have seen how
smallholders and ranchers were drawn into the gold rush
for predominantly economic reasons. Other groups were
not so quick to get involved and it is important to
understand why this is the case. The extent to which
different groups participate in garimpagem influences
the distribution of its impacts among the local people
and environment. It is therefore relevant to ask why
some social groups get involved and others do not-. In
this chapter we see how the caboclo population of the
lower Rio Branco and the Macuxi Indians of the cerrado
reacted to the Roraima gold rush. Even though they
behaved in quite different ways, it becomes apparent
that some common elements shaped their responses to the
various opportunities arising from the rush.
5 .1 Caboclos and the garimpo:
Government directives throughout the 1980s have
considerably altered the lifestyles of the caboclos who
inhabit the lower Rio Branco and its tributaries. At
the start of the decade, a similar agricultural model
to that which had been developed for colonisation
projects along the federal highways was applied in
these riverine areas. Traditionally, the caboclos
resided in houses that were dispersed along the river
banks- a settlement pattern which was adapted to the
demands of extractivism. However, in the early 1980s
the state government (notably the Secretary of
Agriculture) encouraged them to move into planned
communities on the grounds that it facilitated the
provision of healthcare and education in these remote
areas.
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Fig 5.1 Riverine Settlements of the Lower Rio Branco
Abanooned Dwellings
J u a p • r i River Names
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Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of current
and abandoned settlements along the lower Rio Branco
and its tributaries. Typically, communities were
established on sites which already had a cluster of
houses, although in two cases totally uninhabited areas
were selected. The caboclos were given materials with
which to construct new houses in a grid pattern and
were allocated a plot of land nearby (usually 100
hectares) to cultivate. In the largest of these
communities, Santa Maria de Boiagu, migrant families
were also settled in the same way and the small town
was entitled an agricultural colony 1. Diesel-powered
electricity generators and tractors were provided for
each of the new settlements, but by the end of the
decade few of them still worked. Extension workers from
the agricultural secretariat encouraged the caboclos to
devote less time to fishing and hunting, and to
concentrate on agricultural production.
During the mid 1980s, the caboclos experienced a
fate similar to that of the colonist farmers discussed
in chapter 3. Political changes in the state government
left these recently established communities virtually
abandoned and the transport of agricultural produce to
the principal markets of Boa Vista and Manaus became
extremely precarious. While the majority of caboclos
switched back to extractivism, new legislation by the
environmental protection agency IBAMA served to
classify many of their traditional hunting and fishing
practices as illegal. The sale of turtles and bush
meat, which represented an important source of income
for the caboclos, was prohibited. By the end of the
1980s, IBAMA was enforcing these laws, as well as more
1 It was anticipated that a 130 Kilometre road would link Santa Maria de Boiasu to the BR 174,
but although this connection had been planned in 1980, it was still incomplete in 1991.
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rigid fishing regulations (particularly those relating
to the pirarucu [Arapaima sp.]), with a vigour that the
caboclos resented.
The financial difficulties faced by the caboclos
were exacerbated by a simultaneous decline in the value
of sorva (Couma sp.) which is historically the most
important non-timber vegetable product extracted in
Roraima. At the start of the 1980s, its production
measured in tons was typically tenfold that of Brazil
nuts, the second main product (IBGE 1980-1984).
However, by 1988 the price of sorva latex had dropped
to such a low that the traders no longer purchased it.
This is particularly significant as the unique link
that some of the more remote communities had with the
urban market was effectively severed when the trading
boats stopped venturing up the tributaries of the Rio
Branco. As was noted in the introduction, true rubber
(Hevea brasiliensis) is scarce in the area, and so the
livelihoods of Roraima's caboclos were not protected by
government price subsidies for the extraction of this
product. Furthermore, the collection of Brazil nuts,
which subsequently became the principal extracted
vegetable product, is subject to large annual
fluctuations in supply, generating variable rates of
income from year to year.
These combined pressures encouraged caboclos to
look for alternative sources of income and a large
number of families moved away from the lower Rio Branco
to seek urban employment. This reflects a pattern that
has been observed throughout rural Amazonia since the
1970s (Ayres 1992, Torres & Martine 1991) . In the case
of Roraima, the rates of outmigration from caboclo
communities during the 1980s peaked between 1987 and
1990. Settlements that had existed on the banks of the
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Rio Branco in 1980 were abandoned by the end of the
decade, notably Caranoanatura, Sao Jose, Catrimani, and
Carimau (see fig 5.1). In the absence of a relevant
census, a rough estimate calculated from conversations
with local residents suggests that the riverine
population of the lower Rio Branco and its tributaries
declined by at least 60% from 1980 to 1991.
The families that remained along the river banks
(approximately 100 households in 1991) continued to
live off the production of manioc flour (farinha),
hunting and fishing. In order to avoid being fined by
IBAMA, the caboclos developed more subtle techniques
for catching turtles, which, along with dried fish,
still provided a modest income in the summer months.
Although river traders were reluctant to purchase
turtles, the caboclos were able to continue selling
them, albeit in reduced numbers, to the crews of barges
which regularly ply along the Rio Branco transporting
fuel and construction materials between Manaus and Boa
Vista. A few young men from the lower Rio Branco also
migrated seasonally to the rivers Jau and Unini (both
tributaries of the Rio Negro) to extract rubber in the
rainy season. Otherwise most households received a cash
income from the annual Brazil nut harvest and the
occasional sale of manioc flour and dried fish,
although a handful of people were employed as nurses,
teachers, radio operators, or in one case as an
agricultural technician, and so received government
salaries.
It is interesting that virtually none of the
caboclos sought work in the garimpos in response to the
deteriorating economic situation along the river banks.
Only one person from a total of 71 caboclo families who
live in the communities of Santa Maria de Xeriuni
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(7), Terra Preta (13), Lago Grande (14), Saquai (18),
and Caracarai (19) went to the garimpos during the gold
rush (Interviews in November 1991). Moreover, informal
conversations amongst residents of the riverine
agricultural community of Santa Maria de Boiagu
(estimated population of 280) indicated that only 4
inhabitants of that village participated in the gold
rush. Two of them were northeastern colonist farmers
settled there at the start of the 1980s. Thus, if we
consider all of the residents inhabiting the banks of
the Rio Branco and its tributaries in 1991, as well as
the 19 families that had migrated from this area to
Caracarai in the late 1980s, it is apparent that less
than 1% of them participated in the 1987-1990 gold
rush.
This is all the more surprising as evidence from
other parts of Amazonia notes riverine peoples behaving
in a totally different way. During the 1960s, caboclos
provided much of the initial labour in the original
placer mines of the Tapajos (Gaspar 1990). Similarly,
contemporary studies note that members of caboclo
households near Altamira on the Rio Xingu (Clara da
Silva 1991) work in local garimpos. Clearly, there is
nothing intrinsic about the lifestyle of the Amazonian
caboclo which makes them averse to mining. The
situation in Roraima is therefore unusual, particularly
when the geography of the situation is considered. For
although the principal mining areas were not right next
to the caboclos ' houses (as is the case along the Rio
Madeira in Rondonia where caboclos work in the garimpos
- Cleary pers. comm.), they were not so distant from
the areas the caboclos worked in. One centre of garimpo
activity was in the headwaters of the Rio Catrimani
which is one of the main sorva producing rivers
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(although it is now permanently inhabited only by the
Yanomami) and garimpeiros had also been prospecting
along other rivers. The Rio Xeriuini had attracted
their interest and local caboclos had helped
garimpeiros mount a couple of prospecting trips into
its headwaters, but these ventures were unsuccessful.
It is therefore surprising that a greater
proportion of caboclos did not turn to the garimpos as
a solution to their economic difficulties. They
mentioned that the violence and disease associated with
mining dissuaded them from entering the garimpos.
Unlike the colonists, who tended to justify their
decision not to go mining on economic terms, the
caboclos were quite prepared to admit that they were
scared. Others mentioned a reluctance to leave their
families and noted that a long absence would jeopardise
other activities such as the production of manioc flour
or the collection of Brazil nuts. A lack of experience
in mining, the expense of entering the garimpos, the
inherent risks, the illegality of the practice and the
threat of Indian attack were among the more pragmatic
responses given.
However, while the caboclos often explained their
minimal participation in the gold rush on ethical
grounds (inferring that it was wrong to interfere with
the Indians, leave the family, or indulge in a violent
and illegal practice), it is misleading to assume that
their (perhaps inflated) morality was the only obstacle
standing between them and the mines. Notwithstanding
their geographic proximity to the garimpos, other
factors actually served to constrain their entry into
the mines. In the manual phase of the garimpos, mining
is restricted to the dry season. As this coincides with
the Brazil nut harvest and the peak fishing season, the
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caboclos of the lower Rio Branco are unlikely to have
left for the garimpos during what is their most
productive time of year. Even if some of them did want
to enter the garimpos at this early stage, they would
probably have required external help in discovering the
correct access routes to the mining areas. As the gold
rush developed (post 1986), air transport from Boa
Vista eroded the seasonality and inaccessibility of
mining. But, flights into the garimpos were not only
very expensive, they were also dominated by urban
merchants whom the caboclos did not know. Unlike
smallholders, the caboclos rarely possess anything as
valuable as cows which they could sell at short notice
to pay for the flight. In order to enter the mines
therefore, most of them would be obliged to accept an
air fare into the garimpos on credit (ten grams of
gold), and subsequently repay the owner of the air taxi
company with some of the proceeds of their garimpo
earnings.
Under such an arrangement the caboclos are
immediately disadvantaged on two counts. Firstly,
having such minimal involvement in both the garimpos
and the urban economy of Boa Vista, they knew very few
people who would advance them an air fare. Garimpo
entrepreneurs/ patrons who did offer passages in this
way would usually distribute them only to people that
they knew or to individuals recommended to them by
friends. Secondly, the characteristic trading relations
of the riverine economy make caboclos reluctant to
become indebted to strangers. The economic influence of
patrons and river merchants typically extends along
lines of kinship, and fictive kinship, so that
virtually all transactions along the riverbank are
underpinned by personal bonds. In many ways, the
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disadvantageous economic terms that caboclos usually
accept under debt bondage (aviamento) are offset to
some extent by the security inherent in establishing a
social tie through trade with an influential patron
(Hugh-Jones 1992). However, a caboclo entering the
garimpo is obliged to accept a debt which is not
underwritten by any social relationship with his
creditor and is, in this way, denied some degree of
insurance against the contract. Even though the large
number of gold dealers ensure that garimpeiros are
never exposed to the same monopolistic prices
characteristic of the riverine economy when entering
the garimpo, the caboclo is nonetheless making a
commitment to the unknown on terms that appear to be
highly unfavourable.
It is illustrative that the only resident of the
Rio Xeriuini who participated in the gold rush was
personally invited to do so by a local politician who
befriended him. He was advanced the air fare and repaid
it from the income he gained constructing timber rafts
(balsas) in the garimpos on the Uraricoera. In this
way, he generated sufficient capital to purchase a
fishing boat and outboard motor and became a fisherman
in the port of Caracarai. His success in the garimpos
encouraged others to try and enter, but they were
effectively thwarted because they did not have similar
contacts among suitably influential people. His cousin
also went to Boa Vista attempting to secure an airfare
to the garimpos, but he was unsuccessful. He neither
knew, nor obtained an introduction to, any of the
garimpo gatekeepers 2. It therefore appears that
2 As he himself explained: ' I reckon that there are a lot of people who are interested [in going to
the garimpos] , but the difficulty comes when you arrive in Boa Vista., it's really hard, you've got
to know a garimpeiro patron and I just don't know anybody like that, so I never got anywhere.'
(interview recorded 7/11/91 Santa Maria de Xeriuini).
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caboclos find the material benefits of gold mining just
as attractive as other rural producers do. Their low
rate of participation not only demonstrates their
reservations about the dangers or the ethics of mining
(and this is what many of them would stress) , but it
also reflects the geographical, economic, and social
constraints which stand between them and the garimpos.
Indeed, the lack of social relations between the
extractive and garimpo economies was probably the key
factor which prevented larger scale caboclo involvement
in Roraima's garimpos. This differs considerably -from
early developments in the Tapajds gold fields where
traders such as Nelson Pinheiro formed a powerful link
between the two sectors of the rural economy. He
recruited many of the original garimpeiros from the
rubber estates along the tributaries of the Tapajds,
and employed them along similar work relations to those
existing in the extractive economy (Gaspar 1990
:42/43). Miller's subsequent analysis of the local
elites in Itaituba reveals that a number of influential
rubber patrons also diversified into garimpagem, in
response to the post war decline in rubber prices,
presumably facilitating the transfer of labour from
extractive to mining activities in the area (Miller
1985) 3.
Despite living nearby, Roraima's caboclos could
not easily reach the garimpos on their own (as is the
case on the Rio Madeira) , nor were the relevant social
bridges available to facilitate access (as in the case
of the Tapajos). Consequently, they turned to the other
options available through their network of kinship and
3 It would be interesting therefore to leam in greater detail about the specific social relations that
underpin the involvement of cuooclos from the Rio Xingu in the garimpos around Altamira
(Clara da Silva 1991: 29).
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fictive-kin ties, and migrated to urban areas. The
movement of Manuel Candido, the Rio Branco's most
influential patron, to the fishing port of Caracarai in
1987 was particularly significant in shaping the
behaviour of the caboclos at this time. In response to
the falling price of extracted products (notably
Sorva), Manuel Candido stopped trading along the Rio
Branco and instead purchased an ice making plant and a
small fleet of fishing boats in Caracarai. He was
capitalising on a rapidly expanding market precipitated
by growing urban demand for fish (principally in - Boa
Vista) during the gold rush years. Although many of the
caboclo families along the lower Rio Branco already had
strong ties with Caracarai, Manuel Candido's new
investment greatly accelerated their migration to the
town. As is illustrated below, Manuel came to employ
many of the caboclo families with whom he had
previously traded in his new fishing enterprise. It is
interesting to speculate that caboclos might equally
easily have been drawn into the garimpos if he had
instead chosen to invest his capital directly in the
mining economy.
5.2 Orban growth and rural-urban migration:
Urban centres have mushroomed in the wake of the
Amazon gold rush. The cities of Maraba, Itaituba,
Redengao, Imperatriz and Alto Floresta all testify to
this process. Roraima is no exception, rates of
urbanisation have increased from 43% in 1970, to 64.6%
in 1990 (IBGE 1992 census) . An alternative source of
data, extrapolated from the number of residences,
estimates that in the first half of 1991, 72% of the
state's inhabitants were residing in urban areas (SUCAM
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1991) i. The real figure probably lies somewhere
between the two, but the important point is that in
Roraima, as in Amazonia as a whole, more people now
live in cities than in rural areas (Bogue and Butts
1989 :55).
Boa Vista was the administrative centre of the
gold rush and absorbed the greater part of these
changes. By 1991 it was twenty three times the size of
either Caracarai or Mucajai, which vied for the title
of the state's second largest city (each have a
population of about 5150, IBGE 1992). Business boomed.
The state secretariat for industry and commerce
(SEICOM) registered 3779 new enterprises in the formal
economy alone between 1987 and 1989; these were
principally in the service sector and retail trade.
This compares with a total of only 602 commercial
establishments in Roraima as a whole in 1980 (IBGE 1983
quoted in Abers and Pereira 1992). Interestingly
enough, the larger proportion of migrants were not
employed directly in the gold mining economy itself,
but in other informal sector activities. A survey of
410 households in Boa Vista conducted in February 1991
by Abers and Pereira (1992) notes that 46% of the 852
workers interviewed were employed in the informal
sector. Only 13% of the total sample were directly
associated with the garimpo. From this Abers and
Pereira draw the important conclusion that 'While the
garimpo is significant for urban growth, activities
4 There are problems with both sets of data; the IBGE figures affect the budget of local
government and are heavily influenced by politics. They are collected from questionnaire surveys
which are often inconsistently applied. The SUCAM data was collected by malarial spraying
teams who do more continual fieldwork, but as they extrapolate population from residences, they
have a tendency to double-count in areas where people may have more than one home.
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related only indirectly to the gold rush are
responsible for most of the urban economy's dynamism'5.
Abers' work (Abers 1992) suggests that the
majority of people who came to Boa Vista during the
gold boom years had migrated from other urban areas.
But before coming part of the urban labour force, large
numbers of people had initially lived in rural areas.
Having migrated from the countryside into the city,
they then formed part of a large urban workforce which
tends to move from city to city as new economic
opportunities arise:
'While about half of the migrant
household heads [interviewed in Boa Vista
in 1991] were born in rural areas, the
majority had significant experiences living
in cities before moving to Boa Vista. While
rural to urban migration plays an important
role in their migration patterns, rural
out-migration represents only the first
step in a long history of otherwise largely
urban migration experience.' (Abers 1992
: 49) .
Given that the initial transition from countryside
to city may initiate a lifetime on the road, it is
worth having a closer look at the rural-urban migration
generated by the gold rush. But while rural-urban
migration has significant repercussions on people's
subsequent migratory behaviour, it is seldom a clearly
defined process. The experience of Roraima's caboclos
illustrates that people may move between the rural and
urban economies for many years without necessarily
becoming permanently incorporated within the urban
labour force.
5 This also indicates the scale of the multiplier-effect associated with the garimpo economy.
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The following discussion is based on interviews
with nineteen households who had moved to Caracarai
from the Rio Xeriuini at this time 6. Of these 19
households, 15 (79%) had migrated from the Xeriuini to
Caracarai between 1988 and 1991, 3 had moved since
1986, and only 1 household had resided in the city for
over 5 years. The caboclos themselves estimate that a
total of 58 households lived on the Xeriuini in 1985;
therefore in a period of five years, one third of the
river's population migrated to Caracarai. This not only
brought considerable changes to the three small
communities that the migrants moved away from (Santa
Maria de Xeriuini, Terra Preta, and Lago Grande), but
also altered the urban morphology of Caracarai. These
households are linked by strong kinship ties 7, and
they built their houses together, creating a new suburb
which is known locally as the 'Bairro de Xeriuini'.
The forces that drive rural-urban migration can be
illustrated by a simple comparison of household
economics on the Xeriuini and in Caracarai. The main
sources of employment for the 19 migrant caboclo
families are commercial fishing (10 of the households
have somebody employed as a fisherman) and manual
docking work - unloading barges which bring fuel,
construction materials and some foodstuffs up from
Manaus to Boa Vista. There is only one head of
household employed exclusively as a docker because it
is common for individuals to substitute fishing for
docking on a seasonal basis. The barges can only get to
6 Fieldwork was in two phases; The first (in November 1991) was a survey of the communities
along the Lower Rio Branco and its tributaries to evaluate the scale and causes of outmigration
which is presented in section 5.1. On discovering the rapid population flux to Caracarai', a further
period of research (January 1992) focused on the current situation of caboclo migrants in the
town, from which the economic data presented in this chapter was derived.
7 For example, one respondent had a blood relative in all bar one of the other 18 households who
had moved to Caracarai'.
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the port when the river is full, which is also the
period of maximum fishing restrictions (April-
September) . Principal sources of income for the
remaining families include public sector salaries (5) ,
petty commerce (1), boat building (1) and construction
(1), though it should be understood that most families
have members employed in a variety of informal sector
activities simultaneously.
A caboclo household in Caracarai (two adults and
six children) calculates that monthly groceries cost
US$ 150 (this does not include transport, rent, bills,
or entertainment expenses), which is roughly double
that of their rural counterparts. But, these greater
outlays are offset by urban wages which are
considerably higher. During the 5 month long fishing
season, a fisherman possessing his own boat and motor
may receive a maximum revenue of US$ 640 per month,
although a proportion of this has to cover boat
maintenance and the overheads of the trip 8. Fishermen
who are permanently employed on the boats of others can
earn between US$ 270-400 per month over the same
period, depending on their position of responsibility
within the crewt Dockers estimate that they earn US$
250 per month for 5 months of the busy wet season, but
this is reduced to US$ 30 per month or less during the
dry season io. Government employees such as gardeners,
primary school teachers and nurses typically receive
US$ 50-70 per month, but during the early 1990s their
° Only 1 head of household interviewed posessed their own boat and he was the one mentioned
earlier who had been to the garimpo, having obtained it with the money he earned in the mines.
9 This data is underpinned by an expanding market for fish, resulting from the considerable
demand generated by Boa Vista's rapid growth.
10 A dockers' union had been established lobbying the principal employers to provide members
with a minimum wage of USS 30 during the dry season. The union also aimed to prevent
fishermen from transferring so easily into docking during the wet season as the resulting
abundance of labour depressed wage rates.
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income was decreasing in real terms as public sector
wages failed to keep pace with inflation.
It is however virtually impossible to calculate
total family income from this data. Most households
seek to maximise revenue by spreading available labour
across different sectors of the urban economy in
response to seasonal and political fluctuations. Again,
the extent of an individual's social networks is of key
importance in determining the ease of movement between
jobs. The salient point is that during the gold rush,
urban wages were considerably higher than incomes "from
the riverine economy. The following example of a
caboclo household's balance-sheet on the Rio Xeriuini
is intended to illustrate the disparity between urban
and rural incomes. The data presented in this example
was derived from one particular household and fits
within the broad limits of production recognised both
by the caboclos themselves and by other studies of the
Amazonian extractive economy (Ayres 1991, L'Escure
pers. comm., Wagley 1967, Sizer 1991). Nonetheless, the
limitations of this data should be recognised. The
production of manioc flour and Brazil nuts fluctuates
considerably and none of these figures have been
confirmed with real measurements of household
production over a long period of time.
A household of 2 adults and 4 children on the Rio
Xeriuini estimates that it can produce up to 100 sacks
of manioc flour (one sack is 50 kilograms or 77 litres)
and 100 barricas of Brazil nuts in a good year (one
barrica weighs 72-78 kilograms when fresh, and 60
kilograms when dry) . Normal production is estimated at
60 sacks of manioc flour and 50-80 barricas of Brazil
nuts, of which 30 sacks and 50-80 barricas are
typically sold. At 1992 prices paid by traders on the
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riverbank (US$ 7 per barrica of Brazil nuts, and US$ 15
per sack of manioc flour), this yields an average
monthly income of US$ 66-84 (although it should be
recalled that income is not evenly distributed
throughout the year) . This may be supplemented by the
sale of salted fish and turtles during the dry season,
but the market for these products is quite limited 11.
On the Xeriuini, commodity prices are typically 20-50%
higher than in Caracarai, but the riverine household
consumes much less marketed produce than the urban one.
The household under study estimates that its monthly
grocery bill is in the region of US$ 50 and includes
salt, sugar, matches, biscuits, powdered milk, coffee,
cooking oil, soap and radio batteries.
These calculations suggest that the household
generates a monthly surplus income of US$ 16-34, most
of which is spent on items like fuel, tools, alcohol,
tobacco, shooting and fishing equipment, as well as
some medicines. However, it is quite likely that in
many cases riverine producers will not hold any of this
modest income in their hands. Direct barter still
accounts for a large proportion of riverbank
transactions, and traders often reduce payment by 15%
if the producers demand cash payment for the sale of
their goods. Besides, as many caboclos still purchase
goods on credit from river traders, their incomes are
significantly eroded by usurious rates of interest,
which in some cases exceed 40% per month. Therefore,
even though this comparison illustrates that annual
household incomes in Caracarai are about 4-6 times
those of the Rio Xeriuini, rural dwellers are unlikely
11 A person wising to sell such goods usually has to transport them to one of the villages on the
Rio Branco itself, which may be prohibitively time consuming or expensive. If a lift is arranged on
a powered boat, payment is usually demanded.
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to see a fraction of the cash income that their urban
counterparts receive.
This then gives some understanding of why the
caboclos were so keen to move to Caracarai during the
gold rush. But the key question here is are they likely
to stay in the city and become part of the transient
urban labour force identified by Abers? Or will they
move back to the predominantly subsistence livelihood
of the Rio Xeriuini when the urban economy contracts?
It might even be more appropriate to ask not will they,
but can they, go back? The crux here lies in whether
their subsistence option has been foreclosed by their
initial migration to the city, or to use Marxist terms,
whether rural-urban migration is synonymous with
proletarianisation. In certain parts of Brazil, the
pressure on land is so great that once the peasantry is
either forced off or moves off it, they have little
alternative but to embrace an urban livelihood.
Smallholders in the northeast and south of Brazil,
squatters in south-eastern Para, and some rubber
tappers in Acre, all provide appropriate examples.
But in other areas, particularly in the northern
and western Amazon, the struggle for land is not as
intense. Riverine peoples around Belem (Nugent 1992)
and along the middle reaches of the Solimoes (Ayres
1992) move frequently between the urban and rural
economies. Clearly, there is nothing exceptional about
the behaviour of Roraima's caboclos, cities are just as
much a part of their economic domain as riverbanks are.
But perhaps more importantly, this suggests that many
of them will probably leave Caracarai as the urban
economy declines. This option is not foreclosed to
them, as relatives had been defending their usufruct
rights to the land on the Xeriuini during their
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absence. Indeed, three of the five caboclo migrants who
had become public sector employees in Caracarai
complained that their incomes were insufficient to meet
the expenses of urban life. On the eve of the 1992
Brazil nut season, they were contemplating a return to
the Xeriuini to work in the harvest. Clearly, rural-
urban migration in this context suggests that they are
moving between the subsistence and exchange spheres,
characteristic of peasant economics, in response to
changing circumstances. Having said that, it is just as
likely that a proportion will stay on in the city, -and
certainly some of the wealthier household heads
declared that to be their intention. This is the
fraction that will probably become permanently
incorporated within the urban labour force.
The point to be drawn from all this is that only a
proportion of the households who moved into the cities
during the gold rush actually made the crucial first
step noted above. It is therefore wrong to assume that
the sudden growth of the urban population directly
reflects the process of proletarianisation. Clearly
there is a fragment who do undergo this transformation
and it would be interesting to go back to Caracarai in
ten years time and find out what that proportion is.
But whatever the figure, the gold rush itself can only
be held partly responsible. The forces which serve to
push peasants off the land are probably much more
significant players in this game than those which
attract them to the city. Here, a highly inequitable
distribution of land, rural violence, drought and
declining agricultural prices have been taking their
toll for over twenty years (most notably in the
northeast). The urban population of Amazonia had been
swelling long before the gold rush took off. It is
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therefore not surprising that the largest proportion of
the migrants who flooded into Roraima during the gold
rush did not come from rural areas at all, but from
other cities. They had already been shoved-off the land
years ago.
5.3 Involvement of the Macuxi Indians in the garimpos.
Comparing the behaviour of the Macuxi Indians, with
that of the caboclos offers an insight into how two
different social groups react to similar socio-economic
changes. Like the caboclos, the Macuxi produce for both
subsistence and exchange. They participate in a local
economy that is dominated by extensive kinship and
fictive kinship ties, and exhibit multifaceted
livelihood strategies. These include hunting, fishing,
agriculture, diamond mining, urban employment and
working as cowhands on the cerrado ranches. Hunting and
fishing is for domestic use only, as is the largest
share of agricultural production. Therefore, other than
the limited sale of manioc flour, it is the diamond
garimpos, ranches and urban employment which provide
the Macuxi with virtually all of their cash income.
The Macuxi have worked in the diamond garimpos of
the cerrado for over 7 0 years and have participated in
all stages of the mines' development from the early
workings in the 1920s, through the introduction of
rudimentary diving equipment in the 1950s, to the more
recent period of semi-mechanised mining in the 1980s.
By 1991 the Macuxi accounted for 20% of the total
workforce of the cerrado diamond garimpos (Porantins
1991 :7), even though there was a dramatic influx of
non-Indian garimpeiros to this area following the
closure of the gold fields in the Yanomami reserve.
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Macuxi Villages marked on figure 5.2.
In all there are about 50 Macuxi villages on the
cerrado and this list is not exhaustive. However,
it does include the principal Macuxi settlements
situated within the proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol
reserve.
Name of Vilage: Population in 1991
1. Serra do Sol 132
2 . Manalai 58
3. Mapae 176
4 . Sauparu 66
5. Pedra Preta 200
6. Maloquina 155
7 . Piolho 125
8 . Suapi 115
9. Waramoda 65
10 . Caraparu II 156
11 . Caraparu I 227
12. Caracana 103
13. Canawapai 39
14 . Cana 79
15. Willimon 138
16. Uiramuta 123
17 . Camararem 96
18 . Tabatinga 16
19. Mataruca 410
20. Central 10
21. Pedra Branca 162
22 . Maracana 141
23. Cumana 171
24 . Miang 34
25. de Barro 80
26. Surumu -
27 . Taxi 180
28. Limao 75
29. Santa Cruz 227
30 . Bismark 72
31. Guariba 263
32 . Napoleao 308
33. Cachoerizinha 286
34 . Araca 180
35. Canta Galo 120
36. Raposa 452
37. Olho d'Agua 94
38. Campo Alegre 125
39. Sao Marcos -
40. Vista Alegre 360
Population data from CIR archives 1991
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At that time, 773 garimpeiros (including the Macuxi
contingent of the workforce) were working on 119 sets
of mining equipment (maquinas, balsas and one draga)
along the rivers Mau, Quind, and Cotingo (see fig 5.2).
Five of these sets of mining equipment were owned
exclusively by the Macuxi and they provided the
workforce from the villages nearby; 19 Macuxi
settlements containing a total population of . 2216
Indians are situated within 2 hours walk of these
garimpos. Therefore, both the physical proximity of
their villages to the mines, and the historical
development of diamond mining on the cerrado, have
equipped the Macuxi with a comprehensive knowledge of
garimpagem.
In spite of this considerable involvement in
diamond mining, the Macuxi did not flock to the gold
fields of western Roraima during the 1987-1990 rush. A
questionnaire was addressed to Macuxi village heads at
two Indian meetings in January and March 1991. The
survey aimed to assess both their personal mining
history as well as that of their village over the
previous 3 years. 34 (64%) of the village heads had
worked in the garimpos at some stage in their lives and
the same number (64%) responded that members of their
village have been working in the garimpos over the last
3 years (1987-1990) . The most notable point is that
virtually all of this mining had taken place in the
diamond garimpos of the cerrado and only 3 of the 53
respondents mentioned that either they, or members of
their village, had been to the gold fields of the
Yanomami reserve. Two of them had worked in Santa Rosa,
which was a mixed gold and diamond garimpo, and the
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third in Paapiu, which was at the heart of the gold
fields 12.
Roraima diamond garimpos are markedly different
from the gold placer mines, which partly accounts for
the Macuxi's striking discrimination between the two
activities. The two types of mining differ most
obviously in accessibility. The Macuxi can walk or ride
(either by horse or more commonly by bicycle) to the
diamond mines and face none of the expenses or
difficulties that a trip to the gold garimpos would
incur. This ease of access also facilitates .the
policing of the diamond garimpos which are considerably
less violent than the more isolated gold mining areas.
Comparatively stable communities with permanent houses
have been established in the diamond garimpos, and
there are many more women and children in these areas
than are ever encountered in the gold mines. Overall,
the tension and aggression of the gold mines is
generally absent from the diamond garimpos, and as a
result, mining on the cerrado tends to be a much more
relaxed affair.
But this also reflects considerable economic
differences in the two types of mining. The diamond
garimpos are much older than the gold fields and are
usually much less productive. Therefore, even though
the overheads associated with diamond mining are
minimal, and the same work relations apply in both
types of garimpo, the earnings from diamond mining are
on the whole substantially lower than gold incomes. For
the Macuxi, the modest income gained from a fortnight's
manual work in the diamond garimpos provides them with
it should be noted here that this data only refers to rural Macuxi communities and does not
consider the large numbers of Macuxi who reside in Boa Vista (see Ferri 1990); it is likely that a
larger percentage of this urban Macuxi population were more directly involved in the gold rush.
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goods which they would otherwise have difficulty in
obtaining. They usually spend their mining incomes on
basic household items like salt, soap, oil, coffee,
aluminium pots, hammocks, clothes, or even bicycles. It
is very rare for the Macuxi to invest income from the
garimpo in either livestock or consumer goods (other
than radio/cassette recorders). In short, garimpo
earnings represent a small cash income to complement
their predominantly subsistence agriculture.
The Macuxi, unlike the caboclos, do have contact
with politically influential fazendeiros and donos do
garimpo on the cerrado who could provide them with
access to the gold garimpos. But even so, they use
similar arguments to the caboclos when explaining their
lack of involvement in the gold rush. In particular,
they note the difficulties and expense of entering the
gold fields while also acknowledging the risks of
disease and violence. The costs and distances involved
necessitate a longer stay in the gold garimpos than
many were prepared to tolerate, prejudicing both their
family lives and their agriculture. A few respondents
mentioned their reluctance to participate in an illegal
activity that was detrimental to the welfare of their
perceived relatives, the Yanomami. Therefore, in spite
of having the contacts that could give them access to
the gold fields, most of the Macuxi did not regard gold
mining as attractive employment.
But perhaps there is more to this story. And here
it is worth recognising the strong social relationships
that characterise diamond mining on the cerrado. For
while an excursion to the diamond mines provides the
Macuxi with a break from village life, it also offers
them an opportunity to visit relatives and friends in
more distant areas. Typically, a small group of men
170
(usually 4 to 6 people) will leave their village and
mine autonomously (por conta propria) for a two or
three week period in the summer. It is not uncommon for
them to work alongside friends and relatives from other
villages. Social events planned in nearby villages may
even influence the timing and location of their mining
venture. This suggests that to the Macuxi, social
objectives may be just as important as economic
considerations when planning a trip to the diamond
garimpos.
But the diamond garimpos also offer them a chance
to extend their social network beyond their own
community 13. Mining diamonds and working on the local
ranches brings them into contact with locally
influential people. This may be particularly important
to adolescent Macuxi who often look for waged
employment outside their villages. For them, a spell in
the diamond garimpos is frequently the first step
towards economic independence. Donos who spot diligent
young men in the garimpos may subsequently offer them
employment either on their ranches or more
significantly in Boa Vista. In short, gaining
recognition in the diamond garimpos may prove to be an
adolescent Macuxi's most valuable passport to life
outside the village.
The point is that on the cerrado, the Macuxi mine
with a considerable degree of autonomy in a very
familiar social and physical landscape. Although the
economic returns from gold mining are undoubtedly
higher, it does involve working in a totally different
social context. A trip to the gold fields does not
involve the same interaction between familiar people
13 This discussion derives from a conversation with Paulo Santilli, an anthropologist who has
worked extensively with the Macuxi.
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and places that the Macuxi value. Thus, from their
perspective, the economic benefits of gold mining
probably do not compensate for the sacrifices it
entails. Consequently, they find it surprising that
other people are prepared to commit themselves to the
gold rush in a way that few of them would. To one
Macuxi this indicated a fundamental difference between
Indian and non-Indian values:
'..People come from Maranhao, getting
hungry, without any money, hitch-hiking to
get to the garimpos.. if for example they '
opened a garimpo in Maranhao no Indian is
going to leave here getting hungry, hitch¬
hiking without money to get there, as they
come from there to here. I do not think that
the Indian has such a strong desire for the
garimpo' 14
Perhaps it is this outlook that enables the Macuxi
to balance mining against their other activities. They
seldom allow their excursions into the diamond garimpos
to prejudice agricultural production. Individuals tend
to go mining only when they are satisfied that
everything is under control in their gardens (roqa) .
Even so, the questionnaire responses indicate that
their trips to the garimpos are brief, rarely exceeding
three weeks in duration. As part of the same survey,
leaders of the 34 villages that participated in
garimpagem were asked if the activity caused a large,
small, or negligible scarcity of labour in the
community. 23 (68%) stated that labour shortages were
negligible, 9 (26.%) noted a small shortage, and only 2
said that they were large. A number of village heads
claimed to have the authority to restrict migration to
the garimpo but in practice these powers were rarely
14 Interview recorded in the Maloca of Boqueir3o, April 1991
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exercised. In fact, it is usually social pressure
exerted by other members of the village that prevents
an exodus of labour during critical periods. Clearly
this may create tensions as is illustrated by the
following quote. Here one Macuxi is speaking about his
colleagues who leave the village to go mining:
" Their attitude differs from ours,
they are practically divorced from communal
activities, and when they go to the
garimpos they have a different way of
thinking.. they reckon that if they go
mining they will make something, but they -
are not producing (agriculturally) here,
and there (in the garimpos) they obtain
nothing " .
This social regulation of outmigration tends to
prevent Macuxi villages from becoming too dependent on
the mining economy. They appear to strike a balance
between agriculture and mining that often eludes
migrant society. They are certainly not alone in this
respect. Gray (1986 :39) has made a similar observation
concerning the Amarakaeri in the Madre de Dios of Peru.
However, recent events have threatened to upset this
equilibrium as thousands of garimpeiros moved on to
Macuxi lands both in Brazil and Guyana, following the
closure of western Roraima's gold fields.
5.4 Garimpos and the invasion of Indian lands.
Mineral deposits of economic value exist on Indian
lands throughout Amazonia. A detailed survey of DNPM
archives notes that 2245 mineral claims have been
registered for 33.5% of the total Indian land area in
Amazonia Legale. Claims had been formally registered in
15 This tigure includes 560 mineral research permits (alvaras de autorizaqio de pesquisa), and
1685 claims (requerimentos incidentes) (CEDI/CONAGE 1988 :4).
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a quarter of the 302 Indian lands examined, but as
mining companies rarely obtain the necessary permission
to exploit them legally, many of these areas are mined
illegally by garimpeiros. During the 1980s, all of the
indigenous groups in Roraima had their lands invaded by
garimpeiros. Although strict laws exist to prevent such
trespassing, they are rarely enforced. The expulsion of
garimpeiros from the Yanomami reserve was quite
exceptional in this respect. But far from offering a
long term solution to the issue of mineral extraction
on Indian land, it simply transferred the related
problems from one Indian group to another.
As garimpeiros were squeezed out of the Yanomami
reserve, many of them moved eastwards to the diamond
garimpos of the cerrado. With the unique exception of
Tepequem, all of these diamond fields are situated on
the proposed Macuxi reserve called Raposa/Serra do Sol.
In 1991, the Indigenous Council of Roraima (CIR)
claimed that as many as 13 000 people had invaded this
area (Porantins 1991 :7). A proportion of these were
ranchers (as was mentioned in the last chapter) , but
the overwhelming majority were garimpeiros.
Mining is never without its costs. Traditionally
the Macuxi have accepted them as being the inevitable
consequences of a generally useful activity. But in
this instance their tolerance was surpassed. The influx
of garimpeiros was accompanied by a malarial epidemic
which killed 21 Macuxi and affected over 400 between
1990 and 1991 (Porantins 1991 :7) . The rivers which
provided them with drinking water and fish became
increasingly polluted 16. Not surprisingly, tensions
16 Although mercury is used in the garimpos of the cerrado to separate the small quantities of
gold from other sediments, it is not used as extensively in these diamond mining areas as it is in
the gold fields.
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between garimpeiros and Indians rose, most notably in
the villages closest to the principal mining areas. At
least four Macuxi were killed in fights with
garimpeiros between 1990 and 1991 (CIR 1992) . Conflict
was heightened by the uncertain nature of the Macuxi's
legal rights to the land and the unwillingness of the
federal police to intervene. As the proposed
Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve had not been officially
demarcated, the garimpeiros did not regard their
presence in the area as being illegal. Indeed they
presumed that the lack of a police presence actually
legitimised their occupation of the area. In addition,
local politicians were defending the invasion to ensure
the continued growth of the state's mining economy.
Thus, even though it contravened both the Brazilian
constitution and Guyanese immigration laws, only
derisory attempts were ever made to regulate the
situation.
Although the authorities would not intervene
decisively, the Macuxi themselves vigorously resisted
this invasion. CIR stepped up its campaign for the
expulsion of the intruders and the demarcation of the
Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve. In May 1992, the Macuxi
established road blocks on the access routes to the
garimpos along the Rio Mau. Their objective was not so
much to close down the mining on their lands, but more
to gain control over the activity. Like the Yanomami
(Ramos et al. 1985), Munduruku (Burkhatter & Murphy
1989) and Amarakaeri (Gray 1986), the Macuxi appreciate
the benefits of mineral extraction when it is practised
on their terms. But in spite of having a powerful ally
in the form of the Roman Catholic Church, they face
many difficulties in achieving this goal. In order to
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assess their prospects, it is worth having a brief look
at how other Indian groups confronted the same issue.
The Kayapo have probably been the most successful
of Brazil's Indians in controlling gold mining on their
lands. Between 1981 and 1985, different Kayapd leaders
made a series of arrangements with garimpeiros who were
working in different parts of their homelands. In all
cases, the Kayapo policed the mining areas and kept
the garimpos open in exchange for a negotiated fee
which varied from 1-10 percent of total gold
production. But it was one such agreement struck ever
the garimpo of Maria Bonita that merits attention, for
it became the vehicle through which the Kayapd achieved
the demarcation of their lands. They closed down Maria
Bonita in 1985 after a contract expired which had
provided them with 1 percent of the mining tax.
Together with the Brazilian airforce, they expelled
5000 garimpeiros from the site. By insisting that Maria
Bonita would only be reopened if FUNAI agreed to
demarcate their reserve, the Kayapd waged a successful
campaign for the preservation of their land rights. In
May of the same year, chief Paiakan, the group's main
negotiator, signed an agreement establishing a three
million hectare reserve for them. He subsequently
agreed to reopen Maria Bonita on condition that the
Kayapd received 5% of the mining royalties.
This is exceptional and few other Indian groups
have been able to manage garimpagem on their lands so
successfully. The Yanomami, for example, consistently
failed to strike any kind of deal with the gold miners
of western Roraima. So what is it that determines the
balance of power between Indians and garimpeiros in
such circumstances? The history and social organisation
of the indigenous group itself are perhaps as relevant
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as anything else. Here the Kayapo who are well versed
in dealing with Brazilian society have an obvious
advantage over the Yanomami. Nevertheless, even the
most acculturated Indian groups will still have
difficulties in handling garimpeiros if they are unable
to present and defend a united policy over mining on
their lands. The groups' internal social and political
organisation therefore become crucial in the struggle
over mineral deposits. The real strength of the Kayapd
lay in masking internal conflicts so that all of their
five villages presented a united bargaining front- to
the garimpeiros. This was bolstered by spectacular
demonstrations of power and skilful use of the media.
It would be hard to find a greater contrast with the
highly dispersed settlements of the Yanomami, who are
renowned for their feuding.
If these two groups represent the extremes of a
spectrum, then the Macuxi probably sit somewhere
between the two. They, like the Kayapo, are experienced
in dealing with outsiders and do have regular village
meetings to formulate appropriate strategies. But while
the Kayapo have enough difficulties reaching a
consensus among a population of 1500 people dispersed
throughout five villages, the Macuxi have to play the
same diplomatic game with ten times as many people and
settlements (see fig 5.2). It is therefore hardly
surprising that considerable internal rifts have
emerged in their campaign. The majority of villages
(particularly those which are nearest the mining areas)
still defend CIR's proposal to expel all the ranchers
and garimpeiros from the reserve. But a number of
settlements (particularly those which receive
government investment) argue against this, claiming
that a contraction in the cerrado economy will be
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detrimental. These conflicts are exploited fully by the
politically influential ranchers and garimpeiros who
are threatened with eviction. So, even though the
Macuxi have learnt from the Kayapd and are using the
garimpeiro invasion to focus attention on their land
claims, one can only speculate whether they will be as
successful.
5 .5 Summary:
It is interesting that neither the caboclos nor
the Macuxi participated more actively in the Roraima
gold rush. As we have seen, they responded to the
changes going on around them quite differently. But
even so, there are similarities in the way each society
evaluates the options available to them. It would
appear that social considerations are probably just as
significant in shaping their behaviour as economic
factors. In this respect, they seem to differ from many
of the colonist farmers and ranchers discussed in the
two previous chapters.
In spite of their very limited involvement in gold
mining itself, both societies were still influenced by
the gold rush. In economic terms, they experienced the
spillover effects of mining. This is not simply a
social issue, for in reshaping people's livelihoods,
the gold rush also had a whole series of impacts upon
the physical environment. In effect, it altered the
relationship between different people and the
environment that they inhabit. The Yanomami, who
discovered the considerable economic value of an inert
metal for which they previously had no use, is only the
most obvious example. The declining extraction of non-
timber forest products along the lower Rio Branco in
response to the caboclos ' new urban lifestyle is just
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as relevant. So too is the changing use of the cerrado
by the Macuxi. During the late 1980s, the Catholic
Church and FUNAI encouraged them to raise herds of
cattle in order to assert their claim over the
contested grasslands. For the first time, the Macuxi,
who have no history of autonomous animal husbandry,
became independent pastoralists. The overall impression
is that, throughout the decade, Roraima's folk and
Indian groups were adapting their livelihood strategies
in response to the changing social, economic and
political circumstances brought by the gold rush.
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Chapter 6 : The politics of gold mining in Amazonia.
Land-use changes in Amazonia are highly sensitive
to alterations in the political climate and state
policy has been one of the principal factors behind the
occupation and settlement of the region since colonial
times. In Roraima, the ruins of fort Sao Joaquim (1776)
constructed in the wake of the Directorate, provides a
lasting reminder of the historically important role
played by the state. In more recent years road
building, colonisation programmes, the Calha Norte
project and rural credit schemes all provide clear
examples of government directives influencing the
nature of Roraima's rural economy. This chapter
illustrates how the rapid exploitation of Amazonian
mineral resources during the 1980s has shaped the
region's political climate and how this in turn has
affected rural development policy. On a local scale,
consideration will be given to the effect that gold
mining has on the socio-political composition of state
governments. The wider consequences of these local
changes are then assessed by analysing the dynamic
relationship between the state and federal governments.
As we shall see, the nature of this relationship not
only determines the garimpeiros ' access to mineral
resources, but also shapes other land developments in
rural Amazonia over the longer term. Therefore, we
start with a brief look at political changes in the
Brazilian Amazon since the 1930s and pay particular
attention to the changing roles of the state and the
federal government within this context.
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6.1 The changing relationship between state and federal
governments:
A small number of land-owning groups have been
disproportionately influential in shaping the
development of the Amazonian rural economy. The power
of these regional elites rested not so much on the
extent of their land-holdings, but more significantly
on the resources which were contained therein. The
result was that local oligarchies dominated the
extraction of rubber in Acre, the collection of Brazil
nuts in the south-east of Para and the rearing of
livestock on the grasslands of the Ilha de Marajo,
Amapa and Roraima. Historically, these rural elites
have been important players on the local political
stage, commanding influence through clientelistic
networks associated with the economic activities they
dominate.
Even though the occupation of Amazonia has been a
national goal since colonial days, the current drive
for regional growth is rooted in the expansionist
philosophy of the Vargas administration (1930-45) . The
development ideology articulated at that time (known in
Portuguese as desenvolvimentismo) viewed public
infrastructure as a vehicle for the occupation and
economic development of peripheral areas. Over the past
fifty years, successive governments have sought to
extend their influence in Amazonia with these
objectives in mind. In broad terms they have achieved
this by subdividing the regional political structure so
that more administrative units are created, stepping up
the presence of the armed services in the region,
investing heavily in the transport and energy
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infrastructure and placing large swathes of land under
the administration of central government organisations.
The federal government initially asserted its
authority in the Amazon by implementing administrative
reforms. One key piece of legislation was the 1937
constitution which for reasons of national security,
permitted the Union to establish Federal Territories in
frontier areas. At that date Acre, which had been
annexed from Bolivia in 1903, was the only existing
federal territory in Amazonia, but in 1943 it was
joined by the newly created Rondonia, Amapa -and
Roraima. Even though the Federal Territories were to be
developed by channelling capital through government
agencies, they received only a small proportion of the
funds disbursed by the regional development
organisation SPVEA and its successor SUDAM. Indeed, by
1985, less than 10% of the total funds administered by
SUDAM had been allocated to the territories1. The net
effect was that these early reforms were predominantly
bureaucratic and did little to alter the structure of
the rural economies on which the influence of local
elites rested. Hence a potential cause for conflict
between powerful landowners and the federal government
was effectively preempted and Vargas' 'Estado Novo', as
it came to be known, did not impinge on the local
elites' control of land which remained their principal
vehicle for the political control of rural areas.
Agrarian oligarchies continued to dominate local
politics either as appointed administrators of the
Federal Territories or as elected politicians in the
states which were democratically governed (Amazonas,
Para, Maranhao, Mato Grosso).
1 Until January 1985 Acre had received 1.6% of total SUDAM funding, Amapa 2.25%, Rondonia
4%, and Roraima only 0.65%. (Freitas 1991 :55).
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However, there has been growing animosity between
the local and federal governments since the 1960's. The
military dictatorship (established in 1964) centralised
power even further and wrested greater control over the
administration of land from local government, although
not without some considerable trade-offs with the
larger land-owning class (Hine pers. comm.).
Administration of the federal territories was delegated
to the navy in the case of Amapa, the army for Rondonia
and the air force in the case of Roraima. More
significantly, a series of laws, which were justi-fied
on the grounds of national security, annexed huge
tracts of land and placed them under the administration
of federal agencies in the early 1970s. INCRA was by
far the most significant of these agencies, which under
decree law 1164 of 1971, was made responsible for the
management of a 100 kilometre swathe of land along all
federal highways. This legislation (which was
subsequently revoked in 1988) enabled the federal
government to extend its control over the development
of Amazonian resources through the construction of new
highways.
Roraima, being a frontier state of strategic
interest, was a prominent target for this transfer of
land from state to federal government administration.
Figure 6.1 illustrates that 62.5% of Roraima's lands
were under federal government administration in 1992
(Roraima 1992). INCRA exerts control over the largest
area of 9 538 817 hectares (41.5%), situated within 150
kilometres of the frontier, and a wide band along
federal highways, while FUNAI, IBAMA and the army
administer a further 4 917 360 hectares (21.4%).
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Fig 6.1 The Public Administration of Land in Roraima
Land Areas administered by
150 kmsfB&gg incra
M 9. 538, 317 ha
FUNAl
Id 9,155, 569 ha
The State Gevemment




The Total land area of Roraima is 23, 010, 400 ha
Source: Government ofRoraima 1992
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In fact, only 37% of the state's total land surface
lies outside federal government control and, more
significantly, only 9.6% (2 218 893 ha.) of Roraima is
under the sole authority of the state government. Most
of this land is concentrated in the inaccessible lower
reaches of the Rio Branco basin2. Thus, on an
administrative level at least, the local government
has only a limited say in the exploitation of state
resources. This is especially true of minerals as
virtually all of Roraima's garimpos, with the unique
exception of Tepequem, lie on land administered, by
FUNAI. The efficacy with which the federal government
polices these areas is therefore a crucial factor in
regulating state mineral production.
The new roads posed a considerable threat to the
interests of the local agrarian elites. This was not
simply due to the transfer of land away from state
government administration, but also because the
restructuring of the rural economy precipitated by the
highway developments served to marginalise the
productive activities that the elites controlled. The
difficulties facing Amazonia's agrarian oligarchies at
this time were further compounded by the migration
which the road building programme generated. This was
certainly the case for the Mutran family of south¬
eastern Para whose domination of the local Brazil nut
trade has been undermined by the activities of
squatters since the completion of the PA 150 in the
early 1970s. The squatters challenged the Mutran's
ownership of the land and also began to erode their
economic base by clearing the Brazil nut forests on the
family's estate for agriculture (Hine 1991). In short,
2 Para provides a similar example of how these laws placed large areas of Amazonia under
federal government administration. See Schmink and Wood (1992 :108).
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the pre-existing social and economic landscape on which
the authority of local oligarchies rested, underwent a
rapid transformation following the road constructions
of the 1970s. As a result the landed families were
increasingly challenged over their domination of the
local political stage by actors associated with the
newly expanding sectors of the Amazonian economy. These
were most notably land speculators, timber merchants,
urban retailers, government administrators and, as we
shall see below, garimpeiros.
However, these internal dynamics of state politics
did little to reconcile the continuing struggle between
local and federal governments over the control of
Amazonian resources. Surprisingly, the outcome of this
contest has been increasingly shaped by economic, and
not political factors. Throughout the 1980s, the
federal government experienced growing difficulties in
maintaining the physical and administrative
infrastructure which it had so vigorously assembled in
Amazonia during the previous decade. To use a sporting
metaphor:
'On the one hand, in constructing the highway
network and directly encouraging external
investment in Amazonia, it [the state] marked
out the playing field for the region's future
development. On the other, the state proved to
be so incapable of controlling the consequences
that it now has difficulties in putting a team
on the pitch.' Cleary (in press p. 20).
While the inability to control regional
development processes is most obviously a manifestation
of the Brazilian economic crisis of the 1980s, it also
reflects the impotence of the bureaucratic federal
agencies in applying government policy (see Bunker
1985). Their chances of fulfilling such directives are
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now further compromised by the tax reforms incorporated
within the 1988 constitution, which bestowed greater
financial autonomy on municipal and state governments,
augmenting their share of tax revenues from 50 to 66
percent (Amparo in press). As the influence of federal
government wanes therefore, local interests once again
assume an increasingly important role in Amazonian
resource exploitation.
Even so, it is wrong to believe that the
fragmentation of federal government control is the
unique cause of this emerging local political force,
for factors intrinsic to Amazonia have done much to
enhance this transition. Indeed, by examining the
political dynamics associated with the garimpo, it can
be argued that the region's mineral boom actually
strengthened the hand of Amazonian state governments
over that of the Union. In purely economic terms, the
rapid growth of the Amazonian mineral sector gave the
region and its politicians a new significance in
domestic and even international politics. But an
equally significant point is that the growth of the
gold mining sector presented local interests with an
opportunity to extend their political and economic
influence in a sphere which could not be penetrated by
federal government intervention. By its very
definition, informal sector mining occurs outside the
domain of government authority and, being denied direct
control, Brasilia can only influence the Amazonian
mineral sector through clumsy external interventions.
Thus, in complete contrast to the history of Amazonian
land administration over the previous two decades, the
federal government was unable to wrest control of the
regional mining economy from local interests during the
1980s.
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But what exactly were the political opportunities
that arose from the 1980s Amazonian mineral boom, and
how successfully were they exploited? Answering these
questions offers an insight into how the Amazonian
mining lobby emerged as such a powerful force on both
the regional and the national stage. The following two
sections of this chapter address this issue by looking
at the principal channels through which garimpeiros
gained power in Amazonia during the 1980s. Then the
local situation will be placed once again in its
national political context to evaluate the significance
of these events for the exploitation of Amazonian
mineral resources.
6.2 Roraima, Serra Pelada and the garimpairo vote:
The intense migration that accompanies gold mining
often leads to a rapid transformation of the local
electoral base. In Roraima, this was unusually
significant as it occurred on the eve of the state's
first democratic elections in 1990 which marked the
transition from federal territory to statehood. Four
distinct groups of voters existed before the rush:
colonist farmers, Indians, urban professional classes
(principally public sector employees) and urban working
classes (mainly employed in the informal sector). The
arrival of 40 000 garimpeiros and an even greater
number of urban immigrants linked to the mining
economy, created a new clearly-defined segment of the
electorate which was numerically superior to any of the
four groups noted above. Whoever succeeded in
harnessing this vote would be guaranteed considerable
political influence in both state and national affairs.
There was a rapid proliferation of the local media
in the form of three radio stations, six newspapers,
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and one state television channel, all mouthpieces for
an array of political parties which competed for the
garimpeiro vote. Even though virtually all of the
candidates promised to support the interests of the
garimpeiros, there were two principal figures who
championed their cause. The first was Romero Juca, ex-
president of FUNAI (1986-1988), who, having been
dismissed from that office, was subsequently appointed
governor of Roraima. Although not directly involved in
mining, Juca had overtly sanctioned the garimpeiros'
invasion of the Yanomami lands during his governorship
(1988-1990), and had campaigned vigorously for the
reduction of the single indigenous area into the 19
separate islands which were briefly established by
inter-ministerial decree 250/88 (as discussed in
chapter 2) . While Juca contested the seat of governor,
Jose Altino Machado, head of the Union of Amazonian
Garimpeiros, USAGAL, ran for senator. Jose Altino is
one of Roraima's most influential garimpeiros who has
fought for the extraction of mineral resources within
the Yanomami Reserve since the early 1980s. This is
manifest not only in the unsuccessful invasion of
Surucucus in 1985 which he coordinated (see chapter 2),
but also in his skilled lobbying for the creation of
three garimpeiro reserves within the Yanomami park
which were established under presidential decree
25/01/90 and 16/02/90, before being revoked later in
the same year (see fig. 2.1).
On polling day however, the garimpeiro lobby
failed to vote either candidate into office. Juca was
ousted by Brigadier Ottomar de Souza Pinto, a previous
governor, whose marginal victory rested on considerable
support from smallholders. Jose Altino was similarly
unsuccessful. Tv»u of the three government posts he
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contested were won by established local land-owners and
the third by Marluce Pinto, Ottomar's wife. Thus, in
spite of a considerable electoral base and substantial
financial resources, the two principal figures of the
mining lobby failed to secure key positions in the
elections.
There are a number of reasons for this unexpected
result, one of which is the contraction of the local
mining economy in the run up to the elections. But,
while outmigration might have somewhat diminished the
electoral support of Juca and Altino, there were still
sufficiently large numbers of garimpeiros within
Roraima to have swept them into office had their
campaigns been more effective. The electoral results
therefore reflect their inability to translate the
large number of potential garimpeiro supporters into a
sufficiently powerful vote. Here the odds were stacked
against them, and against anybody else seeking to use
gold mining as an electoral platform, on two counts.
Firstly, even though voting is compulsory, it is
likely that a substantial proportion of the potential
garimpeiro vote is never expressed. The transience of
miners may discourage them from registration in states
which they are only passing through, especially if they
are working in inaccessible areas which are a great
distance from the nearest ballot box. Electoral
registration is no doubt further impeded by the
garimpeiros' aversion to official documentation,
particularly in areas like western Roraima where mining
is practised illegally.
A second, and perhaps more fundamental obstacle is
the limited extent to which garimpeiros identify
themselves as a professional class with common
political objectives. Any one garimpo contains
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smallholders, ranchers, tradesmen and merchants who are
united not so much in their mutual love of mining, but
in their displacement from other sectors of the
economy. Furthermore, the flexible nature of work
relations in the garimpos, and the autonomy which this
generates, may serve to erode notions of both a
professional identity and a common struggle amongst the
workforce. A large section of the garimpo workforce is
therefore likely to prioritise political and economic
support for other activities over that of the garimpo,
particularly if they perceive a trade-off between - the
two. Indeed, it is possibly only the smaller group of
professional garimpeiros who place the future of
informal sector mining at the centre of their political
agendas.
In spite of the similar circumstances in which
each campaign was fought, the Roraima result differs
markedly from the outcome of the Maraba municipal
election in 1982 (the garimpo of Serra Pelada lies
within the municipality of Maraba). In both cases,
garimpeiros whose access to mineral deposits was under
threat, accounted for the majority of the electorate.
But this is probably the limit of any valid comparison,
for Serra Pelada was unique in having mining densely
concentrated in a very confined area which facilitated
state intervention in the organisation of the garimpo.
Indeed, the federal government trouble-shooter who
implemented the state directives, Major Curid,
succeeded in harnessing the garimpeiro vote. Having
dramatically improved the working conditions at Serra
Pelada, Curio capitalised on the popularity this
engendered by making electoral registration a necessary
pre-condition for access to the garimpo. The plan
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worked, and on polling day, a wave of populist support
swept him into office as a congressman.
Curio's successful exploitation of the garimpeiro
vote was exceptional. Even so, it provides a good
illustration of the garimpo's potential to influence
politics up to the level of central government and
furthermore, it challenges the suggestion that
garimpeiros lack political cohesion. In searching for
the root of Curio's success, it is worth recognising
that his victory rested as much on the support he
received from the federal government as it did on' the
garimpeiro vote. Without the former it is doubtful
whether he would have obtained the latter. Indeed, by
placing him in Serra Pelada and providing the funds to
reform the garimpo, the military government was
actively seeking to empower Curio as a political ally.
They saw in him an opportunity to displace the dominant
Mutran family from office and to bolster support for
the ruling party in congress. The concentration of
mining activity in Serra Pelada and the threatened
take-over of the garimpo by the Companhia de Vale Rio
Doce (CVRD) were two key factors that played in Curio's
favour. And he was particularly adept at cultivating
the opportunities they presented. Through daily
addresses to the workforce he carved out a powerful
electoral platform.
In contrast, the dispersed clandestine mining of
Roraima did not allow garimpeiro leaders such as Juca
and Altino to consolidate political support. The
different responses of the two work forces when faced
with the prospect of expulsion illustrates the extent
to which they acted as politically cohesive units.
Serra Pelada's garimpeiros formed an formidable
political force. In October 1983, a contingent of them
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went to Brasilia to lobby for their right to continue
working at the site. This was only one element in an
efficient and ultimately successful campaign to keep
the mine in the informal sector. By June 1984, protests
were less restrained: several thousand garimpeiros
blocked the Belem-Brasilia highway and other more minor
roads, disarmed the police, and burnt down the CVRD
buildings at Parauapebas. In contrast, Roraima's
garimpeiros displayed little coordinated political
activism. Other than a handful of demonstrations in the
central square of Boa Vista between July and September
1990, one of which culminated in an attack on the
Bishop's residence, the workforce dispersed with
remarkable passivity. Unlike the Serra Pelada
workforce, which had been transformed into a
politically influential mass by Curid, Roraima's
garimpeiros appeared to be little more than a
disorganised rabble.
The rapid influx of garimpeiros into a particular
area does alter the electoral base, but this is not
necessarily mirrored by sudden alterations in the local
political climate. Indeed, while the demographic
changes that accompany mineral rushes undoubtedly
present new political opportunities, these are seldom
realised by candidates who do not already enjoy
considerable political support in governmental circles.
This is precisely because electoral success in Brazil,
as in many other democracies, is still largely a
function of the resources which a candidate has at his
or her disposal. The backing that Curio received to
improve conditions in Serra Pelada provided the
foundation on which both his support and subsequent
victory rested. As a result, aspiring politicians must
extend their access to resources through political
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alliances if they are to turn an electoral base into a
campaign success. For this reason, numerical
superiority alone is rarely sufficient to equip
garimpeiros with a clear voice in Brazilian politics.
6.3 The garlmpo and the formation of an 61ite class:
The specific nature of the Roraima rush, coupled
with the inability of institutions and individuals to
exploit the situation effectively, ensured that the
garimpeiro lobby gained only limited power through
direct elections. Nonetheless, the explosive growth of
the informal mining sector still influenced the tone of
state politics in two distinct ways. Firstly, members
of the already established local elite invested in
mining and came to defend those interests on the
political stage. Secondly, the opportunities for social
advancement presented by the rush enabled recently
arrived garimpeiros to enter the local elite and gain
political influence. Certainly in Roraima, it was
through the personal involvement of powerful
individuals in garimpagem, and not via the formal
mechanics of the democratic system, that the garimpo
lobby acquired greatest influence in state politics.
Local politicians are well placed to make
investments in the garimpos not simply because they
have access to the necessary sums of capital, but also
because they are linked into extensive social networks
in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, as the
mineral resources on Indian lands are widely perceived
to be common property, few politicians regard investing
in the garimpos as being incompatible with their public
responsibilities. In addition, involvement in the gold
rush actually offers them an opportunity to strengthen
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their electoral position. Contacts may be forged with
economically powerful donos who might provide financial
backing for future election campaigns and support can
be engendered among the electorally significant
garimpeiro workforce. More specifically, politicians
who invest in mining demonstrate a personal commitment
to the progress and development of Amazonia which is
often perceived to be threatened by external political
pressures.
A number of public figures therefore seized the
opportunity to invest in gold mining in the Yanomami
reserve. In the 1991 Ottomar administration, at least
four state deputies, one senator and one federal deputy
had financed mining operations in this area between
1987 and 1990^. A number of senior civil servants also
invested in the gold rush; these included the chief of
the state police force, the transport secretary, and
ironically, the Secretary of State for the Environment,
Interior and Justice. When interviewed, one of these
politicians presented a candid explanation of why he
and his colleagues decided to invest in the garimpos:
'GJM: Why did you decide to invest in the
garimpos when you had both a public position
and rural property. What was it that attracted
you to the garimpo ?
P: Right listen closely, the garimpo arrived
here like a fever that passed through the heads
of everybody who lived here. At that time it
was almost impossible to meet anybody who was
not affected by that wave of garimpo wealth
which spread across the whole city [Boa Vista].
Look then at what happened to me as a
politician. My political colleagues began to
invest in the garimpo and they invited me to
enter as a partner. That was how it was.
Anybody who had a little bit of money on the
3 This data is collected from newspaper reports and interviews with local politicians.
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side took it and invested in the garimpo in
that illusion of El Dorado.
GJM: So how did you manage your investment
there. Did you contract an overseer ?
P: Yes we had a manager, a person of
confidence whom we knew - do you understand ?
Our investment was like this...I bought the
equipment in partnership with another friend of
mine who was also a politician. We calculated
all of the costs and split them fifty-fifty for
everything we needed; a set of machinery, food,
fuel, the transport flights, and then we put
the work team in to start production.' 27/12/91
This quote illustrates the ease with which
investments can be made in the garimpo, providing local
entrepreneurs with an opportunity to diversify their
economic base into mining. This is particularly
important when assessing processes of elite formation,
for it ensures that people who already carry some
economic and political weight are not excluded from
this rapidly expanding sector of the local economy. The
pre-gold rush elite in Roraima consisted of the well
established ranching families of the cerrado as well as
an urban professional class. The latter was dominated
by civil servants, but also included a small group of
retailers and a handful of diamond traders. Other than
this, a few officers in the air force such as Brigadier
Ottomar de Souza Pinto, remained influential having
come into power while the state was a Federal
Territory. Most state and municipal politicians had
interests in at least one of these fields, and
virtually all of them owned land. The structure of
their portfolios at the start of the gold rush
typically shaped their response to the various
opportunities that it presented. For example, those who
already had investments in urban commerce were well
placed to expand their activities in the booming retail
and entertainments sectors. Similarly, diamond traders
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expanded into gold purchasing, whilst anybody in
possession of a light aircraft employed it in servicing
the garimpos. Others, particularly those whose only
concern was ranching or diamond mining, were less able
to penetrate the lucrative and stable urban-based
service sector and often chose to invest in the gold
extraction process itself. The case of the extended
families who have traditionally dominated the cerrado
ranching economy is illustrative. As we saw in chapter
4, they were keen to transfer capital from ranching
into mining because the FUNAI proposal to establish-the
Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve threatened to displace them
from the cerrado.
In effect, these ranchers took a gamble and backed
the wrong horse. For although mineral extraction may be
a lucrative venture, it tends to be a much more risky
investment than the service sector of the garimpo
economy. Furthermore, it demands a level of vigilance
which few of the ranchers were prepared to give and
consequently a number of them were swindled by
untrustworthy managers whom they had employed to
supervise their mining operations. In spite of all of
these problems, it was probably the sudden closure of
the garimpos that dealt the hardest financial blow to
these ranchers, particularly to those who had over-
committed themselves to mining due to the uncertain
future of cerrado ranching. They, like other investors,
suffered considerable financial losses when, in 1991,
the federal police began destroying all the mining
equipment they encountered within the Yanomami reserve.
While these alterations in the financial affairs
of Roraima's elite provide some understanding of
subsequent political changes in the state, the
relationship between economic power and political
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influence is slightly more complex. For although secure
financial backing is undoubtedly a prerequisite for any
successful campaign, strong electoral support is an
equally important ingredient; marrying the two is, as
Curio demonstrated, the skill of the politician. Under
rapidly changing socio-economic circumstances,
Amazonian politicians have been forced to re-articulate
both their electoral platform as well as their economic
interests in order to maintain their influence. The
speed and flexibility with which they respond to such a
challenge is beginning to emerge as one of the -most
striking characteristics of Amazonian elites. The
ability of the Mutran family to reclaim the mayor ship
of Maraba in the 1989 elections, only seven years after
Curio ousted them from office, is one of the most
spectacular, but by no means the only, example. Miller
provides further evidence of this resilience by
demonstrating that some of the figureheads who
traditionally dominated the extractive economy around
Santarem (Para), were able to maintain their local
influence by diversifying into informal sector mining
from the 1960s onwards (Miller 1985).
As we have seen, Roraima follows a similar
pattern. Rather than experiencing the total replacement
of an old elite with a new class of miners, there was a
merging of the two groups into a new political class.
Firstly, members of the pre-gold rush elite were quick
to invest in mining and to extend their political
appeal to the electorally significant garimpo
workforce. The failed campaigns of Altino and Juca
testify the skill with which the old hands, like
Ottomar, adapted to changing circumstances and
maintained their grip on power. Even so, the rush was
not without its political victims the most obvious of
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whom were the cerrado ranchers. By investing in the
gold extraction process itself and not the more secure
service economy, their economic weight was eclipsed by
the urban based professional and commercial classes. Of
course there are exceptions to this rule. Some
ranchers, like Zelio Mota, were able to make this
transition. Zelio's success lay in extending his
previous diamond trading concern into the new gold
trade. But the experience of others, like Jose Augusto
Macaggi head of the Roraima's landowners union the UDR
(Rural Democratic Union), is more representative;
despite personally managing his own balsa on the rio
Uraricoera over a sixteen month period, Jose generated
about the same income that he had earned previously as
an agricultural consultant and ranch owner. Less astute
members of the cerrado ranching fraternity, like Junior
Magalhaes and Petita Brasil, lost considerable sums of
money by investing the proceeds of land and livestock
sales in the garimpo. In general terms therefore, the
cerrado ranchers were economically and politically
marginalised by events at the end of the 1980s. They
suffered both the financial impact of their
unprofitable experiences in the garimpo and declining
political authority as their control of the cerrado
economy was gradually undermined by FUNAI policy.
Secondly, just as members of the old elite moved
into mining, the new class of garimpeiro entrepreneurs
simultaneously penetrated the economic domain of
Roraima's establishment. We have already seen that
members of the local elite whose interests were
confined exclusively to the rural sector tended to lose
ground to an increasingly powerful urban class, but the
composition of this urban fraction also changed as new
garimpeiros entered. These new arrivals were typically
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entrepreneurs who came to Boa Vista to ride out the
mineral boom. The retailing of garimpo equipment,
mineral extraction, gold trading and the provision of
air transport, were often at the centre of their
portfolios, but they also invested in rented
accommodation, car sales, taxi companies and the
ubiquitous entertainments sector. Even so, the speed
with which these entrepreneurs entered Roraima was in
many cases matched only by the swiftness of their
return to Porto Velho, Maraba, Santarem or other towns
from which they originated. In the aftermath of -the
rush therefore only a small proportion of this rich
garimpeiro class remained to become part of the socio¬
political fabric of Roraima.
These newcomers were able to use their
considerable economic wealth to gain political
influence. Making an investment in ranching is perhaps
the first step for entrepreneurs seeking an entry into
local politics (see the discussion in chapter 4).
Having gained a social position in this way, they are
well placed to extend their influence further by using
their accumulated wealth as a tool for political
negotiation on the local stage. The 1190 elections
which marked Roraima!s transition to statehood were
particularly significant in this respect as numerous
candidates were searching for campaign funds.
Competition was heightened because the transition would
bestow a greater degree of political autonomy than ever
before. The elected government was also charged with
the formulation of a state constitution. More
significantly perhaps, the inconsistent approach of the
federal government towards the Yanomami question in the
run up to the elections suggested that local
politicians would enjoy greater influence over the
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exploitation of local mineral deposits than eventually
proved to be the case.
The resultant clamour for power gave politically
inexperienced garimpeiros an opportunity to gain
influential positions in state government through the
backing of election campaigns. This therefore
represents a direct channel through which the mining
lobby acquires a political voice. Indeed, Rora-ima's
garimpeiros were more effective in articulating their
interests in this way than by their unsuccessful
attempts at gaining office through the formal electoral
system. It is important to understand the exact
mechanics through which the newcomers entered local
politics without getting elected themselves. The
following detailed case study presents a clear
illustration of how powerful garimpeiros can acquire
positions of considerable local influence through
backing electoral campaigns.
Originating in the South of Brazil, Elton Ronhelt
came into contact with the Amazonian elites through
informal sector mining. In 1983 he established the
company 'Edgar Ronhelt Mineraqao Limitada' in
partnership with his brother Luz and the Mestrinho
brothers Thome and Gilberto4. The company had mining
operations throughout the garimpos of Amazonia, but
came to concentrate their activities in the region
known as the 'Cabeqa do Cachorro1 in northwest
Amazonas. In 1985, FUNAI and DNPM granted them
permission to mine two out of the three mineral
concessions that the company held on the Alto Rio Negro
indigenous reserve5. Simultaneously, Paranapanema, the
4 Gilberto Mestrinho is the long-standing governor of Amazonas state. He has strong political
connections with Roraima, where he was elected a federal deputy in the 1970s
5 The details of these concessions are published in CEDI/CONAGE 1988 : 21-22, and are
illustrated cartographically in Wright 1990 p.40.
201
large state mining corporation, was given permission to
mine a different site in the same reserve. Wright
(1990) notes that the two companies worked together
under the protection of the police force of the state
of Amazonas. Mineral dealers in Boa Vista explained
that having received permission to mine the concession,
'Edgar Ronhelt Mineragao Limitada' invited Paranapanema
to provide the financial and technical resources to
develop the site, in return for a percentage of the
profits.
The partners restructured their business interests
in 1986; Gilberto Mestrinho sold out of the company and
dedicated himself to his political career; Thome
Mestrinho established a new mining company called
'Mineragao Montes Roraima Limitada' *>, anci the Ronhelt
brothers kept the company operating under the new name
of 'GoldAmazon' . Both Monte Roraima and GoldAmazon had
operations in the Yanomami indigenous reserve during
the Roraima gold rush, although neither were
spectacularly successful. Nonetheless, GoldAmazon did
attract the attention of the press on two occasions
during this period. Elton himself had the misfortune of
being caught in flagrante at Boa Vista airport in a
light plane containing an assortment of machine guns
and semi-automatic weapons 7, but was released without
charge. A month later he became the sole owner of the
company when his brother Luz died in a plane crash
while commuting to the garimpo 8. With two helicopters,
a number of light aircraft, and two DC3 transport
planes, Elton owned one of the largest airfleets in
Roraima. A high proportion of his revenue came from
6 Gama de Silva 1990 :282, the same text also notes that Thomd Mestrinho owned a further
company called 'Minera?ao Thome Medeiros Recursos Naturais Limitada'
7 O Journal de Boa Vista 12/08/88.
8 Folha de Boa Vista 21/09/88
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providing prospecting and transport services in the
garimpos, but this was also supplemented by mining and
the trading of tin ore which was sold mainly to
Paranapanema.
Elton Ronhelt and Thome Mestrinho stood as
candidates in the 1990 Roraima elections, but neither
of them obtained sufficient votes to qualify for the
second round of the two-tier electoral system. On
receiving the results, Elton placed the GoldAmazon air
fleet at the disposal of Brigadier Ottomar de Souza
Pinto who used it successfully to whip up support among
colonists in remote rural areas and so clinch his
victory against Romero Juca. On taking office,
Brigadier Ottomar appointed Elton Ronhelt head of the
department of mining and hydro-electric projects in the
state development corporation CODESAIMA. His daughter
Denise Ronhelt, who owns a registered gold-trading
company in Boa Vista, was appointed State Secretary for
Tourism. As no DNPM office exists in Roraima, Elton
effectively became the most senior government figure
concerned with mineral development in the state.
There are many other examples of garimpeiros
achieving political influence in similar ways
throughout Amazonia. Again, in Roraima, Antonio Dias an
entrepreneur who became wealthy retailing garimpo
equipment during the gold rush, was appointed Vice
Governor by Ottomar. At the time of his appointment,
Antonio had resided for more than five years in the
state and had no previous political experience.
Similarly, Rubens da Silva, another successful
garimpeiro, was appointed head of the Roads Department
DETRAN in exchange for the support he lent to Ottomar's
campaign. In Para, Senhor Wilson, the owner of
'Agropepas' in Tucuma, and Joao Kai-Kai, owner of
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'Pioneiro dos Motores' , provide two well known examples
of garimpo retailers extending their economic influence
into the political sphere by supporting electoral
candidates. Furthermore, as is well illustrated by the
relationship between Ronhelt and Paranapanema, larger
interests may also use this same avenue to influence
local politics 9. One well-publicised, recent example
was the significant contribution that Mercedes Benz
made to Curio's unsuccessful 1990 election campaign in
Maraba
The point to recognise is that once garimpedros
gain political influence they may use it to support the
interests of large mining companies over the informal
mining sector. Elton Ronhelt's appointment forged a
strong link between Paranapanema and the government of
Roraima. This is well illustrated by an interview that
Ottomar, Elton Ronhelt, and Lacombe (the director of
Paranapanema) gave to the national newspaper Folha de
Sao Paulo in July 1991. Having appealed to the
garimpeiro vote during his election campaign, Ottomar's
statement on this occasion favoured the participation
of formal sector companies in any future development of
the state's mineral resources, representing a distinct
change in policy 11
The political opportunities that wealth offers
ensure that the garimpo is a significant force
9 Other candidates in the same elections also appeared to have the support of larger interests.
According to local cassiterite dealers, the mineral company 'Companhia Industrial Amazonense'
(CIA), which is joint owned by Brascan (95%) and Best Metals and Solders (5%) (DNPM 1982 :
868) provided Jose Altino and Jo3o Fagundes with vehicles to help canvas the electorate. Jo3o
Fagundes was elected as a federal deputy, leaving the less fortunate Altino with a political ally
who can represent his interests in government; presumably the same privilege is extended to CIA.
10 This event came to light amongst evidence presented at the hearings over the impeachment of
the President (Veja 22/07/1992 :18-26). Schmink and Wood (1992 :128) give details of a similar
deal made in Para in the 1970s, in which a logging contract was awarded to the pension fund
CAPEMI in return for their financial support of a political campaign .
11 Folha de Sao Paulo 11/07/91.
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affecting the composition of Amazonian elites.
Nonetheless, this discussion suggests that even though
certain garimpeiros may become more influential, the
entrepreneurial class which the garimpo empowers seldom
comes to replace a local elite entirely. Rather, the
facility with which the established class can diversify
into mining and re-articulate their political and
economic influence through dealing with powerful
garimpeiros favours a fusion of the old elite group
with the new. It is precisely through merging different
interest groups that the garimpo has had significant
political repercussions. In general terms a common
support for the mining economy is stimulated as
previously established politicians invest in garimpagem
and powerful garimpeiros enter local politics. This
then was how the mining lobby became an important force
in Amazonia.
6.4 The emergence of a regional political identity and
the struggle over mineral resources:
Once garimpeiros gain office in state governments
they can alter the course of local development in three
main ways. Firstly, they may come to determine the
allocation of regional development funds, such as the
FNO, which are an important source of capital to local
investors (notably ranchers) . Secondly, they can
influence state policy, as was the case when Roraima's
constitution was being drawn up in 1991. Finally, they
may also sway decisions concerning the development of
the local infrastructure such as the construction of
roads and hydro-electric projects. As head of the
Mining and Energy Department of the state development
company, CODESAIMA, Elton Ronhelt over-ruled previous
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plans and commissioned the construction of Roraima's
first hydro-electric project on the River Jatapu at the
easternmost tip of the Perimiteral Norte highway12. By
1992, the initial works were being undertaken by
Paranapanema, the very company with which Ronhelt had
been most closely associated in the garimpos.
However, it is the relationship between the state
and federal governments which determines the precise
extent to which locally-influential garimpeiros can
shape the course of Amazonian development. As local
interests tend to dominate when the influence- of
federal government slips, the state's control over land
development is directly proportional to the impotence
of the Union. This was certainly the situation in
Roraima during the gold rush itself. For various
reasons, neither FUNAI nor the military were able to
prevent the garimpeiros from entering the Yanomami
reserve. Local interests seized this as an excellent
opportunity to pursue their own agenda - the central
item of which was, and still remains, the exploitation
of the state's subsoil wealth.
They were probably surprised to see the explosive
growth of the mining economy being matched in scale by
the media coverage and international concern that it
generated. Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such
as the Commission for the Creation of a Yanomami Park
(CCPY), the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF), Cultural
Survival (CS) , and Survival International (SI), were
particularly active in lobbying the Brazilian
government to address the fate of the Yanomami. The
The site for the hydro-electric plant is just downstream from the garimpo on the river Jatapu
which is discussed in chapter 7. Elton Ronhelt gave precedence to the Jatapu site over two others
which had been favoured by previous state governments. Work had already begun on one of them
at Pareddo on the Rio Mucajai, funded by a loan from the Midland Bank pic. The second site,
which had also been surveyed by the time Elton came to office, was on the Rio Cotingo .
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real muscle of their campaign lay in mobilising western
electorates and governments to pressurise Brasilia over
the issue. But, although this strategy ultimately
proved decisive, their demands were resisted by the
Sarney administration while it remained in office.
Sarney continued to favour the garimpeiro lobby,
signing the inter-ministerial decree 250/88 which
carved the proposed Yanomami territory into 19 separate
islands, thereby permitting garimpeiros to work in the
intervening national forest (see chapter 2).
It took a change of government before - the
international pressure applied to Brasilia had anything
other than a superficial impact on the situation in
Roraima. But when change came, it was swift. Within the
first month of his presidency, Fernando Collor de Melo
had revoked the controversial decree 250/88, had
visited the Yanomami reserve, and had ordered the
removal of the garimpeiros. In spite of this dramatic
change of policy it was immediately apparent that the
federal government lacked the necessary infrastructure
in Roraima to realise these goals. In attempting to
address this problem, the federal government set about
empowering its agencies in the state. Considerable
human and financial resources were channelled into the
appropriate agencies through three specific projects.
The federal police force was bolstered via 'Operation
Free Forest', the National Health Foundation (FNS)
through the Yanomami Health Project, and FUNAI was
strengthened subsequently by the demarcation programme.
These measures dealt a severe blow to the
aspirations of the now politically-influential mining
lobby in Roraima. The local magnates employed every
available strategy to disrupt the federal government's
programme. But the federal government was not prepared
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to allow the interests of a peripheral elite to tarnish
its international reputation. By this stage, the plight
of the Yanomami had become something of a showcase for
Brazilian environmental policy on the eve of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. As one
Washington-based NGO noted:
'No other single issue is more indicative of
the Brazilian government's political will to
defend the Amazon and its inhabitants than the
fate of the Yanomami territory' (EDF 1992 : 2) .
Brasilia was sensitive to such remarks because
they had potentially damaging financial repercussions
on the domestic economy. The EDF had already
demonstrated its ability to hamper Brazil's access to
foreign credit having successfully lobbied the World
Bank to suspend funding of the POLONOROESTE project in
1985" until certain social and environmental conditions
of the loan were fulfilled. The Yanomami situation was
somewhat different in that it was never directly
incorporated as a condition for any specific loan. But
even though they may not have been formalised in a
written contract, the concerns expressed by overseas
observers, such as the UN who wrote to Collor on the
subject on 12/02/91, may nonetheless have affected
Brazilian liquidity. Here it is worth recalling that
the Collor administration had been involved in
protracted loan negotiations with the IMF since it came
into office. After two years of discussion, a deal was
eventually clinched in January 1992 providing US$ 2.7
billion to aid debt repayments and to facilitate
domestic economic reforms geared towards reducing
inflation. Although this sum is small in relation to
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her external debt, which exceeded US$ 118 billion at
that time, the loan did make Brazil credit-worthy in
the eyes of the international banking community. This
is not to argue that the demarcation of the Yanomami
reserve in November 1991 was a principal factor in
securing this loan, merely to note that, among other
criteria, Brazil's environmental policies probably had
some influence on the final decision taken by the IMF.
Therefore, on the eve of UNCED, Brasilia was under
considerable political and economic pressure to remove
the garimpeiros from the Yanomami reserve. Naturally,
there were voices other than those of the indigenous
movement lobbying for the same ends, not least of which
was that of the ATPC who wanted to restrict the
production of Surucucus cassiterite. But the point is
that a locally powerful garimpo lobby which had
previously been able to withstand Brasilia, could no
longer dictate the course of mineral development in
Roraima. This was an exceptional situation; nowhere
else had the federal government intervened so
decisively in the informal mining sector and usurped
local interests. This is just as true for the numerous
concessions made by Sarney to Roraima's garimpeiros as
for the eventual decision to leave Serra Pelada in the
hands of the informal mining sector. As it turned out,
the international pressure, which had forced the
federal government to intervene in Roraima, waned in
the aftermath of the UNCED conference and garimpeiros
once again started to move back into the Yanomami
reserve.
Nevertheless, local elites were swift to equate
increasing external pressure on the central government
with their diminishing control over the exploitation of
the subsoil. Responding to these adverse political
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circumstances, they aimed to reassert their influence
over the region and its resources by using a
nationalistic rhetoric. In Roraima this was clearly
articulated by 'The Movement Against the
Internationalisation of Amazonia', which united
garimpeiro leaders such as Jose Altino with influential
ranchers like Jose Augusto Soares Macaggi. They lobbied
for reductions in the size of Indian reserves, argued
for the continued presence of garimpeiros and ranchers
within them, and condemned the activities of bodies
such as the Roman Catholic Church and CCPY -for
preventing Brazil from realising its mineral potential.
Although this movement arose from the specific
situation in Roraima, its emergence coincided with
growing debate over Amazonian sovereignty at a regional
level. The relevance of this discourse lay in providing
a catalyst to consolidate an increasingly cohesive
political identity. In effect, it helped bring together
local politicians around an Amazonian issue and in so
doing, it furthered the development of a regional
political agenda. The Inter-parliamentary Commission on
the Internationalisation of Amazonia, which united
various local politicians to investigate the activities
of foreigners in the region during 1992, provides one
such example 13. But the same rhetoric, emphasising
local sovereignty and challenging existing indigenous
policy, underlay other expressions of regional
political thought. A statement from the Governors of
Western Amazonian states (Amazonas, Roraima, Rondonia
and Acre) signed in Manaus on 14/11/92 provides a good
13 Romero Juca's wife, Teresa, who was then a state deputy in Roraima, took part in this
commission. She subsequently headed another special commission charged with reformulating
indigenous legislation through amendments to the Indian Statute (CPI 1992). Like her husband,
she staunchly defended mining on Indian lands. She was elected mayoress of Boa Vista in
January 1993.
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example. Having noted that "the socio-economic
development of the Amazon constitutes a legitimate,
unquestionable, non transferable and inviolable right
of the Region's inhabitants", this text proceeds to
argue that 'Indian areas should be adequately
demarcated within reasonable limits which should not
exceed 200 hectares per Indian family of whatever
ethnic group' (Roraima 1991: 5). Both this document,
and the unsuccessful Codigo Amazdnico which was signed
by all of the Governors of Amazonia Legal in 1991,
sought to place greater authority over the demarcation
of Indian reserves and the management of natural
resources in the hands of the regional political elite.
The Internationalisation debate has been aired
since the 1960s, and for this reason its origins
predate the contemporary developments in the informal
mining sector discussed here. Nonetheless, its current
resurgence, and more significantly the political
changes which this precipitated, cannot be divorced
from more recent socio-economic changes in the region.
By raising questions of Amazonian sovereignty, the
local elite was not only able to challenge the actions
of the federal government, but they were also provided
with a convenient issue around which to strengthen a
regional political identity 14.
There were two principal mechanisms through which
informal sector mining increased regional political
cohesion. Firstly, it eroded the influence of local
agrarian oligarchies whose interests were as diverse as
the geographical variations on which their influence
rested. In forcing them to redefine their economic
foundations along more common lines, and by partially
14 This development of a regional political debate structured around Amazonian sovereignty has
also been noted and discussed by Amparo (in press).
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replacing the old guard with a new entrepreneurial
class, the garimpo helped forge a regional elite that
shared a political interest in resource development. As
is noted above, there was an assimilation of divergent
economic and political interests as members of the
existing establishment invested in the garimpo while at
the same time powerful garimpeiros acquired local
political influence. In this respect, the 1980s- gold
rush helped smooth out the disparate concerns of rural
oligarchies and prepared the way for a new regional
elite to seek increasingly common political objectives.
The second point is that the same rush enhanced
the subsequent development of this regional political
identity by strengthening the intra-regional links
operating between state governments. The widespread
involvement of politicians in the informal mining
economy helped construct an intricate social network
among the Amazonian political elite. The case study of
Elton Ronhelt provides an insight into how these links
develop. Through the garimpo he forged strong ties with
the government of Amazonas. Likewise, Antonio Dias,
another member of Ottomar's State Cabinet has strong
connections with politicians in Para following his
mining experiences in that region. While not negating
the importance of other factors in this context, it
should be noted that the garimpo often provides a
common denominator that links politicians in one part
of the Amazon to colleagues in neighbouring states,
thereby facilitating intra-regional political
networking.
In conclusion, the recent political and economic
history of Amazonia suggests that local interests are
becoming increasingly influential on both the regional
and national stages. This has very real implications
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for the future pattern of resource development and
land-use in Amazonia, particularly as political changes
on a national level have meant that the federal
government's already limited control over regional
planning appears to be slipping even further. The
precarious state blockade of the Yanomami reserve
collapsed in the wake of the UNCED conference and by
the start of 1993, over 12 000 garimpeiros had resumed
their work inside the area. FUNAI was hardly in a
position to act, having had its already meagre budget
slashed by over 80% in the financial year 1992-93 15-. At
the same time, the newly appointed secretary for the
environment, Coutinho Jorge, was laying foundations to
decentralise many of IBAMA's responsibilities16, thereby
giving state governments greater control over local
environmental planning17. Clearly, if this trend
continues (and here it should not be forgotten that
Brazilian politics is notoriously unpredictable) then
environmental and social policy in Amazonia will be
increasingly determined by those who exploit the
region's natural and human resources most successfully.
15 The Financial Times 20/02/93.
16 Address given by Coutinho Jorge to the University of Glasgow Institute of Latin American
Studies, 05/03/1993.
17 Sawyer (1990 :18) notes "this is not necessarily a positive trend..decentralisation may be
disastrous for the environment and vulnerable groups such as Indians and traditional extractors."
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Chapter 7 The garimpo as a catalyst for land-use
change in Amazonia
Having examined the specific relationships between
the garimpo, politics and individual land-uses, it is
now appropriate to synthesise these observations and
focus on the whole picture. Here, the salient points
from the previous chapters are distilled and organised
into an analytical framework, illustrating the ways in
which informal sector mining affects the course of
Amazonian development. This is achieved by looking at
the social and environmental repercussions of mining.
Summarising the various impacts of the activity in this
way enables us to identify the aspects of garimpagem
which are least known and to outline appropriate ways
of researching them. Attention then focuses on why
certain groups go mining more than others. This
analysis of rates of participation not only offers an
insight into how the costs and benefits of garimpagem
are distributed, but it also permits the identification
of some of the theoretical problems inherent in
researching the informal sector.
Thus, the chapter aims to show why the garimpo can
be considered as a catalyst for land-use change in
Amazonia and in so doing it identifies some of the
problems and priorities of researching the subject.
To set the context for this discussion, a short account
of a garimpo's development is presented, offering an
overview of the processes operating between it and its
hinterland.
7.1 The gold rush on the Rio Jatapu.
Figure 2.1 illustrates that geological intrusions,
similar to those found in the Yanomami reserve, exist
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along the Guyanese border in south-eastern Roraima. A
number of prospecting teams were commissioned by
ranchers and influential garimpeiros to survey this
area following the closure of the garimpos on the
Yanomami reserve and in June 1992 a strike was made in
the headwaters of the Rio Jatapu. It provoked an
immediate influx of garimpeiros to the small
agricultural community of Entre Rios (see fig. 1.3).
They congregated in the village situated at the eastern
end of the Perimetral Norte highway before embarking
upon the fortnight long walk into the newly-
established garimpo. Within two months, the strike had
attracted over four hundred people the majority of whom
came from Boa Vista, but others had travelled directly
from Venezuela, Maranhao, Itaituba and the Cabega do
Cachorro, all on the strength of a poorly founded
rumour1.
The villagers of Entre Rios were quick to take
advantage of the opportunities presented by the influx.
Residents opened up their homesteads as guest houses,
farmers sold agricultural produce for gold and the
village lorry driver made a tidy sum charging for
rides. The Jatapu strike boosted what was a previously
stagnant rural economy by increasing the demand for
food, accommodation and transport. From the outset of
the rush, garimpeiros were the most welcome visitors
ever to have set foot in the sleepy village of Entre
Rios. However, as the garimpo evolved its influence on
the local economy changed and eventually its spin-offs
for the locality were not as substantial as they might
have been.
1 Sec footnote 10 of chapter 2 for the states of origin of 66 garimpeiros interviewed entering the
garimpo at Jatapu.
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The initial strikes were made along a small
depression in which a limited amount of gold was
concentrated. But beyond this restricted area the
mineral was thinly spread over higher ground,
necessitating the use of pumps for its extraction.
Under manual operations the garimpo could not generate
sufficient quantities of gold to maintain itself. As we
have seen, the dono receives dues of between forty and
fifty percent of the total gold produced, from which
air drops of food and equipment are commissioned. The
goods are then either distributed or sold to ' the
workforce in accordance with the work relationship
adhered to2. But this system broke down in the early
days of the Jatapu garimpo because the influx was out
of all proportion to the size of gold deposit
discovered3. A desperate food shortage prevailed, which
could only be remedied by the immediate construction of
an airstrip. This would not only increase gold
production by permitting the installation of the
appropriate machinery, but would also strengthen
communications, thereby facilitating the re-supply of
the garimpo.
The confused politics of the situation gave an
extra impetus to the airstrip's rapid construction. The
deposit had actually been discovered by a garimpeiro
named Goiano, who was prospecting on behalf of Zeze,
one of Roraima's few female miners (garimpeiras) . The
standard arrangement is for the prospector and patron
^ Under meia-praga, the garimpeiros pay 50% of their gold earnings and receive free food; under
conta propria, they typically pay 40% of their gold produce, but have to pay for their food.
3 Apparently these chaotic events are commonplace during a fofoca (rush). Some of the
garimpeiros leaving the Jatapu garimpo compared it to similar circumstances that prevailed
during the fofoca of Novo Cruzado which became one of Roraima's most productive mines. In
both situations there was a dispute over ownership which was resolved violently and the
considerable food shortages caused by the rushes allegedly claimed a small number of lives in
each case.
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to share any profits that accrue from such research,
but in this case Goiano failed to inform Zeze of his
strike in the Jatapu, attempting to establish himself
as the sole dono do garimpo. Zeze recognised Goiano's
deception the instant that rumours of his find broke in
Boa Vista and resolved to challenge him. She entered
the garimpo on foot accompanied by a handful of gunmen
and a large group of garimpeiros. After a showdown
which left two dead and a third seriously wounded, Zeze
impressed her legitimate authority upon the garimpo4.
Like many other donos, she had been left seriously
indebted to other miners by their expulsion from the
Yanomami reserve, so her immediate concern was to open
an airstrip at Jatapu and invite her creditors to
install their mining equipment. As a fortnight-long
walk back out of the garimpo was the only alternative
option available to the famished workforce, they set to
the task of building the airstrip. On the sixth of
August, less than two months after the initial strike
was made, the airstrip was completed. Thus, the
introduction of pumping equipment to Jatapu was not
preceded by an extended period of manual extraction
which characterises the evolution of many other
garimpos.
These internal dynamics had a profound effect on
the economic changes brought to the surrounding area.
Before the airstrip was built, all of the garimpo
traffic had passed through Entre Rios and the commerce
of this remote agricultural settlement had benefited
accordingly. But this situation altered dramatically as
soon as the first aircraft touched down on the
garimpo's new airstrip. It now became more convenient
4 Both Zeze and Goiano divided the considerable expense of commissioning a helicopter to
transport the injured person to a hospital in Boa Vista.
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to service the site by air direct from Boa Vista and
the village of Entre Rios experienced a sharp deflation
of its previously expanding economy. Soon there were
few hints that a gold mine existed nearby, save the
drone of a passing aircraft or the occasional arrival
of garimpeiros who could not afford to fly into the
mine. Nonetheless, the rush was probably the most
significant event in the history of Entre Rios since
its inception in 1983, and, in spite of being a short
term phenomenon, it did leave some longer term
legacies. At least one garimpeiro bought land nearby
from a smallholder entrepreneur and a number of others
stayed on in the area to join the local agricultural
labour force.
7.2 The social and environmental impacts of garimpagem
in Amazonia.
This account demonstrates that there are many
different influences at work in the formation of any
garimpo and as a result no two garimpos are quite the
same. Recognising what is happening in the garimpo
itself is therefore the first step in assessing its
impact on what is going on around it. The switch to air
transport at Jatapu provides one good example, but
other less obvious factors which distinguish one
garimpo from another may be just as significant. For
example, in riverine garimpos, like those of the Rio
Uraricoera, the workforce gets paid a higher percentage
of the gold produced than in land-based mining
operations. This is because diving work is much more
dangerous than employment on land. These technological
differences often come to affect the composition of the
workforce itself; since diving is a relatively skilled
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job, it tends to be the more experienced professional
garimpeiros who undertake it. Both observations are
relevant to this discussion because they affect the
flows of capital and labour between the garimpo and
other sectors of the Amazonian economy.
Despite these variations in individual mines,
certain principles and widely-acknowledged work
relations underlie garimpagem throughout Amazonia and
so it is still possible to evaluate the impacts of the
activity in a systematic fashion. Table 7.1 presents a
resume of the environmental and social impacts" of
garimpagem. Essentially it summarises the principal
points raised in the previous chapters.
The table makes a distinction between the direct
and indirect impacts of garimpagem. Direct impacts are
those sustained in the immediate vicinity of the mining
operation itself and are restricted to places and
people that come into contact with the garimpo, whether
willingly or otherwise. The indirect impacts extend
further afield. In effect, they are relayed via a
series of ecological, political, economic, and social
processes that link more distant people and places to
the gold mines. To give one illustration, a household
in Entre Rios which is not involved in mining
nonetheless feels its influence when demand from the
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7.2(a) The direct environmental impacts of garimpagem
The left hand column of fig. 7.1 lists the direct
impacts of garimpagem. In environmental terms these
include the removal of vegetation to get at the gold
itself and for the construction of airstrips. The
analysis of deforestation in chapter 4 showed that the
areas cleared for mining are small, particularly when
compared to other Amazonian land-uses. But as this
deforestation and the mining itself is concentrated
along the watercourses, garimpagem does have a
disproportionately large impact on the riverine
ecosystem. Some authors (e.g. Douroujeanni and Padua
1992 :103) have argued that sedimentation of
watercourses is the most significant of all the
environmental costs attributable to garimpagem. They
estimate that 2 cubic metres of sediments enter the
watercourses for every gram of gold extracted in the
garimpos. Although geological variations throughout
Amazonia ensure that this proportion will change
between different garimpos, it does indicate that the
sedimentation caused by mining in the region may be
measured in billions of tons. This not only interferes
with the reproduction of fish, which is an important
source of protein in the region, but it may also
accelerate the rate at which the reservoirs of hydro¬
electric projects silt up (Uhl 1992).
Other authors (Cleary 1990, Butler 1990) are more
concerned with mercury pollution, particularly as this
may have has serious health consequences for the local
population. Mercury use is common to all forms of gold
mining equipment in the garimpos because its affinity
for gold aids gravimetric recuperation. Consequently,
it is not pure gold, but a gold-mercury amalgam that is
the product of the mining exercise itself. The dono of
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the operation is usually responsible for heating this
amalgam so that the mercury is driven-off as a white
vapour leaving only the gold. Mineral traders in nearby
urban areas will subsequently perform the same ritual
when purchasing gold (as this ensures that they are not
inadvertently buying mercury as well), but even though
they may burn more gold than the donos in the garimpos
they are typically exposed to smaller amounts of
mercury vapour. This is because the donos will have
burnt almost all of the toxic metal from the gold at
the site of production before taking it to the gold
dealer in the city. The results of a collaborative
research project between Imperial College London and
the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro confirm this5.
By analysing the blood and urine of people either
living in or next to the Tapajds gold fields, the study
showed that gold burners in the garimpos tend to have
higher levels of mercury in their urine than gold
traders in the cities. This suggests that while mercury
contamination through inhalation may well affect the
health of individuals in the garimpo, it is unlikely to
pose a serious threat to the welfare of the Amazon's
large urban population.
When inhaled, mercury passes in an inorganic form
through the mucus membranes of the nose and lungs into
the body. While undoubtedly toxic, mercury in this
inorganic form may be flushed out of the body and
discharged with urine. Consequently, people who are
contaminated by mercury vapour can be treated quite
effectively by removing them from the source of
pollution. In extreme cases drugs maybe administered
5 The results of this research are presented in an unpublished report entitled: Mercury
contamination in the Brazilian Amazon: a report for the European Commission
DGl/Environment (Brussels 1991).
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which increase the rate at which mercury is discharged
through urine.
A second channel of mercury contamination, via the
consumption of polluted fish, poses a more serious
health problem. Some of the mercury which is placed
behind the riffles in the garimpeiros' sluice-boxes is
washed by the constant flow of water and sediments down
the sluice into local watercourses. It settles amongst
the sediments of the riverbeds where it is joined by
mercury that has been vaporised (through the burning
process described above) before being condensed out of
the atmosphere and into the streams by rainfall.
Ground-feeding fish and other organisms absorb the
mercury and they in turn are eaten by carnivorous fish.
In the course of these events the mercury is
transformed from an inorganic to an extremely toxic
organic state (called methyl-mercury) through a process
known as methylation.
Methyl-mercury, unlike the inorganic mercury, is
not easily discharged from the body and so it
accumulates in the tissues of organisms at the higher
end of the food chain (like large carnivorous fish,
caiman, and eventually people). The above mentioned
Imperial College- University of Rio de Janeiro study
found that riverine communities in close proximity to
the garimpos are at greatest risk from mercury
contamination through fish consumption. As the
limnology and biochemical processes operating in
Amazonian rivers are poorly understood, it is difficult
to know what time-lapses are involved in these
processes. There is little that can be done other than
to inform riverine dwellers of the issue, to introduce
new technologies such as portable mercury condensers
(known as retentors) and sluice attachments that reduce
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mercury discharges into the ecosystem, and to monitor
the situation in detail.
Current research on mercury pollution is focused
on the Tapajds and Madeira rivers, where garimpagem has
been practised intensely since the 1960s. Clearly, it
makes sense to collect data from these areas where
mercury use has been most profligate. But even so,
there is still a need to gather basic information on
the subject from the less accessible parts of Amazonia
where gold mining also occurs. Virtually nothing is
known about the extent and likely consequences' of
mercury contamination in Roraima, the Cabeqa do
Cachorro (Amazonas) and Amapa. For although less
mercury has been discharged into the watercourses of
these more recently mined areas, hydrological
differences and variations in diet mean that the health
implications of mercury pollution in one part of
Amazonia cannot be directly extrapolated from data
gathered elsewhere. It would therefore be appropriate
to extend the monitoring of mercury pollution from the
Madeira and Tapajos rivers to other parts of the
Amazon, and to integrate this with appropriate data on
the dietary habits of exposed populations.
7.2 (b) The direct social costs of garimpagem
It is particularly unfortunate that the geology of
the region encourages prospectors to enter the very
watersheds which provide the ultimate refuge for some
of the world's last isolated Indian communities. The
arrival of garimpeiros on the lands of groups like the
Yanomami tends to be particularly destructive because
the Indians have minimal resistance to 'Old World'
diseases and their livelihoods are closely dependent on
the healthy functioning of the ecosystem. Thus, they
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typically bear the full brunt of the environmental
problems noted above, whilst simultaneously being
smitten by disease. All of this occurs within a social
and economic context which is profoundly disorientating
and is often compounded by violent conflict with the
invading garimpeiros. Many of the problems stem not so
much from the mineral extraction process itself, but
from the way in which it is organised and controlled.
As we have seen, there are plenty of examples of Indian
groups benefiting from garimpagem when it is practised
on their terms (chapter 5) . The problem is that this
beneficial situation is extremely hard to achieve and
is even more elusive when the deposits are of
considerable value. Even the Kayapo, who were
exceptional in regulating mining activity on their
lands, were obliged to make some trade-offs with the
garimpeiros. For these reasons, its impacts on the
welfare of indigenous peoples probably tops any
evaluation of the direct social costs associated with
garimpagem. Here, there is no obvious alternative to
rigorous government intervention in order to prevent
garimpeiros invading Indian lands.
In contrast, many of Amazonia's non-indigenous
populations argue that the benefits of garimpagem
outweigh the social and environmental costs that it
inflicts. This reflects in part a widespread ignorance
of the consequences of mercury pollution and a tendency
to dissociate the changing pattern of disease
transmission from mining itself. But it does
nonetheless point to the significance of an activity
that brings economic growth to remote parts of the
region. The spin-offs for rural areas may be
considerable, especially if the garimpo leads to
improvements in transport such as the construction of
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the 'Transgarimpeira highway' in the Tapaj6s. Here a
road built to gain access to the regions' gold fields
has stimulated agriculture, ranching, and timber
extraction in the locality6.
Even so, the infra-structural changes associated
with garimpagem are minimal in comparison to those made
by the formal mining sector. For example, in the mid
1980s the CVRD constructed a 900 kilometre railway to
transport iron ore from the Serra do Carajas to a deep
water port at Sao Luis. Likewise Paranapanema has built
roads into the Waimiri-Atroari reserve to gain access
to the Pitinga cassiterite mine. But while garimpeiros
are not responsible for such large scale developments,
their impact on the regional economy and local society
is probably much greater than that of the formal mining
sector. The capital-intensive nature of corporate
mining and the removal of their profits from the region
means that they bring only limited benefits to
Amazonia. In contrast, garimpeiros receive a
respectable proportion of the income they generate and,
more significantly, they spend it locally in all
sectors of the Amazonian economy. Thus the garimpo has
a much higher 'multiplier effect' than the formal
mining sector and the considerable demand for goods,
services, and land that this generates often brings
radical transformations to the local and regional
economy.
Nowhere is this more clearly visible than in the
rapid expansion of cities like Santarem, Maraba, Porto
Velho and Boa Vista. While this is clear evidence of
the economic benefits that garimpagem brings to urban
areas, such sudden urban growth is not without its
6 Road networks are especially sensitive to mining because the economic viability of developing
any mineral deposit hinges on its accessibility.
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social costs. Drug use, prostitution and violent crime
have all become part of life in the Amazonian boom
cities. There are two ways in which the mining economy
stimulates the demand for drugs and prostitution in its
hinterland. Firstly, men who migrate large distances to
work in the garimpos for extended periods may abandon
their households after a period of time and experience
isolation (although some cope with that by running dual
households). Secondly, having created desires in this
way, miners are one of the very few social groups in
the Amazon whose needs are translated into real
economic demand. In this way informal sector gold
mining supports two thriving rackets which are often
characterised by exploitation and violence.
The prostitution trade is illustrative. Research
in the garimpos of Para (Dimenstein 1992, SEICOM 1993)
points to an extensive network of Amazonian
prostitution in which girls are sometimes kept in
conditions of slavery. Women interviewed in the
brothels of Cuiu-Cuiu, one of the most established
garimpos of the Tapajos, explained that they were lured
into prostitution under false pretences and were
violently threatened unless they worked 7. Like many of
the prostitutes in Roraima, they were recruited from
the same poverty-striken areas of Maranhao and Para
that most of the garimpeiros originate from. Given that
intense regional migration places such a strain on
personal relationships, it is plausible that many of
them are female heads of households seeking an income
having been deserted by their partners. Others are
significantly younger and child prostitution is not
7 Following a series of articles published by Dimenstein in the Folha de S3o Paulo in February
1992, the brothels of Cuiu-Cuiu were raided by the police. They released 74 prostitutes who had
been held against their will and arrested 10 brothel owners, 20 of the girls who were released
were minors. (Sutton in press).
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uncommon in a region where great status is placed on
virginity (Sutton in press). In most cases women are
transported to the brothels of the gold camps by
intermediaries. They arrive owing the middlemen the
cost of their passage and are obliged to repay it from
their earnings. Clearly it is in the brothel keeper's
interest to charge the girls high prices for food,
clothing and keep, so that they are barely able to
repay their debts.
The large, isolated, yet stable, garimpos of the
Tapajbs lend themselves to these forms of debt-bondage.
But in more fragmented, volatile mining areas (like
those of western Roraima) prostitution is not
centralised to the same extent as it is more difficult
for one person to exert the same degree of control.
Here, there are few actual brothels like those which
exist in Cuiu-Cuiu and as a result prostitutes tend to
have greater autonomy. Women are typically employed in
the gold mines as cooks and earn extra income by
working as prostitutes for the crews that they cater
for. As they have often acquired their job through
being a friend of the dono de maquina or dono de
garimpo, they may enjoy a relatively privileged
position in the mine.
While there is undoubtedly exploitation in many of
the Amazon's brothels, prostitutes working in the urban
areas are probably better able to escape from tyrannous
employers and gain other work. Even so, conditions are
far from ideal. In Boa Vista the brothels are clustered
along the banks of the Rio Branco in a violent part of
town that floods seasonally. Most of the girls come
from Maranhao, Para and Goias, though a number are
local Macuxi girls seeking independence in the city.
Men buy the key to the girl's room from the barman and
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the girls subsequently receive a percentage of the
trade they generate once the brothel keeper has
deducted costs for 'overheads'. Condoms are usually
available on request with the key, but they are seldom
requested as miners often see them as an affront to
their virility. Clearly this favours the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases. Gonhorrea is common, and
although no official statistics exist, it is likely
that AIDS is rife.
7.3 The indirect impacts of garimpagem.
The full extent of the garimpos' influence can
only be truly appreciated if we look beyond the
immediate confines of the garimpo itself and consider
the indirect impacts of garimpagem which are listed in
the right hand column of figure 7.1. It is easy to
understand how natural processes are responsible for
transporting mercury pollution and sedimentation to
communities who live downstream of the garimpos, but
all of the other indirect impacts are transmitted by
the social, economic and political changes that
garimpagem causes. Even though they have provided a
specific focus for this work, these socio-economic and
political processes are still poorly understood and are
often overlooked. More specifically very little is
known about the exchanges of capital and labour between
the garimpo and other land-uses. For this reason they
remain an appropriate subject for future research and
it is worth considering how we might improve our
knowledge of them.
Chapter 3 suggests that smallholder migration into
the garimpos is a widespread phenomenon that has
important social and environmental repercussions. But
even though there is now a well established literature
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on population movements from the Northeast into the
Amazon in search of land, virtually nothing is known
about the patterns of migration associated with
garimpagem. Research could focus on the precise links
between the smallholder population of north-western
Maranhao and the garimpos of Amazonia. Do smallholders
just go into the Amazon looking for land and enter the
garimpos if they cannot obtain it, or is the pull of
the garimpos sufficiently powerful to stimulate
migration in its own right? It would be illuminating to
undertake a detailed survey of the migratory strategies
employed by smallholders in the municipalities of Lago
de Pedra, Pinheiro arid Imperatriz, from where many of
Amazonia's garimpeiros originate (Pereira 1990). It is
quite probable that these factors influence the
agricultural strategies adopted by farmers in the area,
the division of household labour along gender lines and
the transmission of disease in the locality. Perhaps
the most relevant issue lies in addressing the
following question; do the opportunities available in
the Amazonian informal mining sector encourage farmers
from the Northeast to sell their smallholdings and
migrate to the region permanently, or do temporary
excursions to the garimpos provide these smallholders
with sufficient income to resist the pre-existing
economic and social pressures that have traditionally
fuelled Amazonian migration?
The flows of capital from the garimpos into other
activities also determines how the indirect impacts of
garimpagem are distributed. Here the relationship
between ranching and mining which is discussed in
chapter 4 merits further attention. Evidence that gold
from Roraima was being invested in the fazendas of
south-eastern Para suggests that it would be
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interesting to focus attention on the area between
Maraba, Redengao and Imperatriz. It is unclear what
continues to drive the beef economy in this area now
that many of the government subsidies for ranching have
been withdrawn. Therefore, it would be particularly
interesting, though far from straightforward, to
evaluate the significance of capital flows between the
garimpo and the ranching sector in this context.
Clearly, garimpagem is only one of a range of
activities from which income is tapped and channelled
into ranching. But the considerable wealth generated by
mining, together with its tendency towards spatial and
social concentration, could make for significant
financial exchanges between the mineral and ranching
sectors in certain parts of the region. A well-planned
research project could examine the complex interactions
between the garimpo, deforestation, land tenure and
agrarian violence. The overriding difficulty lies in
undertaking such work, not least because ranchers are
unlikely to disclose their sources of income to a
stranger. Therefore, rather than seek precise data on
personal finances, it would perhaps more appropriate to
collect detailed life-histories on a wide range of
ranchers who hold properties of varying sizes in the
study area. Not only would this provide useful
information on the various economic practices and
investment strategies adopted by Amazonian ranchers,
but it would also yield a valuable insight into the
processes of elite formation.
Thus migration to, and remittances from, the
garimpo have a variety of far-reaching social and
environmental impacts which are often ignored.
Surprisingly enough, many of the most significant
transformations occur not when the garimpo is
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expanding, but when it contracts. Roraima1s
agricultural production was boosted in 1991 when
thousands of garimpeiros who were expelled from the
Yanomami reserve either returned to their holdings, or
laid claim to new plots. Similarly, it was only when
the garimpos began to contract that ranchers like
Robertino (who is mentioned in chapter 4) were obliged
to adopt the most dramatic management practices. This
shows that these, and other indirect impacts of
garimpagem (like those associated with the political
changes discussed in chapter 6) have a role in shaping
the lives of people who may live hundreds of miles away
from the garimpo itself.
7.4 Motives for participation in garimpagem
This discussion shows that the impacts of informal
sector mining are spatially concentrated in certain
places and are inequitably distributed amongst
different groups of people. To understand exactly how
garimpagem fuels an uneven development model we need to
look in greater detail at why some people prefer to go
mining more than others. Here we look at the factors
that influence rates of participation in garimpagem.
For in determining who gets involved in different parts
of the mining economy these processes influence the way
that the costs and benefits of the activity are
distributed.
On one level, mining unites a diversity of social
groups in the quest for material wealth. However, this
common interest eclipses a whole range of non-economic
factors that also draw people into the garimpos. Many
of the smallholders (especially single men) are
attracted to the adventure of the garimpos, but groups
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like the Macuxi appear to be looking for something
completely different. To them one of the most valuable
returns from mining may be gaining prestige and
identity among a different society. Politicians perhaps
see garimpagem as a vehicle to strengthen their
political support and maintain their local hegemony.
For thousands of others, most notably the professional
garimpeiros, it is purely a means of surviving
economically.
Because it means different things to different
people, there are few straight-forward rules as to' why
some groups go mining more than others. Nevertheless,
certain statements can be made. The distance between
one group of people and the garimpo appears not to be a
dominant factor in shaping their behaviour. City
dwellers and smallholders travelled thousands of miles
from the Northeast to extract gold in Roraima, while
caboclos did not even venture into the headwaters of
the very rivers that they lived along to go mining.
Similarly, while people who have previous experience of
garimpagem are able to make more informed migratory
decisions, it is hard to predict their likely response
to a mineral rush purely on the basis of their life
histories. As has been noted, the Macuxi are amongst
Roraima's most experienced garimpeiros, yet only a
minority of them left their villages to join the gold
rush.
A more relevant consideration is the ease with
which mining can be integrated other activities. The
seasonal nature of garimpagem ensures that timing is
all important for those seeking to combine it with
alternative forms of employment. While this seldom
poses a problem for urban dwellers, it is fundamental
to rural people whose livelihood strategies usually
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vary markedly throughout the year. The case of the
Macuxi is illustrative; for them, the peak gold mining
period clashes with the best time for hunting, fishing
and diamond mining on the cerrado. Many of the Macuxi
obviously felt that gold mining was not an attractive
proposition, but at the same time other groups of rural
producers, most notably smallholders, were flocking to
the garimpos. As there is virtually no demand for
labour on colonist holdings during the summer months,
garimpagem dovetails neatly with agriculture. The
salient point is that the seasonality of different
activities dictates the opportunity costs of gold
mining. In this respect, it is clear that a trip to the
garimpos does not entail the same trade-offs for the
smallholders as it does for the Macuxi.
The social networks that underpin different
livelihoods also influence the ways in which groups
respond to the opportunities presented to them.
Although anybody can enter and leave garimpos as they
wish, social networks do nonetheless shape the movement
of labour and capital within the informal mining
economy. This is particularly the case in remote areas
like western Roraima and the Tapajos where access to
the gold fields is usually by plane and transport to
the garimpos is often monopolised or 'closed'. Under
these circumstances, air-taxi operators and the 'donos
do garimpo' may fulfil a role as gatekeepers to the
mining areas. Numerous people in these positions are
competing with one another on a commercial basis and
for this reason, there is no group control over access.
But even so, these more powerful individuals may still
represent an obstacle which prevents certain people
from reaching the garimpo. Members of the Amazonian
peasantry are generally wary of working in an alien
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environment precisely because their only insurance
against economic exploitation is rooted in social
networks. It is probably true that such a philosophy is
more deeply ingrained among residents of tighter and
more remote communities than it is among urban
dwellers, colonist farmers or ranchers. However, when
trying to understand why certain people are more
willing to go mining than others, the extent of their
social contacts merit attention. The caboclos'
restricted involvement can be related to their
extremely limited interaction with garimpeiro society.
In contrast, smallholders and ranchers who were
frequently engaged in trading and urban employment had
greater links with garimpeiros. This undoubtedly
reflects the predominantly urban basis of the garimpo
economy, but even so it is wrong to assume that contact
with garimpeiro society is denied those groups who have
little interaction with the city. A glance at the
diamond mines of the cerrado for instance reveals that
many of the Macuxi Indians knew garimpeiros in an
entirely rural context.
The seasonality of an individual's employment and
the extent of their social networks determine the ease
with which gold mining can be tailored to other jobs.
In this way, an individual's involvement in mining can
only be truly understood if it is evaluated in relation
to their other activities. Indeed, if garimpagem is
considered to be one element in a range of
possibilities that constitute a living, then decisions
made in this sphere are probably influenced by wider
livelihood strategies. Involvement in mining may, for
example, reflect risk-management behaviour on a higher
level. The standard argument is that the peasantry
spreads risk by engaging in a wide variety of economic
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activities8. But while this suggests that people might
be on the look out for new options, it is strange that
they should embrace a high-risk venture like garimpagem
so enthusiastically. Cleary (in press) advances an
alternative thesis, arguing that Amazonians might
actively seek out high risk-activities in order to keep
pace with high inflation. From this perspective, the
short term gamble like garimpagem makes greater
economic sense than the gradual accumulation of capital
over a long period. Obviously such a strategy only
becomes feasible once an individual has other options,
like agriculture, to fall back on. The behaviour of
colonist farmers is illustrative. The garimpo is
attractive to them precisely because they are able to
underwrite the inherent risks of mining against the
security of their smallholdings.
A point common to both theories is that economic
success is closely related to the efficiency with which
different activities can be complemented. It is here
that social networks provide the crucial lubrication;
knowing the right people in the right places becomes
important when moving between various sectors of the
economy. Thus, social networks acquire a clearly
defined economic significance. For example, a mining
trip is most appealing to those whose absence threatens
no other aspect of their livelihood and who know
garimpeiros willing to keep an eye on them, offer them
tips and maybe even arrange employment for them. At the
other end of the spectrum, the same venture is probably
least attractive to those who have no contacts in the
mining world, have no previous experience in the
activity, and whose absence from alternative
enterprises incurs high opportunity costs. Obviously,
^ Sawyer 1990: 14
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these factors are weighed up against a whole range of
other considerations when evaluating the option
presented by the garimpo. But the point to recognise is
that social networks come to fulfil a central role in
this decision-making process because they actually
reduce the risks of garimpagem.
It is possible to evaluate the ease with which
mining may be incorporated within the livelihood
practices of different social groups. In broad terms,
it probably fits conveniently into the portfolios of
city dwellers, colonist farmers and ranchers as these
are the groups who usually have the necessary contacts
and are sufficiently footloose to enter the garimpos
whenever an opportunity arises. Interestingly enough,
as urban employees are often obliged to quit a job with
no guarantee of future employment, garimpagem could
represent a greater gamble for them than for rural
producers who always have their land to return to. At
the other end of the spectrum are people with insecure
land rights who derive a large proportion of their
income over the summer months and who have little
contact with garimpeiros. Even though none of the
groups in Roraima fulfilled all of these criteria it
was the Macuxi and caboclos who came closest. In this
particular situation, gold mining represented an
unattractive option for them, but examples both from
within Roraima and from further afield prove that there
is no intrinsic obstacle preventing either caboclos or
Indians from being committed garimpeiros under
different circumstances. This is not to argue that
certain groups will always respond in predictable ways
to changing events, but rather that common elements can
be observed shaping their diverse reactions. Above all,
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social networks are commonly seen to define the
parameters within which economic decisions are taken.
7.5 Theoretical issues with the analysis of informal
sector mining:
From this perspective we see that garimpeiros are
not only gold miners but also smallholders or even
ranchers as well. However, even though individuals may
have various forms of employment they are classified
according to only one of their professions. This is
problematic as it accords a false impression of
occupational stability to what is a highly mobile
peasantry. Amazonians are so economically mobile that
any one person may be labelled according to various
terms at different points in his or her life. Further,
they may even identify themselves with an occupation
other than that in which they are involved at any one
particular instant. For example, it was not uncommon
for people working in the garimpos to deny they were
miners.
This is more than just a question of semantics as
it influences the way in which research is undertaken.
The language defines social groups according to the
activities that they practise; fazendeiro, farmer,
garimpeiro, yet there is considerable fusion between
different economic sectors and different societies. As
social groups are constantly adapting their
occupational strategies to changing economic
circumstances it is wrong to equate a specific land-use
directly with a particular social group. But this is
the sort of mechanistic interpretation that the
vocabulary being used actually engenders. This is not
to argue that the solution lies in formulating an
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alternative vocabulary. Even though it may be
beneficial to introduce new terms like 'professional
garimpeiro', ignoring that which is a product of the
region only serves to further distance observers from
the reality of Amazonia. Rather, the flexibility with
which this vocabulary is used in its local context must
be recognised, and researchers should appreciate that
such classifications are neither definitive nor
mutually exclusive. Above all, the compartmentalisation
inherent within these terms should not be allowed to
structure research objectives in such a way that' the
fluidity of Amazonian life is overlooked.
A second problem relates to the quantification of
the activity. By now it should be clear that informal
sector mining plays an important role in shaping
Amazonian development. But it is often hard to convince
people of this. For although the garimpo has a number
of wide-reaching impacts some of these are hard to
recognise and all of them are difficult to quantify.
This is most notably the case with the flows of capital
and labour which have been a central focus of this
research. Even though these exchanges determine how the
costs and benefits of garimpagem are distributed, it is
virtually impossible to make anything other than rough
guesses at their scale and geography. In the garimpo
itself, employment contracts and incomes are agreed by
verbal exchanges, and outside only a fraction of the
mineral output is ever registered. Further, garimpeiros
often work illegally, shying away from official-looking
documentation. The governmental agencies charged with
collecting the relevant data rarely have the resources
or the necessary enthusiasm to enter the mines and do
their job. The net result is that no reliable figures
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exist either for the number of people engaged in
garimpagem, or the amount of minerals extracted.
Even if a concerted attempt was made to quantify
the Amazonian informal mining economy, it is doubtful
whether such a dynamic and complex activity could be
measured in a meaningful way. The basic issue of
defining a garimpeiro is itself problematic. Do only
those engaged in mineral extraction qualify, or should
anybody in the garimpo at any particular moment such as
traders, carpenters, mechanics, cooks and prostitutes,
be included? And what about that percentage of miners
who are taking a break from the garimpo for a couple of
weeks to spend their earnings in the city? Or for that
matter, the investors who provide the capital but never
set foot in the garimpo - are they garimpeiros too? The
overriding impression is that even if more accurate
statistical data did exist, it would only be of limited
value. The real questions here are not simply how much
gold is produced, or how many people are employed, but
who are garimpeiros'? where do they come from, why do
they go mining, and how is mining incorporated within
Amazonian livelihoods? In addressing these issues, it
is perhaps qualitative, not statistical approaches that
will yield the deeper insights.
All of this makes garimpagem a difficult subject
to research, but there is perhaps another reason why
garimpeiros have not received the attention that they
probably merit. Once again this is related to the way
in which research is usually undertaken. As garimpagem
is usually practised as an aside to other activities,
it affects large numbers of people but few depend on it
for their main source of income. As a result it is
often falsely assumed that garimpagem is a marginal
activity in the regional economy. This is symptomatic
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of a tendency for researchers to focus on one specific
society or activity, when it is often the
interrelationships between them that is perhaps more
relevant. It is illustrative that the significant role
that garimpagem plays in its regional context can only
be recognised by stepping out of the garimpo and
looking at the interactions between it and other
aspects of Amazonian life.
For these reasons people were slow to appreciate
the ways in which garimpagem was shaping Amazonian
development during the 1980s. But, by the start of"the
1990s this picture was beginning to change. The
influence of the garimpo on urbanisation (Abers 1992),
elite formation (Miller 1985), and local development
processes (Coy 1989, Schmink and Wood 1992), is now
receiving attention. Indeed, a recent essay argues that
the Amazonian informal sector is central force driving
current changes in the region's political economy
(Cleary in press). All of these studies, together with
the evidence from Roraima, suggest that informal sector
mining remains an important catalyst for land-use
change in contemporary Amazonia.
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Chapter 8. Informal sector mining in perspective.
So far we have taken the Roraima gold rush and
looked at the various ways in which it affected
people and their use of the land both in the state
and beyond. These empirical findings illustrated the
environmental and social impacts of garimpagem,
enabling us to recognise the extent of its influence.
From this analysis it was concluded that informal
sector mining plays a central role in shaping
contemporary land development processes throughout
the Brazilian Amazon. Now its time to stand back a
bit and ask- so what? It would after all be fairly
myopic to spend so long researching this subject
without stopping to consider the significance of our
findings. In this final chapter we will look what
relevance this has in the Amazonian context before
evaluating its global significance.
8.1 The Amazonian context.
It is precisely because the garimpo is such a
powerful agent of Amazonian change, that the trends
observed in this analysis of informal sector mining
have a significance for the region as a whole. Thus,
by drawing out the themes that recur throughout this
work, we are able to glimpse the principal socio¬
economic developments in contemporary Amazonia.
Perhaps one of the most striking observations made in
this research concerns the fluidity, if not
instability, of Amazonian life. Migrants cover
thousands of miles on the strength of poorly founded
rumours, cities mushroom in a few months as new
opportunities arise, people switch jobs and move
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between rural and urban areas at the drop of a hat,
and capital jumps from one speculative venture to
another. In short, settlement processes in the
Brazilian Amazon appear to be far from settled.
This is the product of both social and economic
processes. Firstly, migration, both inter- and intra-
regional, is intense. Throughout the 1980s inter-
urban population movements have become increasingly
important relative to rural-urban migration. This has
been fuelled perhaps more than anything else by the
periodic boosts that informal sector mining has given
the urban economy. Even though over half of
Amazonians now live in cities their livelihoods are
not guaranteed by a stable and diversified urban
economy. As rapid urban growth is founded upon the
short term exploitation of mineral resources it
offers no long term security of employment. People
have to move frequently either between jobs or
between cities in order to survive. Transience
prevails. Simultaneously, the population influx from
other regions of Brazil appears to be slowing so that
internal movement accounts for an increasing
proportion of total migration. But, as the employment
prospects for the region's poor are likely to remain
insecure there is little evidence that the Amazonian
population will become any less mobile in the
immediate future. An authoritative forecast of
demographic change in the region suggests that
intense population mobility will continue at least
until 2010 (Sawyer 1990 :19).
Secondly, the movement of capital appears to be
equally volatile. Investments are typically short
term, and capital is withdrawn from productive
activities in one sphere the instant that more
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attractive opportunities have arisen elsewhere.
Although not easily quantified, it is likely that an
increasing proportion of the capital invested in
Amazonia is being generated within the region itself.
This is because the gold rush increased local wealth
whilst economic stagnation at a national level,
coupled with fiscal changes, simultaneously reduced
the incentives for external producers to channel
corporate funds into the region. The net result is
that, in common with the dynamics of the labour
market, Amazonian capital flows are increasingly
defined by intrinsic and not external factors. Again,
there are few indications that this situation will
change over the short term, particularly as an
increasingly impotent federal government can no
longer provide either the infrastructure or
incentives that are usually required to entice
capital into the region. Even massively subsidised
projects like the Grande Carajas Programme may not
provide satisfactory returns to potential investors,
as is demonstrated by the withdrawal of a consortium
of Japanese aluminium producers from the ALUNORTE
project at Bararena near Belem in 1987 (Hall 1989
: 56) .
On the other side of the equation new investment
opportunities which fall neatly into the hands of the
local entrepreneurial class are emerging to supersede
the gold rush, which is itself already showing signs
of slowing up. Timber production has grown during the
early 1990s particularly in Para and Rondonia, and
the market is set to continue expanding as the supply
of hardwoods from South East Asia and Western Africa
diminishes due to poor forest management (Johnson &
Cabarle 1993). As these areas have commanded the
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attention of the international trade for so long, the
Amazonian timber industry has been left mainly in the
hands of domestic companies many of which are owned
by regional entrepreneurs. Even so, they are likely
to face growing competition from larger concerns
seeking to make an entrance in Amazonian timber
production.
Given that inflation shows no sign of abating it
is likely that investors will continue to hunt out
short-term high-risk ventures in Amazonia. Here the
expanding cocaine industry looks set to generate
similar investment opportunities to those offered by
both the speculative land markets of the late 1970s
and the gold economy of the 1980s. The Brazilian
Amazon is acquiring a new significance in the Latin
American drugs economy as government intervention
clamps down on Colombian and Bolivian production.
Gold mining has undoubtedly contributed to the
expansion of the regional cocaine industry
throughout the 1980s. Mining operations offer a
convenient front for the processing, laundering and
most notably transport of cocaine1. A glance at a map
of Amazonia reveals that Brazil's garimpeiros
inadvertently established a network of airstrips
along international frontiers which are of strategic
importance to the drugs trade. The garimpos of
Rondonia, the Cabepa do Cachorro, and Roraima are all
located between the main cocaine producing areas (of
Bolivia and Colombia) and export routes (notably
along the Caribbean coast), suggesting that 'the
western Brazilian Amazon ...will become more deeply
1 Cocaine producers prefer to sell their produce for gold because, unlike dollar bills, it cannot
be traced.
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involved in the international drugs trade as time
goes on' (Cleary in press: 18).
This impermanence of both labour and capital in
productive activities has important repercussions for
the use of land. Not surprisingly, labourers and
investors are reluctant to commit themselves to any
particular venture under such circumstances, and so
short term management is usually the order of the
day. But this tendency to keep one eye on the job in
hand while the other continually appraises
alternative options ensures that any one sector of
the economy always remains particularly sensitive to
changes elsewhere. For this very reason land
management practices are highly responsive to
external socio-economic stimuli. Indeed its easy to
get the impression that land-use decisions are more
often a response to changes in other sectors of the
economy than they are to the productive economics of
the land-use itself. For example, it is fluctuations
in price of gold, not rice, that frequently
determines the labour investments made by
smallholders on their plots. Exactly the same process
is at work when ranchers are observed slaughtering
productive heifers to raise short term venture
capital for mining investments. Clearly, it is only
by understanding the rationale behind such decision¬
making that we begin to recognise the true forces
that dictate the use of Amazonian land.
These insights have all been gained by looking
at how different social groups, managing different
ecosystems, respond to changing socio-economic
circumstances. And this is where we can make a
contribution to a wider global debate on conservation
and development. The point is that none of the
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processes that have been scrutinised here are
exclusively Amazonian. All over the world different
societies are constantly adapting to macro-level
changes defined by forces completely beyond their
control. This work simply takes one such stimuli- a
sudden increase in the price of gold -and illustrates
how it comes to have such far-reaching social and
environmental consequences. Perhaps one of the most
disturbing aspects of the global economy is that the
true costs of changing commodity values, in both
human and ecological terms, are seldom recognised and
certainly never accounted for.
8.2 Looking beyond Brazil
Brazil is only one part of this puzzle. The
rising price of gold at the start of the 1980s
sparked rushes throughout Latin America, most notably
in Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic, but also in Chile, Ecuador, Argentina,
Guyana, Mexico and Nicaragua (Green 1981). Further
afield Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, the Philippines
and Ghana have all emerged as important gold
producers during the decade with much of their output
coming from the informal sector. In numerous other
countries, particularly those in the southern
hemisphere, the rural poor kindled a new interest in
gold mining. Clearly, in all of these states, many of
which have extensive areas of natural forest, mineral
exploration will have influenced patterns of land-use
and settlement in much the same way as is witnessed
in Amazonia.
Given that many areas of the humid tropics show
considerable geological potential, fluctuations in
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the international mineral markets will continue to
shape the occupation and development of these areas.
This is certainly true for Papua New Guinea,
Malaysia, parts of west Africa (notably The Ivory
Coast, Ghana, and Zaire), and above all Amazonia.
Thus, changing mineral prices will continue to play a
key role in determining the fate of the world's last
remaining rain forests and their indigenous
inhabitants. The Amazon's northern watershed, which
still boasts vast tracts of natural forest and is
home to many of the region's Indian groups, is a case
in point. The recent surge of garimpagem in this
remote area is perhaps only the first step in a more
protracted process of occupation that is principally
driven by the quest for mineral wealth. One has to
remember that the garimpeiros themselves were only
working the most accessible secondary deposits and
these alone are by no means exhausted. As any metals
analyst will vouch, the geological potential of
northern Amazonia is certainly not being overlooked
by the world's mining industry:
'Countries in Central and Southern America have
recently attracted more mining producers and
exploration work is being done in Venezuela and
Argentina by both senior and junior companies. A
large precambrian greenstone belt which extends
from French Guyana in the east, through Surinam,
Guyana, Venezuela, Northern Brazil and into
Colombia in the west, offers very good mineral
potential and is the focus of most exploration
in the region' (RBC Dominion Securities 1993
: 49)
In evaluating the development pressures faced by
parts of the humid tropics, specialists could do
worse than deepen their understanding of
international mineral markets and relate that
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knowledge to local geology. The price of most base
metals can be forecast with some degree of accuracy
because they are defined by changing patterns of
supply and demand (for use) , like any other
commodity. Speculation on the metals markets may
cause some unpredictable fluctuations in the short
term, but medium and long term trends are relatively
easy to decipher because they are shaped by
structural processes.
Gold is the notable exception because it is
priced not just as a commodity but it also has what
is know as a 'currency value'. In essence, gold is a
bastion of global economics providing a yardstick
against which currencies can be valued. The gold
standard, which was introduced in the wake of the
Napoleonic wars and maintained in various forms right
up to 1971 (albeit with a brief interlude during the
first world war), fixed the value of paper money and
coins in circulation to gold reserves held in banks.
Since the collapse of the gold standard in 1971,
currencies tend not to be directly linked to the
metal and are more often pegged against one another.
But people, and particularly governments, are
unwilling to shake-off their confidence in gold and
simply value it as a commodity. Thus, central banks
continue to hold vast gold reserves (35 000 tons in
1992)2, there is still a tendency for investors to
look to gold as a security in difficult times, and
the metal maintains its currency value as a result.
Whilst analysts can predict trends in the
commodity value of gold with some degree of
2 Ironically these vast reserves means that the economy of the developed world, which
actually produces only a limited amount of gold, benefits tremendously from any increases in
the price of the metal.
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confidence, they have considerable difficulty
forecasting its changing currency value. This is
because it is often, but not always, sensitive to
events which cause economic insecurity on a global
scale. For example, even though the gold price had
been rising sharply throughout the mid 1970s due to
free trading in the wake of the defunct gold exchange
standard (which had held the gold price artificially
low at US$ 15 an ounce) , its value was further
boosted by two political events at the very end of
the decade. America's decision to freeze Iran's
assets and Russia's invasion of Afghanistan were
primarily responsible for pushing gold to its peak
value of US$ 850 on 21 January 1980 (Green 1981 :2) .
Of equal significance is that a decade later Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing gulf war had
virtually no impact on the price of the metal. This
led some analysts to suggest that gold no longer
maintains its currency value, but others who base
their opinion on the metals' 6000 year-old economic
history are not so sure (Nesbitt 1993 :1) . Even
though the relatively stable price of gold during the
early 1990s suggests that its commodity value
dominates at the moment, its currency value has not
disappeared and may well rise suddenly (as it has
done in the past) in response to unpredictable events
which threaten global economic security. The
surprising thing is that this inherent volatility
does nothing to diminish gold's role as economic
bedrock. On the contrary, investors confidence in
gold is confirmed every time they rush to it when
other vantures look shaky. Thus investors and gold
have a strange relationship in which instability
appears to breed security.
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As a rule the global mineral markets set the
mining agenda, but it is not always clear how
different producers will react. Generally speaking,
mineral companies tend to be more sensitive to price
changes than informal sector miners are. During the
late 1980s and early 1990s larger producers have been
struggling to restrict output as the price of gold
has fallen. North American gold mining companies have
turned to Latin America in search of low cost mines
as well as to dodge stiff environmental legislation
in Canada and the U.S.A.3. Expanding operations "in
the tropics provides them with an opportunity to
reduce productive overheads and diversify out of gold
into other metals. They should be well placed to
benefit from the gentle rise in the price of gold
which analysts have predicted for the mid 1990s (see
figure 2.2) 4.
But garimpeiros tend to behave differently. For
many of them, gold mining is not their only source of
income, but is simply a means of supplementing other
forms of employment. In having other options, one
might assume that they will be more responsive to
price fluctuations as they are well placed to
substitute gold mining for another activity such as
agriculture when the gold price declines. But, the
reverse often seems to be the case as the Roraima
rush demonstrated. Garimpeiros working in the
Yanomami reserve actually increased the production of
tin and gold during 1988 and 1989 while the prices of
3 The share of total exploration funds spent in the U.S.A. has declined from 71% in 1989 to
63% in 1992 while Latin America's share has risen from 6-15% over the same period (The
Gold Institute 1993:1)
4 There is some evidence that this is already underway, as a couple of powerful investors
(George Soros and Sir James Goldsmith) were able to turn a bear gold market bullish, in April
1993. Once they had moved into gold many others followed suit and in the space of six weeks
the price of the metal rose from US$ 327 to 380 per ounce. (The Sunday Times 23//05/93 )
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these metals fell. This is exactly the opposite to
what happened in the formal sector. The point is that
as incomes from other activities are so low, informal
sector mining can still makes good economic sense
even when the price of minerals is in decline. Thus,
while the behaviour of formal sector mineral
companies is essentially demand led, informal sector
production is driven by other, more immediate
concerns. Here forecasting is not so difficult.
Poverty and people's struggle against it have a
permanence that guarantees informal sector mining" a
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire addressed to the heads of Macuxi Villages at
an Indian meeting in the Maloca of Surumti 8-11 January 1990.
Entrevistas Para os Tuxauas Congregados Na
Assembleia de Tuxauas 8-11 Janeiro 1990 Surumu
i) .Informadao Pa Maloca;
1.Nome da maloca Regiao
2.Nome do Tuxaua
3.Grupos na maloca: Macuxi/Wapixana/Taurepang/Ingarikd
4.Numero das pessoas na maloca.No das familias
5.A maloca tern: Quantas rogas communal?... individual?...
Quantas cabepas de gado communal?.... individual?




7. 0 senhor/a senhora trabalhou nos garimpos? sim/nao
7.1 Quais garimpos
7.2 Em que ano? Por quanto tempo? meses:
7.3 Que foi sua renda mensal no garimpo mais ou menos?
grammas de ouro p.m quilates de diamantes p.m
7.3 Que tipo de trabalho era?
iii). A relacao entre a maloca e os aarimpos:
8. Quantas pessoas da maloca trabalhavam nos garimpos nos
ultimos 3 anos ? No dos homens No das mulheres
9. Que trabalho eles faziam na maloca antes de garimpar?
e depois?
10.Eles foram para quais garimpos?
11.Geralmente por quanto tempo? meses semanas
12.Sao: donos de garimpo/donos de maquinas/diaristas
porcentistas/outros
13.Que e a renda mensal deles no garimpo ?
grammas de ouro p.m quilates p.m
14.0 senhor/a senhora acha que esta renda garimpeira e
importante para a maloca ? sim/nao
porque?
15. A maloca falta a mao de obra por causa da migragao aos
garimpos? falta muito/ falta urn pouco/ nao falta
16. Quais sao os efeitos desta migragao na produqao da
comida
na maloca?
17. Como as familias se-abastecem quando os homens estao nos
garimpos
18. 0 senhor/ A senhora acha que o involvimento da sua
maloca nos garimpos vai diminuir/ continuar/ aumentar no
futuro?
porque?
